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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the following two questions. How should we understand Hume’s theory 
of the causes and nature of moral judgements? What can we learn from Hume in these 
regards?  
I begin by reinterpreting Hume’s theory of moral judgement. I argue that Hume 
claims, inter alia, that all moral judgements are sentiments, and that we experience a 
sentiment of approbation towards any token action or character trait of any type that we 
habitually associate with causing happiness to people around us. This interpretation easily 
reconciles Hume’s claim that we consistently approve of justice because we sympathise with 
the happiness that it causes with his acknowledgement that many token acts of justice cause 
only unhappiness. Unlike most interpretations, mine does not entail that we ever correct 
moral judgements by adopting a ‘common point of view’. I argue that these are positive 
features of my interpretation. 
I then combine several features of Hume’s theory, so understood, with recent theories 
of intuitive and associative mental states. I argue that typical moral judgements involve what 
Tamar Szabó Gendler calls ‘occurrent aliefs’: intuitive, associative mental occurrences with 
representational, affective, and behaviour-inducing content. Moral judgements are typically 
intuitively produced, as Jonathan Haidt argues. Contra Haidt, I argue that all paradigmatic 
wrongness judgements involve associations with harm, so that we need not posit 
fundamentally different kinds of wrongness judgement. I conclude by developing an ‘emotive 
subjectivist’ theory of the meanings and pragmatics of moral language. I argue that this 
coheres with several core features of Simon Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist’ metaethical 
expressivism. 
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Introduction 
Towards the end of Book 3 of his Treatise, Hume summarises his metaethical ‘system’ as 
follows:  
 
When any quality, or character, has a tendency to the good of mankind, we 
are pleas'd with it, and approve of it; because it presents the lively idea of 
pleasure; which idea affects us by sympathy, and is itself a kind of pleasure 
(T 3.3.1.14, SBN 580).  
 
This thesis represents an attempt to both understand Hume’s system and to learn from 
it.  
In Part 1, I attempt only to interpret and to understand Hume: I generally investigate 
the plausibility of his claims only for the purposes of charitable interpretation. I argue for a 
new interpretation of Hume’s system, by which the summary above is to be understood as 
follows: A ‘quality’ or ‘character’ with ‘a tendency to the good of mankind’ is a token 
character trait, which is of a type that one generally associates with causing happiness to the 
possessors of such traits or to those people around them. Whenever one forms any idea of 
such a trait, then ‘custom’ or habit’ ensures that one automatically forms an idea of the 
general type of pleasure that one associates with it (T 1.3.13.8, SBN 147). Any idea of such 
pleasure will be ‘lively’ to some extent: the idea will feel like it represents something real, 
even though the pleasure is not believed to exist. I call such ideas ‘quasi-beliefs’. Any such 
quasi-belief in pleasure will produce at least some degree of genuine pleasure, via a process 
of ‘delicate sympathy’: a psychological mechanism by which we feel pleasure (or pain) at 
general ideas of pleasures (or pains) that are produced via customary association (T 3.3.1.8, 
SBN 577). And wherever one feels pleasure that has been caused in this way by a character 
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trait, then one experiences a consequent ‘approbation’ towards the token trait concerned (T 
3.1.2.3, SBN 471). By my interpretation, Hume argues that all positive moral judgements are 
occurrences of approbation, produced in this way. 
This argument allows Hume to endorse a thesis, which I call ‘Generality’:  
 
GENERALITY: All ideas of typically beneficial or pleasing character traits  
    habitually cause approbation, all ideas of typically harmful or 
    displeasing character traits habitually cause disapprobation, and 
    the strength of any moral sentiment is dependent only on the 
    degree of happiness or unhappiness with which the type of trait 
    is generally associated.  
 
Hume never states Generality in these terms, but I will argue that he presents several 
arguments for this thesis, mainly in Book 3 of his Treatise. According to Generality, the 
moral sentiments are uniform:  
 
UNIFORMITY: Any kind of evaluative or psychological response is uniform if 
    and only if it is such as to respond in the same way towards all 
    token character traits of any one type, regardless of how the 
    responder is related to the person whose trait it is, or is affected 
    by the particular effects of the token trait. 
 
Approbation is a uniform sentiment, according to Hume, in that we experience a 
strong sentiment of approbation towards any token character trait of a generally pleasing 
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type, such as benevolence, whether or not we have any relationship with the benevolent 
person, and regardless of any particular effects of her benevolence.  
Hume believes that there is very clearly a strong correlation between our moral 
approval of certain character traits and our expectations that such traits will cause happiness. 
His endorsement of Generality, and of the associated thesis of uniform sentiments, allows 
him to explain a range of what he takes to be otherwise perplexing counterexamples to this. 
Two of the most important examples can be summarised as follows: 
 
Justice and other artificial virtues: According to Hume, some types of 
character trait only cause happiness because we have, for non-moral 
reasons, developed various ‘artificial’ systems that benefit society. One such 
is ‘justice’, which includes the practice of repaying money that we have 
borrowed from others. Justice has a strong overall tendency to benefit 
society. However, there are some cases where repaying money causes only 
unhappiness to all concerned. Yet we still approve of the motive to be just in 
such cases. 
 
‘Virtue in rags’: Hume sees a clear role for sympathy in the causes of our 
moral sentiments. Typically, we are pleased by acts of kindness, for 
example, because we sympathise with the beneficiaries of these acts. Hume 
thinks it obvious that sentiments of approbation have been caused, 
somehow, by sympathetic pleasures. Yet we approve of people who 
unsuccessfully try to be kind just as much as we do of those who succeed: 
‘Virtue in rags is still virtue’ (T 3.3.1.19, SBN 584). In such cases, there are 
no beneficiaries with whom we may sympathise. 
 10 
 
 In both cases, I will argue that Hume explains why we approve of the seemingly 
anomalous token motives by appeal to Generality and to the uniformity of moral sentiments. 
This is, so far as I know, a novel interpretation of Hume. Nevertheless, there are 
several widely recognised aspects of his theory of moral judgement that I endorse. It will be 
helpful to summarise some of the details of my interpretation here, all of which I will argue 
for in Part 1. 
Hume’s is a sentimentalist theory, by which moral judgements are to be explained 
primarily by reference to sentiments or passions, rather than by reference to reasoning or 
belief.   
I argue that Hume understands all moral judgements as sentiments of approbation or 
disapprobation, rather than reasoned beliefs. Here, and throughout my thesis, I use the term 
‘moral judgement’ to refer to what we would consider a mental state – what Hume calls a 
‘perception’ – rather than to an utterance or verbalised moral evaluation (T 1.1.1.1, SBN 1). 
Sentiments are impressions and beliefs are ideas. I argue that Hume holds a ‘Vivacity 
Thesis’: that wherever we have a present impression of X, we cannot simultaneously form a 
believed idea (i.e. a ‘vivid’ idea) of X. I will argue that, given Hume’s theories of 
impressions, ideas, beliefs, and the meanings of our utterances, this makes his theory an 
emotivist one, by which all moral utterances express moral sentiments.  
Hume’s is both a naturalistic and anti-realist theory. It is naturalistic in that it treats all 
its objects as scientifically explicable, if explicable at all: it has no place for non-natural 
objects or explanations. It is anti-realist in that it involves no facts or properties that could 
constitute the appropriate objects of putative moral beliefs. Hume’s moral ontology consists 
of nothing more than ordinary, non-moral facts and properties in the world and our moral 
evaluations of some of these. 
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Hume’s moral judgements have several important features, including the following: 
 
• Approbation is a particular kind of pleasure. Disapprobation is a particular kind of 
pain. (T 3.1.2.3, SBN 471) 
• They are directed primarily towards people’s motives or character traits rather than 
towards their actions, although we may derivatively approve or disapprove of actions 
where we associate them with morally relevant motive types. (T 3.2.1.2, SBN 477) 
• As pleasures and pains, they constitute our evaluations of character traits and motives, 
and so of actions or people, as ‘virtuous’ or ‘vicious’, ‘good’ or ‘evil’. Evaluative 
sentiments cannot directly provide any motivational force, but they often indirectly 
provide motivational force by causing desires. (T 2.3.9.7, SBN 439) 
• They are ‘calm’ sentiments, which means that their emotional feeling may be barely 
perceptible, although they may still be (indirectly) motivating. (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276) 
• The processes by which they are produced are very commonly mistaken for processes 
of reasoning, and they in turn are very commonly mistaken for evaluative beliefs. The 
desires which they cause are very commonly mistaken for beliefs about how we ought 
to act. (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417) 
• They are analogous to the sentiments in virtue of which we possess an aesthetic taste. 
They constitute our ‘sense of beauty and deformity in action’ (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276) 
• Approbation is a calm form of the passion of love. Disapprobation is a calm form of 
hate. (T 3.3.5.1, SBN 614) 
• Approbation is caused by character traits of either generally useful or generally 
agreeable types. This is not a substantive distinction for Hume: useful or agreeable 
traits are morally important insofar as they are traits that cause (non-moral) happiness, 
and so please us by sympathy. (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591) 
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A further important aspect of Hume’s theory is his previously mentioned division of 
virtuous types of character traits – ‘virtues’ – into the ‘artificial’ and the ‘natural’ (T 3.2.1.1, 
SBN 477). Natural virtues are, roughly, motives to perform actions of types that we 
instinctively perform, such as the motive to care for one’s child, where the actions so caused 
typically cause happiness to the actor or to those around her. Artificial virtues also typically 
cause happiness in this way, but they are motives to perform actions of types that we have no 
instinct to perform. We have learned to perform these actions for non-moral reasons, because 
they help us and our loved ones in some way. ‘Justice’ is Hume’s paradigm of an artificial 
virtue, and (in the Treatise, at least) ‘benevolence’ is his paradigm of a natural virtue. Here, 
and throughout, I will adopt what I think is Hume’s own approach, of using the names of 
virtue types purely descriptively, rather than as so-called ‘thick’ terms (Williams, 1985). 
‘Benevolence’ is a term that implies no evaluation on the part of the term’s user, but merely 
describes a type of motive. In the Treatise, Hume understands benevolence as, roughly, the 
desire to help those around oneself. 
Throughout Part 1 of my thesis, aside from chapters 3 and 6, I will mainly consider the 
Treatise, although I will look to later works to help understand Hume’s aims within this 
work. Several scholars, including Merivale (2019), Millican (2017), and Taylor (2015), argue 
for significant changes between Hume’s Treatise and his later reworkings of the same topics. 
I will argue for something similar, concerning Hume’s ‘common point of view’ thesis, in 
Chapter 6. To best understand Hume’s arguments supporting his original Treatise Book 3 
treatment of morality, we must first understand the theoretical underpinnings that he develops 
in Books 1 and 2. 
In Part 2 of my thesis, I seek to learn from Hume, by using some aspects of his theory 
to attempt to answer questions or resolve debates within contemporary metaethics. One such 
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question is that of whether there is any one property that is common to all and only moral 
judgements. I consider one influential theory of moral judgements – ‘Moral Foundations 
Theory’ – which appears to suggest otherwise. I argue that, given some suitable theory of 
moral learning, such as Hume’s, we may allow for a common, unifying property of moral 
judgements. I then argue for the stronger claim that all paradigmatic moral judgements are of 
a unified kind. Following arguments from Haidt (2001; 2012) and others, including Hume, I 
conclude that we should understand all paradigmatic moral judgements as produced by 
intuitive, nonconscious processes, rather than by processes of reflective, conscious reasoning. 
Drawing on Hume’s thesis of Generality, I argue that paradigmatic moral judgements are, or 
include, associative and intuitively produced mental occurrences of the kind that Gendler 
(2008a, 2008b) calls ‘occurrent aliefs’.  
I conclude my thesis with a novel theory of the semantics and pragmatics of moral 
language, which is influenced by emotivist and expressivist theories as well as by Hume’s 
theory. I suggest an ‘opacity thesis’, by which most moral thinking is intuitive and 
nonconscious, and I argue that this allows for the Humean claim that, whenever we 
contemplate morally salient objects, we experience moral aliefs, even if we cannot recognise 
this by introspection. I give reasons to think that our moral utterances derive their meaning by 
referencing our moral aliefs.  
I then argue that this simple subjectivist theory can be rendered plausible by means of a 
thesis of strong indexicality, such that we may refer to our current moral aliefs, no matter the 
tense of the moral sentence uttered, and by a theory of the pragmatics of moral language. 
According to this theory, we implicate our desires to coordinate our moral judgements with 
those around us whenever we utter moral sentences. I suggest that the kinds of desires being 
implicated can be understood much as expressivists understand moral judgements, and I 
conclude by arguing that my emotive subjectivism can plausibly draw heavily on many of 
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Blackburn’s (1998) ‘quasi-realist’ arguments to explain and vindicate moral language. I do 
not attempt a thorough vindication along these lines, but I give reasons to think that such a 
vindication is achievable. 
Here is a summary of what is to follow: 
In Chapter 1, I discuss the background to Hume’s theory of moral sentiments, with a 
focus on the sentiment of approbation. I consider his theories of impressions, ideas, causal 
reasoning, and sympathy. I argue that he thinks that all ideas are perceptions that represent by 
being copies of that which they represent, whereas no impressions are representative in this 
way. I then argue that, because of this, we should understand Hume to implicitly endorse an 
extrinsic, causal account of the intentionality of passions, as several scholars have argued. 
 In Chapter 2, I consider Hume’s distinctions between direct and indirect passions, and 
between calm and violent passions. I first argue that Hume sees a generally unappreciated but 
vital role for the formation of complex ideas in the production of four indirect passions: 
pride, humility, love, and hatred. This allows him to develop an account of their intentionality 
that is more coherent than many think possible. I then argue that calm passions are calm 
because they are caused by more generalised ideas than those that cause violent passions.  
 In Chapter 3, I consider Hume’s theories of delicate sympathy and of motivation, and 
I argue for a novel interpretation of his theory of the causes of the moral sentiments, based on 
my arguments from chapters 1 and 2. I argue that approbation is a calm form of love, that 
disapprobation is a calm form of hatred, and that both are produced via processes of pre-
reflective associations of ideas, and of our delicate sympathy with the quasi-beliefs so 
produced. I then look to Hume’s later Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and I 
argue that his theory of the causes of moral sentiments is, in all fundamental details, the same 
there as in the Treatise. 
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 In Chapter 4, I consider Hume’s discussion of justice. I survey a range of 
interpretations of Hume’s treatment of justice, and I argue that they are all subject to 
insurmountable objections. I argue that Hume structured his Treatise so as to use the case of 
justice as evidence for Generality and his thesis of delicate sympathy. 
 In Chapter 5, I consider and reject some recent arguments that Hume allows for some 
moral judgements to be beliefs. I argue for Hume’s Vivacity Thesis: that, wherever we have a 
present impression, we cannot hold a vivid idea in mind which differs from that impression 
only in its level of vivacity. This requires Hume to endorse an emotivist theory, by which 
moral utterances are expressions of either approbation or disapprobation.  
In Chapter 6, I conclude my interpretation of Hume by reassessing his notion of a 
‘common point of view’, which he claims we adopt whenever we moralise. I focus on the 
problem that this discussion is intended to resolve: that of satisfactorily explaining why our 
verbal assessments of character are less variable than most of the passions which result from 
contemplating people’s characters. I argue that Hume’s Treatise response to this problem is 
heavily influenced by a Hobbesian theory of value, which leads him to develop a complex 
account of our reasons to express only our uniform, moral sentiments when we publicly 
evaluate characters. In the moral Enquiry, to take up the common point of view is more 
simply to express our uniform sentiments via the use of moral language. 
Having concluded my interpretation of Hume, I turn to contemporary metaethics. I 
ask what we can learn from some aspects of Hume’s theories; notably, his thesis of 
Generality and his account of the associative causes of moral judgements. 
In Chapter 7, I adopt one of the most influential accounts of moral judgements: Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT). This entails that moral judgements are produced by intuitive, 
associative processes, but it also suggests to some readers that moral judgements cannot be 
plausibly understood as a single kind of mental state or occurrence. I will argue that typical 
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moral judgements plausibly have a unifying feature, in virtue of the habitual way in which we 
learn to respond morally to certain action and character kinds. Therefore, we cannot infer, 
from anything entailed by MFT, that paradigmatic moral judgements may not form a unified 
psychological kind. 
In Chapter 8, I argue for a ‘moral alief theory’, by which paradigmatic moral 
judgments are or include aliefs. I argue that this is compatible with a plausible explanation of 
the role of reflective thought and reasoning in the formation of many moral judgments.  
In Chapter 9, I develop a theory I call ‘emotive subjectivism’: a relatively simple 
subjectivist theory of the meaning of moral terms, coupled with a pragmatic account of moral 
language.  
In Chapter 10, I consider reasons to rethink some aspects of ordinary moral language, 
as typically understood by contemporary metaethicists. I consider what I take to be our best 
available approach to explaining and vindicating ordinary moral language: quasi-realist 
expressivism. I argue that emotive subjectivism can use similar strategies to explain and 
vindicate ordinary moral language, as we should understand it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
1. The Difference Betwixt Feeling and Thinking 
Towards the end of his Treatise, Hume argues that our moral sentiments are pleasures and 
pains that ‘can proceed from nothing but our sympathy with the interests of society’ (T 
3.3.1.12, SBN 580). Four sections later, he introduces the notion that approbation ‘is nothing 
but a fainter and more imperceptible love’ (T 3.3.5.1, SBN 614).1 It now appears that 
approbation is a ‘calm’ form of the passion of love, so that it differs from non-moral love 
only in its absence of any ‘violent’ emotional feeling (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276). Yet in Book 2, 
‘Of the Passions’, Hume discusses the causes of the ‘indirect’ passion of love in some detail, 
and he appears to treat approbation as a distinct passion from love (T 2.1.1.4, SBN 276). In 
Book 2, Hume classifies approbation among our sentiments of taste: it is that sentiment in 
virtue of which we possess a ‘sense of beauty…. in action’ (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276). 
Despite claiming that we approve of actions at T 2.1.1.3, Hume says in Book 3 that 
wherever we approve of actions, this is only because we consider them as ‘signs of… 
motives’ (T 3.2.1.4, SBN 478). In such cases, the ‘ultimate object’ of approbation is always 
the ‘motive’ behind the action, such as a desire to help others, or to repay a loan (T 3.2.1.2, 
SBN 477). We may approve of any ‘quality of the mind’ that makes a ‘character’ ‘naturally 
fitted’ to cause happiness, by being useful to others or to oneself, or by being agreeable to 
others or oneself (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591). All such qualities are character traits. These traits 
are typically motives, but they may be other kinds of traits too, such as wit (T 3.3.4.8, SBN 
611). We approve of all and only those traits with a ‘tendency to the good of mankind’ (T 
3.3.1.10, SBN 578). 
 
1 As Hume does, I will often concentrate on approbation, and assume that all relevant theses and 
arguments also apply, mutatis mutandis, to disapprobation.  
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If approbation is a sentiment of taste, then it must be a calm passion, because all such 
sentiments are calm, according to Hume (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276).2 If it is a form of love, then it 
must be an indirect passion, as love is (T 2.1.1.4, SBN 276-7). Hume calls passions ‘indirect’ 
where they are caused by relatively complex psychological processes, unlike ‘direct’ 
passions, such as desires, which Hume thinks have relatively simple causes (T 2.1.1.4, SBN 
276).3 Love, hatred, pride, and humility are each caused via a notoriously complex process, 
involving a ‘double relation of ideas and impressions’ (T 2.1.5.5, SBN 286). 
Over this and the next two chapters, I will examine three core theses within Hume’s 
theory of approbation, which may be summarised as follows: (1) Approbation is a calm form 
of the ‘indirect’ passion of love; (2) Approbation is a sentiment of taste, in virtue of which we 
come to value useful and agreeable kinds of character traits; (3) Approbation is in all cases 
caused, via sympathy, by an idea of a character trait with a ‘tendency to the good of 
mankind’. I will argue that these claims can almost entirely be reconciled, so that Hume has a 
significantly more coherent account of approbation than is typically believed. In Chapter 3, 
we will see that Hume understands approbation as a faint or ‘calm’ form of love, and as a 
pleasing sentiment of taste, caused via sympathy with an idea of happiness. 
These are, I believe, important points. Nevertheless, mine is not an entirely new 
position. Somewhat like Árdal (1966, 116) I argue for ‘a close analogy’ between approbation 
 
2 I will generally use the term ‘sentiment’ to mean a calm passion, although Hume does not 
consistently use the term in this way. ‘Sentiment’ is not a technical term, and it may refer to any kind 
of preference, opinion, or view. Hume sometimes calls a belief a ‘sentiment’ (e.g. T 1.2.2.3, SBN 30). 
He sometimes calls a violent passion a ‘sentiment’ (e.g. T 1.3.10.10, SBN 631; T 2.2.5.2, SBN 358). 
He often uses the term as a synonym for ‘taste’ (e.g. T 1.3.8.12, SBN 103).  
3 Hume distinguishes desires from aversions, but I will often refer to both as ‘desires’. What Hume 
calls an ‘aversion’ may be understood as a desire to avoid something. 
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and love. Somewhat like Baier (1991, 135), I argue that ‘moral evaluations are general’, 
unlike the more ‘particular’ evaluations of love. I believe that my interpretation reconciles 
theses (1), (2), and (3), as previous interpretations cannot. However, I cannot hope to argue 
against each interpretation individually. A very brief survey of available opinion on the 
relation between love and approbation alone will demonstrate the range of different 
interpretations. 
Árdal (1966; 1977) argues that approbation is a kind of indirect passion, closely 
analogous to love, which is made calm by the nature of its causes. Several others, including 
Brown (2001) and Mercer (1972), follow Árdal in this regard. Cohon (2008, 179) argues that 
approbation is an indirect passion, somewhat like love, but not as similar as Árdal suggests. 
Korsgaard (1999, 9) claims that ‘Hume thinks that virtue and vice are intimately related to 
love and hate, but he is a little unsettled about what exactly the relationship is’. 
Several other scholars deny that Hume argues for any significant connections between 
love and approbation. Baier (1991, 134) thinks that Árdal’s view overstates the similarities 
between love and approbation, and that approbation is not an indirect passion. Kemp Smith 
(1966, 167) claims that approbation is a direct passion. Schauber (1999) argues that love is 
insufficiently motivating to have any close relation to approbation. Moreover, she claims that 
the causes of love are unrelated to the sympathetic causes of approbation. Garrett (2002, 193) 
claims only that Hume argues for ‘distinctively moral impressions’. Carlson (2014) and Loeb 
(1977) argue that moral sentiments are sui generis calm passions that are neither direct nor 
indirect passions. 
On my reading, Hume sees approbation, as felt towards others, literally as a calm 
form of love. Admittedly, it is not always possible to reconcile everything that he says. For 
Hume, love and hatred are always other-directed passions, and there is not strictly any such 
thing as self-love or self-hatred (T 2.2.1.2, SBN 329-30). Yet, for reasons that are not entirely 
 20 
clear, approbation and disapprobation may be self-directed. This complication aside, I will 
argue that Hume consistently understands approbation as a calm form of love. I will conclude 
this argument in Chapter 3 but, first, I must address the background to Hume’s theory of 
approbation. That will be the main topic of this chapter. Then, in Chapter 2, I will consider 
those elements of his theory of the passions that are most relevant to his theory of 
approbation. 
In §1.1, I examine Hume’s several brief summaries of the causes of approbation, 
which at least suggest that any token character trait of any generally useful or agreeable type 
will cause approbation. This is an interpretative thesis that I will be arguing for throughout 
my discussion of Hume. §1.2 addresses the core elements of Hume’s theory of impressions 
and ideas, and those of his theory of causal reasoning, both of which are integral to his theory 
of sympathy. In §1.3, I discuss Hume’s theory of sympathy, and I introduce his taxonomy of 
the passions. In §1.4, I consider the way that ideas represent their objects, according to 
Hume, and I address his implicit theory of the intentionality of passions. 
 
1.1. Hume on the causes of approbation 
Hume provides several summaries of the causes of the moral passions, including the 
following: ‘virtue is distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, 
sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation’ (T 3.1.2.11, SBN 475). 
By this, I propose that he means that any relevant action, sentiment or character will cause us 
to experience a moral passion before we have a chance to reflect on its likely effects. I 
propose this because several of Hume’s other summaries of the causes of the moral 
sentiments suggest the same thing. 
Consider Hume’s initial, brief summary of (what we would now call) his metaethical 
position, in Book 2. There, he claims that ‘certain characters and passions, by the very view 
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and contemplation, produce a pain, and others in like manner excite a pleasure… To approve 
of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance.’ (T 2.1.7.5, SBN 296, my 
emphasis). This passage again suggests that moral sentiments occur whenever we encounter 
the relevant character traits, as soon as they appear to us, and regardless of any of our 
particular beliefs about them or their effects. Similarly; ‘[e]very quality of the mind is 
denominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by the mere survey’ (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591, my 
emphasis). Consider too Hume’s summary of his aims for the second and third parts of Book 
3: to answer the ‘simple question, Why any action or sentiment upon the general view or 
survey, gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness’ (T 3.1.2.11, SBN 475). 
In T 3.3.1.30 (SBN 591), Hume argues that those character traits which cause 
approbation are those that are ‘naturally fitted’ to be useful or agreeable, either to the person 
whose trait it is or to those around her. Typically, Hume talks of token objects being ‘fitted’ 
to cause an effect when they are tokens of types which are generally such as to cause that 
kind of effect. For example, a set of fortifications are ‘fitted to attain their ends’ where they 
are of kinds that we believe will successfully repel invaders, if required (T 2.3.10.5, SBN 
450). In his discussion of approbation, ‘naturally fitted’ cannot mean ‘non-artificially fitted’, 
because, as we will see in Chapter 4, Hume believes that we approve of many character traits 
that are artificially developed to be useful. I take it that ‘naturally’ is intended to be ‘opposed 
to rare and unusual’, which Hume thinks is the most ‘common’ meaning of the word (T 
3.1.2.8, SBN 474). Presumably, Hume means that we approve of traits of types that typically 
cause happiness. 
This all at least suggests a theory that, as soon as one understands any character trait 
to be a token of any type that generally causes happiness, one will immediately experience 
approbation, before one has time to reflect on its particular consequences. Even if a token 
motive of benevolence, for example, ultimately produces no happiness, we will be very likely 
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to ‘conceive’ it ‘under the general notion’ of benevolence: we will be very likely to identify it 
as a motive of benevolence (T 2.3.6.2, SBN 424). Hume seems to be suggesting that we will 
approve of any motive of benevolence, as soon as we categorise it as such, merely because 
benevolence is ‘naturally fitted’ to cause happiness. I will argue that approbation is always 
caused by ideas of traits that are taken to be naturally fitted to cause happiness. 
Admittedly, at T 3.3.1.30 (SBN 591), Hume appears to claim that we may approve of 
some token characters just because they are immediately agreeable to us, so that we might 
feel approbation towards someone because her witty comment makes us laugh, for example 
(see also T 3.3.1.27, SBN 589-90). I will return to this in Chapter 6, where I will argue that 
Hume ultimately denies that moral sentiments can be caused in this way. Indeed, at T 
3.3.1.30, he has just stressed that we need not be personally pleased to approve of traits like 
wit: ‘We approve of a person, who is possess'd of qualities immediately agreeable to those, 
with whom he has any commerce; tho' perhaps we ourselves never reap'd any pleasure from 
them’ (T 3.3.1.29, SBN 590; see also M 8.15, SBN 267). The ‘principle of sympathy’ 
ensures, somehow, that we approve of all token traits that we take to be of useful or agreeable 
types, just because these types of traits generally cause pleasure (T 3.3.1.29, SBN 590). 
In reading Hume in this way, I agree with those, such as Darwall (1994, 71) and Reed 
(2016), who argue that he distinguishes agreeable from useful traits only by the different 
ways in which they cause non-moral pleasures, so that he takes both useful and agreeable 
traits to produce approbation via our sympathy with these non-moral pleasures. Any trait that 
is naturally fitted to be useful or agreeable may cause approbation, and any trait that causes 
approbation does so because it is naturally fitted to be useful or agreeable. 
With this in mind, consider Hume’s brief argument that the ‘good qualities of an 
enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem and respect’, because it is ‘only 
when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it 
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causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil’ (T 3.1.2.4, SBN 
472, my emphasis). If one enemy pleases another by her generosity, we may be violently 
pained by this, but we may nevertheless approve of her simply because she is generous. This 
suggests that wherever we identify someone’s motive as a generous one, then it will produce 
a calm sentiment of approbation, simply because generosity is generally pleasing to us.  
Throughout my discussion of Hume, I will argue that, just as the above passages 
suggest, he believes that we approve of all traits that we habitually associate with causing 
happiness, regardless of our beliefs about their particular effects. There is some intuitive 
appeal to this view. We generally do love people for all their many particular quirks and 
attributes, and we generally do approve, or try to approve, of all similarly generous people to 
the same extent, just because they are generous. Before we can be certain that it is Hume’s 
view, however, we must understand his theories of ideas, reasoning, passions, and sympathy. 
We must understand how Hume thinks that sympathy can cause us to feel approbation 
towards any trait of a generally pleasing kind, as soon as we identify it as a trait of that kind.  
In §1.2, I begin my examination of this topic, by considering Hume’s theories of 
impressions, ideas, and causal reasoning. 
 
1.2. Impressions, ideas, and causal reasoning 
Hume calls all mental objects ‘perceptions’, and all perceptions other than ideas 
‘impressions’ (T 1.1.1.1, SBN 1). Impressions include sensory perceptions, feelings, 
passions, sentiments, pains, and pleasures. Ideas are, roughly, our thoughts, beliefs, and 
memories. Hume claims that we will all recognise the difference between impressions and 
ideas, which is simply ‘the difference betwixt feeling and thinking’ (T 1.1.1.1, SBN 2). To 
‘feel’, according to Hume, is to directly experience something, rather than to think about or 
remember that thing. He can therefore claim – as indeed I think he does – that we feel 
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approbation, without meaning to suggest that approbation is experienced in anything like the 
way that a passionate feeling, like those of joy or wonder, are felt. 
As Beebee (2006, 15) observes, Hume treats the mind as ‘a kind of natural, quasi-
Newtonian system’, in which a relatively small set of principles underpin all the many 
associations and interactions between perceptions. As a careful observer of this system, 
Hume tries to set out in clear detail what these principles are, although he doubts that we 
could ever hope to find any explanation for the principles themselves. 
The first of Hume’s principles of the mind is that ‘all our simple ideas in their first 
appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and 
which they exactly represent’ (T 1.1.1.7, SBN 4).4 This claim is now commonly called 
Hume’s ‘Copy Principle’ (e.g. Garrett 2002, 41). As Garrett (2002, 49) notes, Hume’s 
evidence for this principle is firmly empirical: experience convinces him that it is consistently 
the case (T 1.1.1.8, SBN 4-5). Simple ideas are ones that ‘admit of no distinction’, so that 
they cannot be analysed, such as an idea of a certain shade of red (T 1.1.1.2, SBN 2). We can 
form complex ideas of things that we have never experienced, but the Copy Principle requires 
that all the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas are copies of previous impressions. I 
have never seen a minotaur, but I have seen bull’s heads and people’s bodies before, and I 
combine my ideas of these into the complex idea of a minotaur.  
Hume claims that ideas fundamentally differ from impressions only in their lower 
levels of ‘vivacity’ (T 1.1.1.3, SBN 2). He gives an example: ‘That idea of red, which we 
 
4 Hume allows for a ‘singular’ exception to this ‘general maxim’, that is ‘scarce worth our observing’ 
(T 1.1.1.10, SBN 6). This is that someone who has seen many shades of one colour (blue, in Hume’s 
example) would be able to form an idea of a sufficiently similar shade of which they have never had 
an impression. Hume seemingly allows that, in this very unusual case, the relation of resemblance 
between the ideas involved somehow leads to the formation of a new but very similar idea. 
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form in the dark, and that impression, which strikes our eyes in sun-shine, differ only in 
degree, not in nature’ (T 1.1.1.5, SBN 3). He uses a ‘variety of terms’ to describe the feeling 
of vivacity, including ‘liveliness’, and ‘force’, although he admits, in a late addition to the 
Treatise, to using these in an ‘unphilosophical’ manner (T 1.3.7.7, SBN 629).5 He stresses, in 
both his Treatise and in his later Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, that he is 
referring to a feeling properly called ‘belief’ (T 1.3.7.7, SBN 629; E 5.12, SBN 48-49). I shall 
henceforth assume that all the terms in question refer to the same property, which I shall 
generally call ‘vivacity’. Although detailed interpretations of vivacity vary, I take it that any 
increase in a perception’s vivacity involves (or, perhaps, is) an increase in the extent to which 
it seems really present (e.g. Boehm 2013; Dauer 1999; Waxman 2003). Impressions are 
maximally vivid, so that we take them to be immediately and presently real, rather than 
merely thought of or representative of something elsewhere, as we take ideas and beliefs to 
be. 
Hume thinks that all impressions simply seem or feel immediately real, as ideas or 
beliefs do not, although he does allow a ‘near resemblance in a few instances’ (T 1.1.1.1, 
SBN 2). Consider hearing a distant sound, but then being uncertain as to whether you really 
heard it, or whether you imagined it: ‘Was that really a sound’, you might ask, ‘or just the 
idea of a sound?’ However, Hume’s considered view is that it is only when one’s mind is 
‘disordered by disease or madness’ that one literally cannot distinguish impressions from 
 
5 Hume initially includes the term ‘violence’ among this variety of terms (T 1.1.1.1, SBN 1). In Book 
2, however, where Hume distinguishes calm from violent passions, ‘violent’ means something like 
emotionally turbulent or intense (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276). Along with most readers of Hume, I take the 
violence of a passion to be distinct from its vivacity: as an impression, any passion will be maximally 
vivid, but it may or may not be violent. However, see Radcliffe (2015b, 556) for an argument that the 
violence of a passion just is its vivacity or liveliness.  
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ideas, as one experiences them (E 2.1, SBN 17). If one’s mind is not disordered, and if one is 
paying attention, then one cannot doubt that a sound that one hears is ‘present to the mind’ (T 
1.1.7.4, SBN 19). The sound just is the mental object that one directly experiences, just as 
‘orange’, ‘sweet’, and ‘bitter’ are ‘objects’. (T 1.1.1.8, SBN 5). As Noonan (1999, 56) says, 
‘Hume reifies perceptions’. Any impression or idea in one’s mind is a real object, directly 
present to consciousness. 
Indeed, Hume appears more certain of the existence of impressions than he is of the 
existence of the world beyond our senses. He clearly distinguishes our sense impressions 
from the beliefs about any objects of ‘real existence’ which exist, as it were, ‘behind’ the 
impressions (T 1.4.2.24, SBN 199). These beliefs can be false, but impressions are not truth-
apt in this way. Even if I think that an impression is illusory, as where I doubt that something 
that appears red is really red, I am certain that I experience the impression of redness. Hume 
thinks that one cannot doubt that any impression is a real existent, immediately present to 
one’s mind. In Chapter 5, we will see that this has important implications for his theory of 
moral judgements. 
Hume frequently defines perceptions by their level of vivacity, on a continuum from 
the liveliest, which are all impressions, to imagined, ‘perfect’ ideas, which are devoid of any 
vivacity (T 1.1.3.1, SBN 8). Ideas with some level of vivacity are typically either beliefs or 
memories: a belief is, for Hume, a vivid or believed idea. However, we will see in Chapter 3 
that Hume also allows for a third category of vivid idea: some non-memory ideas become 
vivid, but without becoming beliefs. For want of a Humean name, I will call these ‘quasi-
beliefs’. 
Hume argues that ideas can be derived from impressions in only two ways: either as 
memories or as perfect ideas. These are distinguished primarily by degrees in vivacity. An 
idea is a memory idea if it immediately and directly retains some of the vivacity of an 
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impression, so that it is ‘somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea’ in its 
level of vivacity (T 1.1.3.1, SBN 8). Presumably, Hume means it is intermediate between an 
impression and an imagined idea.  
According to Hume, the primary distinction between memory ideas and those of the 
imagination is due to the greater vivacity of the former. However, he also notes a secondary 
distinction between the faculty of the memory and that of the imagination: the faculty of 
memory ‘preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and… where-ever 
we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in 
that faculty’ (T 1.1.3.3, SBN 9). 
All non-memory ideas are formed as perfect ideas, which are entirely lacking in 
vivacity, but which we can manipulate in ways that we cannot do with memory ideas. One 
such way is by reasoning with them. Hume argues that there are only two forms of reasoning, 
both of which are performed by the faculty of the imagination. The first he calls 
‘demonstration’, which consists of reasoning with ‘the abstract relations of our ideas’, as with 
mathematical reasoning (T 2.3.3.2, SBN 413). This form of reasoning has very little bearing 
on moral judgement, according to Hume, and neither the details nor the various 
interpretations of his account of it need concern us here.  
The second form of reasoning consists of all ‘reasonings from causation, and 
concerning matters of fact’ (T 1.3.7.3, SBN 95). When Hume talks of beliefs, he officially 
refers only to the believed conclusions of causal reasoning.6 Hume defines a belief, or 
believed idea, as a ‘lively idea related to a present impression’ (T 1.3.8.1, SBN 98). However, 
this is shorthand for lively (i.e. vivid) ideas related to impressions or memories (T 1.3.5.7, 
SBN 86). Indeed, Garrett (2015, 43) observes that Hume talks about an ‘impression of the 
 
6 For a detailed argument to this effect, see Owen 2002, chapter 7. 
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memory’, when he discusses their role in causal reasoning at T 1.3.4.1 (SBN 83), presumably 
because, like impressions, they are sufficiently vivid to begin a process of transferring 
vivacity to other ideas. 
Causal reasoning is, as we shall see, precisely the process by which perfect ideas 
come to be vivid, via chains of associated ideas that connect them to our current impressions 
or memories. As Owen (2002, 157) puts it, ideas ‘become beliefs by becoming more like 
impressions’: as they acquire vivacity, we come to feel that they are ideas of real existents. 
Causal reasoning is the product of two mental processes which are, for Hume, 
obviously prevalent in human psychology but ultimately inexplicable. These are the 
association of ideas and the transference of vivacity between perceptions. The first of these 
processes is described as the operation of ‘a gentle force, which commonly prevails’ 
whenever ideas are related by resemblance, contiguity in time or place, or cause and effect (T 
1.1.4.1, SBN 10). Causal relations occur wherever we have frequently seen one object follow 
another, so that, purely from our experience of the ‘repetition’ of the one type of object 
following another, we come to associate the two ideas by custom or habit (T 1.3.8.10, SBN 
102-3). For example, if we have often seen smoke follow fire, then any new perception of fire 
– whether an impression or idea – will be followed by an idea of smoke. Ideas of fire follow 
perceptions of smoke too, as we can make inferences both from cause to effect and from 
effect to cause. The stronger the association, the more swiftly and easily the second idea 
occurs. 
The relevant kind of associations of ideas for causal reasoning is thus habitual or 
customary associations of ideas. This is a ‘brute psychological principle, rather than a 
“principle” to which we consciously appeal in our causal reasoning’ (Beebee 2006, 60). No 
person of sufficient experience – indeed, no animal of sufficient experience – can fail to form 
the idea of smoke when they experience a perception of fire, according to Hume. 
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However, even where ideas are strongly associated, this alone will not cause us to 
form beliefs. The second mental process required is the concurrent transference of vivacity 
from an impression or memory to an associated idea. If I see smoke rising over a distant hill, 
then the association of ideas between smoke and fire will impel me to form an idea of fire 
behind the hill. For me to believe this idea of fire, and thus to have reasoned that the smoke 
was caused by an unperceived fire, some of the vivacity of the perception of smoke must be 
transferred to the idea of fire. This is something which will naturally occur when the initial 
perception is an impression, so I will readily believe in the fire as a cause of the smoke, and 
as existing beyond my senses. In this way, causal reasoning is explained entirely by 
customary associations of ideas and the transference of vivacity. My present impression 
supplies the feeling of belief, and custom produces the idea that is to be believed. 
It is thus from the operations of custom that we form beliefs about the world around 
us, according to Hume, and so build up a picture of a world stretching beyond our own 
perceptions, into the past, the future, and around us in space. In Chapter 5, I will ask whether 
he can allow any place for moral beliefs within this picture. First, however, we must 
understand the passion of approbation, along with its sympathetic causes. To this end, I will 
next consider Hume’s theories of the passions and of sympathy. Hume understands sympathy 
as a psychological mechanism by which we may come to feel the passions of others, via a 
process that typically involves causal reasoning. 
 
1.3. Passions and sympathy 
Hume contrasts the passions, as ‘secondary’ or ‘reflective’ impressions, with the ‘original’ 
impressions of sense perception and bodily sensation, which appear to us ‘without any 
antecedent perception’ (T 2.1.1.1, SBN 275). By this, Hume means that original impressions 
have no observable psychological causes, whereas secondary impressions are caused by prior 
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perceptions. All secondary impressions ‘proceed from some of [the] original ones, either 
immediately or by the interposition of its idea’ (T 2.1.1.1, SBN 275).  
Unlike ideas, secondary impressions do not always resemble the impressions that 
cause them, and they are not copies of the impressions that cause them. A headache or the 
sight of an ocean is an original impression, whereas an aversion to one’s painful headache or 
a feeling of pleasure at the sight of an ocean is a secondary impression. All pleasant 
secondary impressions and desires are caused by pleasant impressions or ideas, whereas all 
unpleasant secondary impressions and aversions are caused by unpleasant impressions or 
ideas (T 1.1.2.1, SBN 7-8). All passions, therefore, including love and approbation, have 
determinable psychological causes. 
Hume is sometimes thought to distinguish love from approbation by claiming that, 
although we love persons, we approve of ‘characters, character traits, and motives’ (Carlson 
2014, 74; see also, e.g., Baier 1991, 134-5). In support of this claim, Carlson cites Hume’s 
statement that, when we see someone who helps others, ‘we approve of his character and love 
his person’ (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 602). However, Hume does not appear to make any clear 
distinction between evaluating a person and evaluating one or more of that person’s character 
traits. Consider the passage where he argues that we never approve of actions alone, but that 
‘the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them’ (T 
3.2.1.2, SBN 477). This certainly seems to suggest that we morally evaluate motives, rather 
than persons. Yet, throughout this section, Hume repeatedly mentions moral sentiments that 
are directed towards people: we ‘blame a person’ for not performing some action (T 3.2.1.3, 
SBN 477); where we find that someone has a virtuous motive, we feel ‘esteem for him’ (T 
3.2.1.3, SBN 478); we ‘blame a father for neglecting his child’ (T 3.2.1.5, SBN 478). 
Clearly, Hume emphasises that moral judgements are directed towards characters, 
character traits, and motives, rather than actions. However, he seems to assume, here and 
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elsewhere, that approbation is directed towards a person wherever it is directed towards one 
or more of her traits. Indeed, Hume often talks of a person’s ‘character’ when he is 
considering a character trait as an evaluable part of the person whose trait it is (e.g. T 3.3.1.5, 
SBN 575; T 3.3.1.19, SBN 584; T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591). Unfortunately, this makes it harder to 
understand his distinction between love and approbation than Carlson suggests. We may 
approve of someone for her kindness, just as we may love her for her kindness. 
To understand Hume’s distinction between love and approbation, we must consider 
his theory of sympathy. Hume believes that sympathy may or may not be involved in our 
coming to feel love for someone, but that approbation occurs only where an idea of 
someone’s character trait pleases us by sympathy (T 3.3.1.12, SBN 580).  
Hume describes sympathy as a propensity ‘to receive by communication [another 
person's] inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own’ 
(T 2.1.11.2, SBN 316). He claims that we can sympathise with people’s beliefs, so that we 
may come to believe something simply because those around us do (T 2.1.11.2, SBN 316). 
More importantly for our purposes, however, he claims that we may sympathise with 
people’s passions, pains, and pleasures. 
 Hume claims that ‘sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our 
understanding; and even contains something more surprising and extraordinary’ (T 2.1.11.8, 
SBN 320). He argues that, wherever we are closely related to someone, our ideas of their 
passions are liable to become more lively than typical beliefs (T 2.1.11.3, SBN 317). The 
most relevant kind of relation here is resemblance. Hume claims that ‘the idea, or rather 
impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us’, and that we have as ‘lively a 
conception of our own person’ as we could possibly have of anything (T 2.1.11.4, SBN 317). 
Any idea of another person will show a ‘great resemblance’ to one’s idea of oneself (T 
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2.1.11.5, SBN 318).7 Any idea of that person’s passion is thus likely to become livelier than a 
typical belief. 
We saw, in §1.2, that Hume claims that ideas differ from impressions only in their 
levels of liveliness. Hume now reminds us of this claim: ‘all ideas are borrow'd from 
impressions, and… these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and 
vivacity, with which they strike upon the soul’ (T 2.1.11.7, SBN 318-9). If the ‘component 
parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike’, then any sufficiently vivid idea would 
become an impression (T 2.1.11.7, SBN 319). And this is, indeed, what happens during 
sympathy, according to Hume: ‘a lively idea is converted into an impression’ (T 2.1.11.7, 
SBN 319). My idea of a person’s happiness becomes so lively that I not only believe that she 
is happy; I feel happy.8 
Our sympathies vary – we sympathise more with those who more closely resemble us 
than with others, for example – but Hume allows that we may sympathise with anyone, at 
least to some extent, simply because of our resemblance to one another as persons.  
Just as Hume appears to see no important distinction between approving of a person 
and approving of that person’s character trait, so he appears to see no important distinction 
 
7 Here, I will not consider how Hume understands the idea of the self in Book 2 of the Treatise. It is 
sufficient that he clearly relies on the existence of this idea. 
8 I agree with Stroud (1977, 198) that Hume only requires, and only really adheres to, a more general 
thesis of sympathy than he officially allows: ‘Unpleasant feelings in others cause unpleasant feelings 
in us, and pleasant feelings cause pleasant feelings in us’. However, I do not see that this greatly 
influences Hume’s discussion of approbation which, I will argue, is a pleasure caused by a 
sympathetic pleasure. This contradicts Abramson’s (1999, 343) interpretation, by which our ideas of 
other people’s pleasures and pains may be directly ‘transformed’ into moral sentiments via sympathy. 
The direct textual evidence regarding this point is unclear, for reasons that I will discuss in Chapter 6. 
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between sympathising with a person and sympathising with that person’s passion. He claims 
both that we ‘sympathize with others’ (T 2.1.11.2, SBN 316-7) and that we ‘sympathize with 
the passions and sentiments of others’ (T 2.1.11.8, SBN 319). Moreover, the process which is 
specific to sympathy – its ‘surprising and extraordinary’ aspect – only occurs after we have 
formed an idea of a passion or sentiment, with which we then sympathise. This allows for 
Hume to claim that, once a relevant idea is in our minds, we may sympathise with it, even in 
some cases where it is not a typical belief about someone else’s passion or sentiment. We will 
see the importance of this point in Chapter 3, when we consider Hume’s thesis of ‘delicate 
sympathy’ (T 3.3.1.8, SBN 577). 
 For now, we can note the following. Given his claim that approbation is at least 
typically caused via sympathy with characters that have a ‘tendency to the good of mankind’, 
Hume seems to suggest that, if I see one person please another, then I will sympathise with 
the second person’s happiness, and so approve of the first person (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 580). 
However, if my sympathy with the second person’s happiness is the sole cause of my 
approbation, then it is very hard to understand Hume’s theory of what we would now call the 
‘intentionality’ of approbation: of the way that approbation can be of or about something or 
someone. As Cohon (2008, 175) argues, there appears to be a ‘significant gap’ in Hume’s 
theory. He seems unable to explain how approbation may be caused via sympathy with one 
person, but then take another person as its intentional object. 
 To understand how approbation may be caused by sympathy, according to Hume, we 
must ask how he understands the intentionality of passions. And to be clear on this point, we 
must also ask how Hume understands ideas to represent their objects. I turn to these 
questions now. 
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1.4. Hume on intentionality and representation 
Hume offers nothing like an explicit theory of the intentionality of the passions. Baier (1991, 
160) thinks that, in one passage, Hume denies that passions are intentional, by claiming that a 
passion has no ‘representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or 
modification’ (T 2.3.3.5, SBN 415). However, as Cohon and Owen (1997), Garrett (2006), 
and Merivale (2019) all argue, Hume merely denies that passions represent anything in the 
way that ideas represent impressions; by being copies of them. Indeed, we will see that he 
does not allow that any impressions can represent in this way. 
Hume does not deny that impressions can represent external objects in some way. As 
Garrett (2015, 71) notes, Hume sometimes, albeit very rarely, suggests that sensory 
impressions represent external objects, as at T 1.2.1.5 (SBN 28). He also claims that we must 
take it ‘for granted in all our reasonings’ that there is a world beyond our senses (T 1.4.2.1, 
SBN 187). However, Hume does not mean by this that our sense impressions appear to us to 
be representative of anything beyond them. Unlike ideas, impressions do not appear, on 
introspection, to have any ‘representative quality’ (T 2.3.3.5, SBN 415). 
It is partly because our impressions do not appear to be representative that Hume sees 
an irreconcilable problem in our understanding of the external world. In T 1.4.2, he argues 
that we firmly believe that there is an external world which we perceive via our senses, that 
we also believe that the objects of our senses may remain consistent even as our perceptions 
change, and that we have no sense of our perceptions as representative of any objects beyond 
them. The only way we can resolve these contradictions is, not via any philosophy, but by 
remaining careless and inattentive to them and simply assuming that there is ‘both an external 
and internal world’ (T 1.4.2.57, SBN 218). 
Throughout all his arguments, Hume takes the following claim to be ‘certain’: 
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[A]lmost all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest 
part of their lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and 
suppose, that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the 
real body or material existence (T 1.4.2.38, SBN 206). 
 
Given this, Hume has no understanding of how impressions might represent objects, 
and he doubts that any such understanding is possible.  
We have seen that Hume’s Copy Principle entails that all ideas exactly resemble and 
are caused by simple impressions, and that they represent these impressions. Landy (2012) 
provides a helpful and, I think, highly plausible account of Hume’s implicit ‘semantic copy 
principle’: that simple ideas represent impressions by being copies of them. Without going 
into the details of his argument, Landy (2012, 43) claims that Hume adheres to the following 
definition of ‘representational content’, at least insofar as it pertains to the representational 
content of simple ideas: ‘x has y as its representational content just in case x exactly 
resembles and is caused by y.’ 
Certainly, nothing that Hume says suggests that he sees how a perception could 
represent anything, unless it is both caused by that thing and exactly resembles it. This is part 
of his worry about our beliefs about the external world. If an impression represents something 
it must resemble that thing, and Hume cannot see how an impression can resemble anything 
other than a perception. The only form of representation that we can imagine obtaining for 
perceptions is that by which ideas represent impressions: by being copies of them (T 1.4.2.54, 
SBN 216). We derive our idea of a perception’s capacity to represent only from our 
experience of ideas representing impressions by being copies of them. Therefore, given the 
Copy Principle, we can have no idea of any other way in which a perception can possess the 
capacity to represent. 
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As an important aside, I strongly doubt that Hume can consistently hold that 
impressions and ideas differ only in their degrees of vivacity, because he treats ideas as 
fundamentally representative, in a way that he thinks impressions cannot be. I am therefore 
sympathetic to Landy’s suggestion that Hume implicitly sees impressions and ideas as 
distinct kinds of perceptions: 
 
Impressions are the original objects of the mind, derived from sources 
unknown; they are not copies of any other mental entities. Ideas are copies, 
either of impressions or of other ideas. It is this difference that makes a 
perception either an impression or an idea (Landy 2006, 124-125). 
 
Landy (2006, 135) argues that, when Hume says that impressions and ideas differ 
from each other only in their different degrees of force and vivacity, he means that this is 
their only difference when ‘considered individually, or non-relationally’. However, it is hard 
to reconcile even this claim with Hume’s belief that our ideas represent as our impressions do 
not. Any impression is real simply in the sense that we are ‘assur’d of its present existence’, 
just as we are assured that our ideas exist as ideas (T 1.3.8.15, SBN 106). Unlike 
impressions, any idea is a real existent that is also representative of something that may or 
may not be a real existent, beyond our perceptions. Whereas an impression of redness just is 
the redness that one experiences when one sees red, an idea of redness is a perception which 
represents an impression of redness. This appears to be an important difference between the 
two perception kinds which is not merely a difference in vivacity. It is also a difference which 
may be observed even when impressions and ideas are considered individually and non-
relationally. 
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In short, Hume’s theory of ideas requires that all ideas represent as no impressions do: 
by being copies of prior perceptions. It is very hard to understand how, or whether, he can 
reconcile this with his claim that impressions and ideas fundamentally differ only in their 
different degrees of vivacity. However, I will not pursue this point here, but simply stress that 
Hume sees no other way that a perception could be representative, except by being a copy. 
As passions are impressions, therefore, Hume needs to account for the way that a 
passion can be about its object, but without allowing that it represents its object. For this kind 
of reason, it is generally believed that Hume implicitly argues for an extrinsic explanation of 
the intentionality of passions, such that a passion can be of or about something only in virtue 
of its relation to other perceptions or objects.9 For example, Cohon (2008, 165) claims that 
‘the intentional object of a passion seems… to be what the passion causes us to think of or 
attend to’. Similarly, Merivale (2019, 133) argues that Hume’s ‘default’ position in the 
Treatise is that ‘the object of a passion… is simply its cause’. I think both claims are correct, 
so that a passion is caused by that idea which it then causes us to attend to. Any idea which 
causes a passion is that idea which the passion is then of or about. I am sympathetic to 
Alanen’s (2006, 194) view that Humean passions can be of objects by ‘affecting the 
perception of whatever object they are reactions to’. My idea of someone who slighted me 
can cause a passion of anger, which then makes the idea of that person an unpleasant one to 
contemplate, in a way that is recognisably due to my anger. 
Merivale (2019, 133) claims that, although most passions in Hume’s Treatise are 
directed towards the ideas which cause them, there are ‘a few notable exceptions, namely the 
passions of pride, humility, love, and hatred’. We will see, in Chapter 2, that Hume sees some 
 
9 Not everyone agrees. For example, Qu (2012) argues that Hume at least has the resources for an 
intrinsic account.  
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important parallels between these four passions. He devotes a significant proportion of Book 
2 to developing a theory of their causes and objects, mainly via a discussion of pride. Several 
readers of Hume, including Árdal (1989), Davidson (1976), Korsgaard (1999), Merivale 
(2019), and Penelhum (1975), believe that his theory of pride entails the clearly implausible 
claim that there is only a contingent relationship between pride and the idea of oneself, such 
that we feel proud before we think of ourselves, and so feel proud of ourselves. In Chapter 2, 
I will argue, against this general interpretation, that Hume applies his default, causal theory of 
intentionality to pride, humility, love and hatred, as well as to all other passions. 
It is, of course, far from obvious whether anything like Hume’s causal theory of 
intentionality could be a successful one. To address one important worry, he believes that ‘to 
form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing’ (T 1.1.7.6, SBN 20). 
For Hume, our experiences just are our perceptions; we can only conceive of something by 
forming an idea of it; and we can only form ideas of that which we have experienced. Hume 
concludes from this that we cannot possibly conceive of anything other than our perceptions. 
I agree with Cohon and Owen (1997, 55) that this is his point in the following passage:10  
 
[S]ince nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all 
ideas are deriv’d from something antecedently present to the mind; it 
follows, that ’tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea 
of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions (T 1.2.6.8, 
SBN 67). 
 
 
10 Garrett (2006, 306) argues that Hume is making a somewhat subtler point in the passage. 
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If we cannot conceive of anything except by forming an idea of that thing, then this 
suggests that, wherever we think of any person or thing in the world, we can make no 
meaningful distinction between that person or thing and our idea of that person or thing. I 
think this is indeed Hume’s view. If so, then we also cannot make any meaningful distinction 
between feeling a passion towards a person or thing in the world and feeling that passion 
towards our idea of that person or thing. 
 Hume certainly seems to assume precisely this about the passions of pride and 
humility. He sometimes claims that an idea ‘excites’ pride or humility (T 2.1.5.5, SBN 286), 
or that an idea is that ‘to which [pride and humility] direct their view, when excited’ (T 
2.1.2.4, SBN 278). At other times, and without any suggestion that he is providing an 
alternative view, he describes both the causes and intentional objects of pride as the objects 
of ideas: ‘the cause [of an instance of pride] is the beautiful house’ (T 2.1.2.6, SBN 279); we 
are proud of ‘power, riches, beauty or personal merit’ (T 2.1.3.4, SBN 281). Cohon (2008, 
165) and Penelhum (1975, 99) both note Hume’s ambiguous language in this regard. 
We will see in §2.1 that Hume thinks that pride and humility are importantly similar 
to love and hatred. This strongly suggests that he sees no meaningful distinction between 
loving or approving of a person and loving or approving of the idea of that person. 
Regardless of any worries we might have about this claim, I will argue, in Chapters 2 and 3, 
that it at least allows Hume to apply his default, causal theory of intentionality to pride, 
humility, love and hatred, and to the moral sentiments.  
In Chapter 2, I will address Hume’s theory of the passions in greater detail, and I will 
discuss two important aspects of this theory. The first is his distinction between direct 
passions and indirect passions. The second is his distinction between calm passions, such as 
approbation, and violent passions, such as love. In Chapter 3, I will conclude from this 
discussion that Hume understands love as a violent sentiment, which may or may not be 
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caused via sympathy, and that he understands approbation as a calm sentiment of the same 
general kind as love, but caused in all cases via a ‘delicate’ kind of sympathy (T 3.3.1.8, SBN 
577). We will see that approbation is always caused by, and directed towards, a complex idea 
that is, roughly, of a person with a trait of some kind that is such as to cause happiness. 
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2. Hume on Indirect and Calm Passions 
In this chapter, I address those aspects of Hume’s theory of the passions that are most 
relevant to his theory of moral judgements, with a focus on his distinctions between direct 
and indirect passions, and between calm and violent passions. I begin this chapter by arguing 
that Hume sees a generally unappreciated but vital role for the formation of complex ideas in 
the production of four indirect passions: pride, humility, love, and hatred. This allows him to 
develop an account of their intentionality that is more coherent than many think possible.  
I then argue for a new interpretation of Hume’s distinction between calm and violent 
passions, according to which calm passions are calm because they are caused by more 
generalised ideas than those that cause violent passions. This allows Hume to distinguish love 
from approbation in a way that has hitherto been unrecognised. We will see, in Chapter 3, 
that he understands love as the violent passion by which we come to value people for their 
particular pleasing traits, attributes, or possessions. He understands approbation as the calm 
passion by which we come to value people who possess token character traits of generally 
pleasing types.  
Mine is by no means the only interpretation of Hume’s account of the passions, of 
course: Fieser (1992) and Radcliffe (2015a) provide useful surveys of the many different 
ways that Hume’s theory and taxonomy of the passions may be understood. I will address 
rival interpretations to my own at key points, but I cannot hope to give detailed arguments 
against each one. Instead, I will argue for my own interpretation, after which the proof will be 
in the pudding. In Chapters 3 to 6, I will consider several aspects of Hume’s theory of moral 
judgements which, I believe, provide strong support to my arguments within this chapter. 
In §2.1, I address Hume’s account of the passions of love, hatred, pride, and humility, 
and I argue that he believes that these are each caused by certain kinds of complex ideas. In 
§2.2, I argue that Hume understands violent passions to be caused by particular ideas, and 
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calm passions to be caused by general ideas. Approbation is a calm form of love, so I will 
conclude that the complex idea that causes approbation must be or include a general idea.  
 
2.1. Indirect passions 
Hume gives the following account of the direct/indirect distinction: ‘By direct passions I 
understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect 
such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities’ (T 
2.1.1.4, SBN 276). The indirect passions include ‘pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, 
hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants’ (T 2.1.1.4, SBN 276-7). 
Hume, rather unhelpfully, sometimes uses the term ‘passion’ to refer to all 
impressions of reflection, and sometimes to refer only to violent passions. Consider the claim 
that, when we ‘take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division of them into direct and 
indirect’ (T 2.1.1.4, SBN 276). Loeb (1977, 396) understands Hume to mean by this that only 
violent passions can be direct or indirect. However, approbation is always calm. Loeb 
concludes that approbation is neither direct nor indirect, so that it cannot be a form of love. 
Conversely, if approbation is a calm form of love, as Hume claims, then it must be an indirect 
passion. 
Love is one of four indirect passions, along with hatred, pride, and humility, that are 
caused via a ‘double relation of ideas and impressions’ (T 2.1.5.5, SBN 286). Merivale 
(2019, 133) helpfully calls these the ‘double-relation passions’. As Árdal (1989), Cohon 
(2008), and Taylor (2015) argue, at least some indirect passions are evaluative passions, in a 
way that desires, for example, are not. We generally desire what we already value. In 
contrast, to use Cohon’s (2008, 172) helpful phrase, the double-relation passions ‘do not so 
much track value as impart it’. Love is that passion by which we come to value others, just as 
pride is the passion by which we come to value ourselves. For Hume, the good just is the 
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pleasing (e.g. T 2.1.1.4, SBN 276). Therefore, all double-relation passions must be pleasures 
or pains. 
Radcliffe (2004, 650) notes that Hume has an ‘unofficial line’ in which he treats 
passions ‘as though they are defined in terms of the processes that produce them’.1 Hume 
claims that a passion like love is indefinable, and can only be known via experience (T 
2.2.1.1, SBN 329). Nevertheless, he allows that each distinct, indefinable passion has 
observable and consistent causes, and he frequently defines passions, tacitly or otherwise, in 
terms of these causes. For example, pride is ‘that agreeable impression, which arises in the 
mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy'd with 
ourselves’ (T 2.1.7.8, SBN 297). 
I will argue that, once we understand their causes, we will see that love and 
approbation have different, but closely related, objects. We love a kind person for her 
particular motive of kindness, which may please in a variety of ways, self-interested or 
otherwise. We approve of a kind person simply for having a motive of a type that we 
generally associate with pleasing others. Each passion is caused by, and directed towards, a 
complex idea that includes an idea of the person and an idea of her motive. 
This may seem implausible at first glance, because Hume argues for ‘a distinction 
betwixt the cause and the object’ of each of the double-relation passions (T 2.1.2.4, SBN 
278). However, I will argue that Hume merely distinguishes the distal cause of each double-
relation passion from its object. What Hume calls the ‘cause’ of a double-relation passion is 
the idea that ‘gives the first motion’ to that passion, by initiating the process that causes it (T 
2.1.5.8, SBN 288). The proximate cause, and object, of any double-relation passion is a 
 
1 Davidson (1976, 754) holds a similar view. 
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complex idea of some person, considered as the possessor of some pleasing or displeasing 
object.2 
Hume’s discussion focusses mainly on pride. He argues that pride cannot be caused 
simply by the idea of the self, because both pride and humility are felt towards the self. If the 
idea of the self directly caused these passions, then they would both consistently occur, so 
that they would, in effect, cancel each other out (T 2.1.5.7, SBN 288). Therefore, Hume 
claims, a different idea must cause pride. Any such idea must be of something that causes 
pleasure, such as a beautiful house. As I interpret him, he argues that, wherever one is closely 
related to anything by causation or contiguity, the idea of that thing will bring the associated 
idea of oneself to mind, and the two ideas will combine to form a more complex idea. If the 
idea of that which is related to oneself is a pleasing idea, then the more complex idea will 
cause pride. The proximate cause and object of pride is thus always a complex idea that 
contains the idea of the self, such as that of myself as the owner of a beautiful house. 
To argue for this interpretation, I will first distinguish the causal features of a double-
relation passion into two, each of which is a necessary condition (and both of which are 
jointly sufficient) for that passion to meet the definition of a double-relation passion.  
The first necessary condition for any passion to be a double-relation passion is that it 
is felt towards something that already causes a different pleasure (for love or pride) or pain 
(for hatred or humility). Hume claims that at least two ‘resembling impressions are connected 
together’ whenever a double-relation passion occurs, one of which will be the double-relation 
passion itself (T 2.1.4.3, SBN 283). If I am proud of a house that is aesthetically pleasing, 
then this aesthetic sentiment resembles pride by being a pleasant feeling, as pride is. 
 
2 Schmitter (2008, 231) suggests something like this possibility. However, her considered view is that 
the intentionality of pride is due to a network of perceptions, which together draw our attention to our 
‘character, or personality’ (Schmitter 2008,  236). 
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The second necessary condition for any passion to be a double-relation passion is that 
a relevant association of ideas occurs in its production, such that the idea of some pleasing or 
painful object is associated with the idea of the self or of someone else. These ideas may be 
related by ‘contiguity’, but they are more typically related by ‘causation’ (T 2.1.9.4, SBN 
305). Anything sufficiently closely related to oneself by contiguity or causation may cause 
pride, from a fine house to a beautiful face, a virtuous motive, power, wealth, or a beautiful 
country. 
At some points, Hume claims that, when some relevant object pleases us, we feel a 
passion of pride, which then causes us to think of the self. For example, he describes pride as 
a ‘passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc'd by 
it’ (T 2.1.2.4, SBN 278). It is clearly the second idea which Hume sees as that of the self. 
Given phrases like this, it is easy to see why Árdal (1989, 388) believes that Hume 
misrepresents the relation between pride and the self ‘as a causal relation between pride and 
the thought of oneself. Whenever one is proud, one's thought is drawn to oneself, but 
according to Hume it could have been otherwise’. Call this putative claim the ‘contingency 
thesis’: that feeling proud causes one to think of the self, and so to then feel proud of oneself. 
Hume is often believed to argue for this thesis (e.g., Davidson 1976; Korsgaard 1999; 
Merivale 2019; Penelhum 1975). Clearly, however, it cannot be right: pride just is a form of 
self-evaluation, and so the relation between pride and the self cannot be contingent in this 
way. 
Hume undoubtedly suggests the contingency thesis, more than once. However, 
despite the weight of evidence, he surely cannot mean to endorse it. Schmitter (2008, 233) 
briefly notes that, because the idea of one’s possession is ‘linked by relations of association’ 
to the idea of oneself, Hume must believe that the former idea will immediately produce the 
latter idea, without requiring the presence of pride. But this point is crucial: Hume would be 
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very unlikely to claim that any identifiable perception is involved in the process by which the 
idea of one’s property brings the idea of oneself to mind. The principle of the ‘association of 
ideas’ is integral to Hume’s philosophy, and he clearly intends a central role for it in his 
theory of pride (T 2.1.4.2, SBN 283). Yet, as Davidson (1976, 749) observes, the contingency 
thesis denies it any such role. 
Hume believes that we are typically proud of things that are causally related to 
ourselves. And, according to Hume, ‘there is no relation, which produces a stronger 
connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another, than the relation of 
cause and effect betwixt their objects’ (T 1.1.4.2, SBN 11). Why, then, would pride play any 
role in producing the idea of the self, once one forms the associated idea of one’s property, 
virtue, wealth, or power? Hume would find it difficult, to say the least, to distinguish any 
such role from that of the association of ideas. 
 In fact, after T 2.1.5.6 (SBN 286-7), Hume no longer suggests that the feeling of pride 
produces an idea of the self. He starts claiming instead that the idea of the self is involved in 
the cause of pride. Merivale (2019, 135) believes that he simply equivocates over ‘whether 
the object of the double-relation passions is their effect or a part of their cause’. However, I 
think this point marks a rhetorical shift in Hume’s (admittedly confusing) argumentative 
strategy. 
 
2.1.1. The associative causes of the double-relation passions 
I agree with Cohon’s (2008, 166) assessment, that Hume wants to explain how a ‘shift in 
attention’ can occur when we feel any double-relation passion, such that thinking about an 
object will make us think of a person. Hume believes that this always happens with pride and 
humility, as where thinking of a house makes me think of, and feel proud of, myself as its 
owner. I also agree with Cohon (2008, 162) that Hume ‘uses his associationism to explain the 
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generation’ of these passions. Unlike Cohon, however, I think that Hume only suggests the 
contingency thesis to stress that a shift in attention always occurs when we come to feel pride 
or humility, so as introduce the need for his associationism. 
Kemp Smith (1966, 166) suggests that the length of Hume’s treatment of the double-
relation passions is ‘significant as showing his preoccupation with, and sense of, the 
revolutionary character of his teaching in regard to association at the time when this part of 
the Treatise was being written’. I suggest, moreover, that Hume’s efforts to persuade his 
readers that something causes a shift in our thinking when we feel pride signifies his belief 
that many of his readers will as yet be unconvinced by his theory of association. By claiming 
that pride produces the idea of the self, Hume is, I think, merely laying the groundwork to 
argue that an association of ideas produces the idea of the self, during the process that causes 
pride. He wants to emphasise that pride is always felt towards the (idea of the) self, despite 
always being ‘excited’ by an idea that is not of the self, so that he may offer his own, 
associative explanation for this shift in attention (T 2.1.2.4, SBN 278). 
Cohon (2008, 165) assumes, as Hume’s readers generally do, that he means the same 
thing when he says that pride ‘turns our view to ourselves’, and that pride ‘naturally 
produces’ the idea of the self (T 2.1.5.6, SBN 287). However, it is not obvious that the 
meaning of these phrases is identical. Hume only suggests that pride produces the idea of the 
self before T 2.1.5.7 (SBN 287-8). Here, he has only just started arguing for the incompatible 
claim that pride occurs at the end of the process of a ‘double relation of ideas and 
impressions’, during which an idea with a ‘relation to self’ produces, by association, the idea 
of the self (T 2.1.5.5, SBN 286). Once he has claimed that this associative process produces 
the idea of the self, in T 2.1.5.8 (SBN 288), he no longer claims that pride does so. Indeed, 
after this, he only claims that pride ‘turns our view’ to the self on one further occasion: in a 
passage where he also claims that the sexual appetite turns our view to the idea of sex, which 
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it typically does after that idea has caused the sexual appetite (T 2.2.11.6, SBN 396). We 
should, therefore, ask if we can plausibly interpret Hume’s phrase ‘turning our view to an 
idea’ to mean something other than ‘producing an idea’. 
I suggest one such interpretation: that for a passion to turn one’s view to something is 
for it to cause us to continue to think about that thing, so long as the passion is present to the 
mind. Consider cases where one cannot stop thinking about one’s beloved, or where a proud 
person continually thinks of, and talks about, himself. Similarly, Hume may mean that, once 
we start thinking about sex, we keep thinking about sex. So interpreted, the claim that pride 
turns one’s view to oneself entails that, once one feels proud of oneself, one cannot ‘ever lose 
sight of this object’ so long as the feeling is present (T 2.1.5.3, SBN 286). However, it 
suggests nothing about how pride is caused, or about how it comes to take the self as its 
object. 
Whether or not my suggestion is correct, Hume’s theory of the double relations of 
ideas and impressions is, I will argue, incompatible with the contingency thesis. His theory 
entails that an ‘original and natural instinct’ ensures that the feeling of pride is always caused 
by, and directed towards, a complex idea of oneself as related to some pleasing object (T 
2.1.5.3, SBN 286). Unfortunately, Hume discusses this instinct before he has explained his 
theory of the causes of pride. At this stage, all he has ‘establish’d’ is that pride is pleasing, 
and that its object is the self (T 2.1.5.5, SBN 286). This is, I suggest, why he merely asserts 
that instinct makes pride take the idea of the self for its object, not for its cause. 
  Hume’s last, clear mention of the contingency thesis is his claim that pride, ‘after its 
production, naturally produces’ the idea of the self, just as hunger naturally makes us think of 
food (T 2.1.5.6, SBN 287). At this point, Hume is arguing that pride, by instinct, ‘always 
turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances’ (T 
2.1.5.6, SBN 287). He may mean to assert the contingency thesis merely to introduce this 
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claim, or he may mean to suggest only that, just as we cannot stop thinking of food when we 
feel hungry, so we cannot stop thinking of ourselves and our qualities and circumstances 
when we feel proud. Either way, in the following paragraph, he asks anew what the causes of 
pride are. He answers that instinct alone cannot cause us to feel proud of ourselves, and that 
some ‘foreign object’ must therefore cause pride (T 2.1.5.7, SBN 287). 
Hume only then claims to ‘discover this cause, and find what it is that gives the first 
motion to pride’ (T 2.1.5.8, SBN 288). He argues that every ‘cause’ of pride is ‘ally’d to the 
object of the passion’ or, in other words, is related to the self (T 2.1.5.8, SBN 288). Every 
‘cause’ also causes a pleasing passion, to which pride will be related by resemblance. Hume 
concludes that these two relations constitute the ‘very principle, which gives rise to pride’ (T 
2.1.5.8, SBN 288). After this, he no longer suggests that the feeling of pride produces the 
idea of the self, presumably because he has now argued that this idea is produced by an 
association of ideas instead. He now clearly states that a relation between some object and the 
self is required before pride can occur: ‘Any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is 
related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object’ 
(T 2.1.5.8, SBN 288). 
Once Hume has established that the idea of the self is not sufficient to cause pride, he 
claims that it is a necessary part of the cause: ‘In order to excite pride, there are always two 
objects we must contemplate, viz. the cause or that object which produces pleasure; and self, 
which is the real object of the passion’ (T 2.1.6.5, SBN 292). Merivale (2019, 135) sees this 
as Hume equivocating over the causal relation between the idea the self and pride, but I 
believe that he has by now firmly rejected the contingency thesis, which would otherwise 
violate his general rule that a ‘cause must be prior to [its] effect’ (T 1.3.15.4, SBN 173). Pride 
cannot produce the idea of the self, if that idea must be contemplated to produce pride. 
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Hume also now claims that pride has ‘in a manner two objects, to which it directs our 
view’ (T 2.1.6.5, SBN 292). Previously, he has insisted that the object of pride is the self. 
However, he has never mentioned being proud of oneself; only of one’s possessions, such as 
‘beauty’, (T 2.1.2.5, SBN 279), or a ‘beautiful house’, (T 2.1.2.6, SBN 279), or ‘handsome 
chairs and tables’ (T 2.1.3.5, SBN 281). He presumably means by these phrases that one may 
be proud of oneself as a beautiful person, or as the owner of a beautiful house, or as the 
owner of handsome chairs and tables. The object of pride is, therefore, ‘in a manner’ two 
objects although, in another manner, it is only one: it is a complex idea of the self as related 
to some pleasing thing. 
Assuming that Hume ultimately rejects the contingency thesis, he can, entirely  
consistently, claim that this complex idea is also the proximate cause of pride. This would 
cohere with his default, causal theory of the intentionality of passions, and with his general 
rule that causes precede effects. This is, I suggest, the most charitable and most plausible 
interpretation of his argument. 
Hume’s considered view is that an association between an idea of an object and the 
related idea of the self is necessary to cause pride or humility: A ‘relation of ideas’ is 
‘requisite… to the production of the passion [of pride or humility]’ (T 2.1.9.5, SBN 305). We 
feel pride ‘upon the appearance of a related object’, and so after a ‘relation or transition of 
thought’ has occurred (T 2.1.9.5, SBN 305). The only relevant transition of ideas is that 
between the idea of some pleasing or painful object and the idea of the self. This transition is 
needed to ‘second a relation of affections, and facilitate the transition from one impression to 
another’ (T 2.1.9.5, SBN 305). Hume means that pride or humility will be the second 
impression to occur: his point is that any pleasures or pains can only be relevant to the causes 
of pride or humility if we experience them before we feel pride or humility. Pride occurs only 
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at the end of the process by which a double relation of ideas and impressions causes it to 
occur. 
To take stock: after T 2.1.5.6 (SBN 286-7), there are no obvious statements of the 
contingency thesis. Instead, Hume argues that, where any idea of a pleasing thing is related to 
the self, it will produce the idea of the self by association, before pride occurs. Throughout, 
he implies that the object of pride is a complex idea of oneself as related to a pleasing thing. 
This strongly suggests that the process that causes pride involves the two ideas combining, to 
form the relevant complex idea. 
When Hume first discusses the associations of ideas, in Book 1, he is primarily 
interested in the ‘associating quality’ that causes simple ideas to ‘fall’ into complex ones (T 
1.1.4.1, SBN 10). Admittedly, he never uses the phrase ‘complex idea’ during his account of 
pride. Nevertheless, when he first mentions the double relation of ideas and impressions, 
Hume claims that any idea that causes pride ‘is easily converted into its cor-relative’: the idea 
of the self (T 2.1.5.5, SBN 286). He cannot mean that the one idea is literally converted into 
the other, but he does allow that ideas ‘are capable of forming a compound by their 
conjunction’ (T 2.2.6.1, SBN 366). Any such compound can only be a complex idea. And the 
most likely complex idea to cause pride, from all that Hume says, is that of the self as related, 
by causation or contiguity, to some pleasing thing. 
This interpretation is consistent with everything that Hume says, apart from the 
contingency thesis. We have seen very good reasons to think that he ultimately rejects this 
thesis. Absent this thesis, and given his default, causal theory of the intentionality of 
passions, Hume can treat it as a conceptual truth (because a matter of definition) that the 
passion called ‘pride’ is directed towards a complex idea of the self, as related to some 
pleasing object. Pride just is that pleasure which is caused by such ideas (T 2.1.7.8, SBN 
297). 
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There is some support for this interpretation in Hume’s later Dissertation on the 
Passions. Merivale (2019, 142) notes an interesting change between two otherwise near-
identical claims that Hume makes in the Treatise and in the Dissertation. In the earlier work, 
he claims that an injured person may ‘find a hundred subjects of discontent, impatience, fear, 
and other uneasy passions; especially if he can discover these subjects in or near the person, 
who was the cause of his first passion’ (T 2.1.4.4, SBN 284, my emphasis). In the 
Dissertation, he says almost the same thing, except he concludes with the mention of ‘the 
person, who was the object of his first emotion’ (P 2.8, Bea 8, my emphasis). 
Merivale (2019, 142) sees this as evidence that Hume may have altered his theory of 
pride between the two works, although he confesses that, aside from this one alteration, 
‘Hume’s presentations of the double-relation theory in the Treatise and the Dissertation are 
almost exactly identical, differing mainly in superficial points of style’. Merivale thinks that, 
unless he was making a substantive change to his view, Hume could only have been 
correcting a mistaken use of the word ‘cause’ in the Treatise. However, I think a third 
possibility more likely than either of these: Hume’s alteration was simply another superficial 
change, because he understands both the proximate cause and object of the person’s hatred as 
a complex idea of some other person who possesses some displeasing characteristic.3  
Hume devotes much more attention to pride and humility than to love and hatred. 
However, he argues that the ‘same qualities that produce pride or humility, cause love or 
 
3 Merivale (2019, 142) describes the relevant passion as ‘anger’ rather than hatred. Hume does not 
name the passion in question, but he describes the person as ‘very much discomposed and ruffled in 
his temper’, which certainly supports this (P 2.8, Bea 8; see also T 2.1.4.4, SBN 284). However, both 
the Treatise and the Dissertation passages occur during his discussions of the double-relation 
passions, so it seems likely that he is discussing one of these. The only plausible contender here is 
hatred. 
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hatred’, but where the idea of the self is replaced by the idea of some other person (T 2.2.1.9, 
SBN 332). There is, however, a further, important difference: pride and humility do not 
typically cause desires, whereas ‘love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin'd 
with benevolence and anger’ (T 2.2.6.3, SBN 367). We want to see those we love happy, and 
those we hate unhappy. 
Given the foregoing, we can conclude that Hume understands love as the kind of 
pleasure that is caused by a complex idea of some person other than oneself, as related, by 
causation or contiguity, to some pleasing thing. To give an example, if I see one person help 
another, then I am likely to form a complex idea of the first person as the cause of the second 
person’s happiness. The idea of this happiness will please me, via sympathy. The more 
complex idea will therefore cause the resembling pleasure of love. 
The instance of love just described is clearly similar to approbation, as Hume 
understands it. Unlike approbation, however, it will be a violent passion of love. 
Nevertheless, we can already see how we might resolve Cohon’s worry, discussed in §1.3, 
regarding the seeming gap between cases where we sympathise with one person and so 
approve of another. Hume has explained, albeit indirectly, how we can love one person when 
we sympathise with another: because, in such cases, love is caused by a complex idea of the 
first person as the cause of the happiness of the second, where this happiness pleases us by 
sympathy. The explanation concerning approbation must be a similar one. 
In Chapter 3, I will argue that Hume claims that all ideas of character traits of 
generally pleasing types cause a certain, calm kind of sympathetic pleasure. Wherever we 
form a complex idea of a person as possessing such a trait, this complex idea will then be the 
cause and object of a similarly calm pleasure of approbation. Before considering this point in 
detail, however, we must consider Hume’s account of the calm passions. 
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2.2. Calm passions 
‘Calm’ passions are those that ‘produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by 
their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation’ (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417; see also T 
2.1.1.3, SBN 276). Baier (1991, 164) notes that Hume and his contemporaries generally mean 
by ‘emotion’ a ‘bodily disturbance’. A calm passion is one without any noticeable degree of 
mental disturbance. A violent passion is one that presents to us as agitated, intensely felt, or 
in some other way mentally disturbing. Calm passions are ones that do not present to us in 
this way. 
Hume does not suggest that we cannot observe the presence of calm passions by 
introspection: he does not claim that the passions themselves are ‘nearly imperceptible’ or – 
worse – ‘imperceptible perceptions’, as Schauber (1999, 362) suggests. For Hume, 
perceptions just are those objects that are ‘immediately present to us by consciousness’, and 
calm passions are perceptions (T 1.4.2.47, SBN 212). They are no less ‘real passions’ than 
the violent ones that we typically call ‘passions’ (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). As Paxman (2015, 
273) argues, they must possess a noticeable, albeit ‘subtle and tranquil’, feeling. This causes 
us to frequently mistake them for the ‘determinations of reason’ (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). 
Hume discusses calm passions at two key points in the Treatise. The first of these is at 
the very beginning of his book on the passions, when he briefly introduces the distinction 
between calm and violent passions (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276). He claims, for example, that a 
typically calm pleasure felt towards music may become violent. Árdal (1966, 94-95) 
understands this to mean that ‘a passion classified as calm can, upon occasion, be violent’, as 
where we move from ‘calmly enjoying something’ that we typically calmly enjoy to being 
‘completely carried away’. I think this is correct, so far as it goes. However, I think Hume’s 
point, although brief, is more important than just this. 
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Hume claims that what we typically call ‘passions’ are ‘more violent than the 
emotions arising from beauty and deformity’, so that we make a ‘vulgar and specious 
division’ between them (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276). For example, fear is commonly called a 
‘passion’, whereas aesthetic disapproval is not, but they are nevertheless both passions. Hume 
will argue for this in greater detail in Book 3, as we will see in Chapter 3. 
Hume describes aesthetic approval as a calm ‘emotion arising from beauty’, by which 
he can only mean that it is caused by whatever is beautiful in virtue of its occurrence (T 
2.1.1.3, SBN 276). This calm passion is contrasted with the ‘raptures’ of music: violent 
emotions, presumably caused by music that we find beautiful (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276). When 
the music finishes, our violent pleasure ‘may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in 
a manner, imperceptible’ (T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276). Hume seems to be suggesting that our taste in 
music is a very calm form of the same kind of joy that listening to music may cause. 
Similarly, the ‘sense of beauty and deformity in action’ appears to be a calm ‘kind’ of a 
certain passion, of which the violent kind comprises the ‘passions of love and hatred’ (T 
2.1.1.3, SBN 276). This already suggests that calm forms of love and hatred constitute what 
Hume will later (in T 3.1.2) call the ‘moral sense’: the sentiments of approbation and 
disapprobation. 
The second key discussion of calm passions in Book 2 concerns only direct passions: 
‘certain calm desires and tendencies’ (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). These are of two kinds: ‘either 
certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the 
love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, 
consider’d merely as such’ (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). Hume argues that violent desires are 
typically more motivationally powerful than calm ones (T 2.3.8.13, SBN 437-8). However, 
he allows that calm desires can sometimes be ‘strong’, or powerfully motivating, and so 
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overcome more violent passions (T 2.3.4.1, SBN 418-9). Hume claims that this is what we 
call ‘strength of mind’ (T 2.3.3.10, SBN 418). 
The passions that Hume calls ‘desires’ and ‘aversions’ at T 2.3.9.1 (SBN 438) are 
violent passions, caused by impressions or ideas of ‘pain and pleasure’. Cohon (2008, 164) 
argues that Hume distinguishes between desires that are caused in this way and instinctive 
desires, such as hunger, lust, and the desire to be kind to children. I broadly agree, although I 
disagree with Cohon’s (2008, 164) claim that instinctive desires occur in ways ‘for which we 
cannot give any causal explanation’. Hume believes that all passions are caused by 
identifiable, prior perceptions: they are ‘secondary’ impressions (T 2.1.1.1, SBN 275). 
Kemp Smith (1966, 168) argues that the instinctive passions are neither direct nor 
indirect: they are not desires, but what he calls ‘primary’ passions, which play the roles 
typically taken by pains and pleasure in the production of desires. However, this cannot be 
right: one such passion is clearly named as ‘the desire of punishment to our enemies’ (T 
2.3.9.8, SBN 439). This is the violent form of that instinctive desire which, when calm, Hume 
calls ‘resentment’ (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). 
Hume discusses several violent, instinctive desires within his account of the direct 
passions, in the paragraph immediately following his discussion of the violent desires and 
aversions that are caused by perceptions of pain or pleasure. The instinctive desires appear to 
be desires and aversions that are caused by perceptions other than ideas of any pleasure that 
will be gained, or of any pain that will be avoided, by acting on them. What Hume calls 
‘hunger’ and ‘lust’ are, presumably, violent desires caused directly by physical sensations (T 
2.3.9.8, SBN 439). Hume claims that some calm desires are also instinctive, or caused by 
perceptions other than ideas of pain or pleasure. The ‘love of life’, for example, is 
presumably the desire to avoid death, which will be caused by ideas of one’s death; even, 
presumably, in cases where one believes in a pleasurable afterlife (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). 
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In fact, all passions are fundamentally instinctive: each type of passion is caused, 
seemingly as a matter of brute fact, by some identifiable type of perception or set of 
perceptions. Double-relation passions occur as they do only by instinct (T 2.1.5.3, SBN 286). 
Instinct ensures that benevolence is caused by the passion of love (T 2.2.6.6, SBN 368). It is 
also ‘instinct’ that ensures that perceptions of pleasure cause desires and that perceptions of 
pain cause aversions (T 2.3.9.2, SBN 438).  
In summary, Hume appears to merely distinguish those desires that are caused by 
perceptions of pleasure or pain from those that are caused by other perceptions. Most desires, 
as discussed at T 2.3.9.2, are instinctively caused by feelings of pleasure (which one then 
desires to continue) or of pain (which one then desires to avoid), or by ideas of some pleasure 
that will occur if one acts, or of some pain that will occur if one does not act. Some desires, 
such as hunger, benevolence, and the desire to be kind to children, are at least sometimes 
instinctively caused by other kinds of perceptions than these. Nevertheless, for want of better 
terms, I will call the former kind ‘learned’ and the latter kind ‘instinctive’. 
With this in mind, we can see that Hume provides a taxonomy of three types of calm 
passion. In T 2.1.1.3 (SBN 276), he discusses calm pleasures and pains, which appear to 
include the moral passions: calm forms of the indirect passions of love and hatred. In T 
2.3.3.8 (SBN 417), he discusses calm instinctive desires, such as the desires to be kind to 
children and to avoid death, and calm learned desires, which he summarises as ‘the general 
appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider’d merely as such’. Later, he discusses similar, 
violent desires. Violent instinctive desires include those for food and sex, as well as the 
‘desire of punishment to our enemies’ (T 2.3.9.8, SBN 439). Violent learned desires are those 
that arise ‘from good [and evil] consider’d simply’ (T 2.3.9.7, SBN 439).  
All three kinds of calm passion appear to be easily confused for reasoned beliefs. 
Moral sentiments, and other sentiments of taste, are often mistaken for evaluative beliefs. 
 58 
For example, if I sincerely say that blues music is a valuable and important genre, then I am, 
it seems, expressing a calm pleasure at the thought of blues music. This is an expression of 
my taste, and taste is ‘plainly nothing but a sensation of pleasure’ (T 2.1.7.7, SBN 297). I 
am, of course, aware that I take this view: introspection reveals an evaluative perception. 
However, I am likely to mistake it for a belief about the value of blues music, because it 
feels far less violent than my feelings of pleasure when I listen to, for example, Nina Simone 
singing ‘Nobody’s Fault but Mine’. What I take to be a perception that represents the value 
of blues music is, in fact, a calm perception of pleasure, directed towards my general idea of 
blues music, and with no representative properties. 
Calm instinctive desires seem unlike mere preferences: it seems reasonable to seek 
the best for our loved ones, or to be kind to children, or to avoid death. Calm learned desires 
presumably feel like beliefs about how we ought to act, as where we feel that we ought not 
perform an action because we disapprove of the idea of it. 
Our question now is, how should we understand the causes of these passions? 
 
2.2.1. What makes a calm passion calm? 
Loeb (2005, 4-6) argues that a ‘calm’ passion is one that forms a settled and stable element 
within one’s psychology, whereas violent passions are ‘volatile’. I do not think this is what 
Hume means by ‘calmness’ or ‘violence’. In both T 2.1.1.3 (SBN 276) and T 2.3.3.8 (SBN 
417), he quite clearly uses ‘calmness’ to refer to a lack of emotional feeling. However, I 
somewhat similarly understand Hume to argue that we experience calm passions more 
frequently than violent ones, and that they are consistently experienced towards the same 
kinds of objects, as violent passions are not. Certainly, Loeb (2005, 4) points to something 
interesting when he claims that one passage in particular is ‘suggestive of a more 
fundamental distinction [between calm and violent passions] than emotional intensity’. 
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In the relevant passage, Hume argues that the calmness of a passion is not simply due 
to its motivational weakness, but rather that ‘when a passion has once become a settled 
principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it commonly produces no 
longer any sensible agitation’ (T 2.3.4.1, SBN 418-9). Hume then makes a further claim that 
Loeb pays surprisingly little attention to: 
 
Both [violent and calm] passions pursue good, and avoid evil; and both 
of them are encreas'd or diminish'd by the encrease or diminution of the 
good or evil. But herein lies the difference betwixt them: The same good, 
when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces 
only a calm one (T 2.3.4.1, SBN 419). 
 
The most obvious interpretation of this last sentence is that a calm passion is one felt 
towards some object that is distant in time or space. Magri (2008, 198) understands Hume to 
be arguing that desires for distant objects are ‘only minimally distorted by the accidental 
features’ of their objects. This causes them to be calmer than desires for nearer objects, as 
well as a better guide to the ‘greatest good’ (Magri 2008, 198).  
There are several problems with this interpretation, however. For one, there seems no 
good reason why evaluations of distant objects should be consistently preferable to 
evaluations of closer objects. There are surely other ways of correctly identifying an object’s 
real features than by remaining at a literal distance from it. Moreover, Hume claims in this 
same passage that calm passions can be motivationally effective because they have been 
caused by ‘repeated custom’, and there is no obvious connection between custom and distance 
in space or time (T 2.3.4.1, SBN 419). We need an interpretation that allows for repeated 
 60 
custom to produce the relevant kind of distance. A clue to this lies in Hume’s definitions of 
calm and violent learned desires. 
Hume’s definition of a violent learned desire is as follows: ‘Desire arises from good 
consider'd simply, and aversion is deriv'd from evil’ (T 2.3.9.7, SBN 439). He defines a calm 
learned desire as ‘the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as 
such’ (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). The only substantive difference between the two definitions 
appears to be the addition of the word ‘general’ to the definition of a calm learned desire. At 
least, I take it that there is no important difference between considering something ‘simply’ 
and ‘merely as such’: Hume presumably means to indicate by these phrases that learned 
desires are directly and ‘immediately’ caused by perceptions of pleasure or pain, without 
requiring ‘the conjunction of other qualities’ (T 2.1.1.4, SBN 276). 
These definitions suggest that violent desires are caused by particular ideas of 
pleasure or pain, whereas calmer desires are caused by more general ideas of pleasure or 
pain. Cohon (2010) argues for something similar. She focuses on Hume’s discussion of 
‘strength of mind’, in which he argues that the calm passions are at work whenever people 
‘counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs’ (T 2.3.3.10, SBN 
418). This suggests to Cohon (2010, 44), very reasonably, that the general appetite to good is 
‘the desire for one’s own long-term well-being, or interest’, which one will consider only in 
general terms. However, I will argue that the notion of generality plays a more central role 
within Hume’s theory of calm passions than even Cohon suggests. 
Hume does not describe calm pleasures or pains as ‘general’ in T 2.1.1.3 (SBN 276). 
However, I believe that the idea is implicit even here. To enjoy the particular auditory 
impressions as one listens to a song is to experience a violent pleasure. Thinking about the 
song later, where one is not presented with its particular features, one may feel a calmer 
pleasure. A yet calmer pleasure constitutes one’s taste for that type of music generally. It is, 
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again, the level of generality of the perception which causes a passion that fundamentally 
determines whether the passion is a calm or a violent one. 
 
2.2.2. Calm passions as caused by general ideas 
McIntyre (2000, 83) notes several factors that Hume claims can increase the violence of a 
passion: ‘proximity, especially in space or in the near future’; ‘uncertainty, opposition’; 
‘novelty’, and ‘particularity’. However, McIntyre does not mention that, of these, only 
particularity – as opposed to ‘generality’ – is treated to a new section: ‘Of the effects of 
custom’ (T 2.3.5). 
Hume begins this section by claiming that custom ‘has two original effects upon the 
mind’ (T 2.3.5.1, SBN 422). The first of these is to bestow a ‘facility in the performance of 
any action or the conception of any object’ (T 2.3.5.1, SBN 422). To conceive of an object is 
to form an idea of it. Hume argues that we can form ideas of familiar things more easily than 
we can of unfamiliar things. To understand his argument, we must consider his theory of 
general ideas. 
In Book 1, Hume argues that ‘all general ideas are nothing but particular ones, 
annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them 
recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them’ (T 1.1.7.1, SBN 17). 
General or abstract ideas are the same mental objects as particular ideas, given a different 
function. We may, to use Hume’s phrase, ‘turn our view’ to one idea in several ways, 
depending on the role it is playing within our thought at the time (T 1.1.7.18, SBN 25). 
Hume seeks to explain the formation of abstract ideas by arguing that we often notice 
a ‘resemblance’ between certain ideas, so that we come to apply the same name to them and 
thereby categorise them together (T 1.1.7.7, SBN 20). Garrett (2002, 104) calls the groups in 
which ideas are ‘annexed to a term’ ‘revival sets’. If I infer that you desire to help someone, 
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for example, then I will notice the similarity between my idea of your desire and my ideas of 
those desires called ‘generosity’. I will then place the idea of your desire in my revival set of 
generosity, and call this token desire ‘generosity’.  
I can, of course, use the term ‘generosity’ to refer generally to desires of this type. 
When I do this, one of the particular ideas from the relevant revival set will come to mind 
and, somehow, represent all other ideas in that set, so that it will function as my abstract idea 
of generosity. Hume thus embraces the ‘paradox, that some ideas are particular in their 
nature, but general in their representation’ (T 1.1.7.10, SBN 22). 
Hume’s theory allows for more subtle distinctions than just that between particular 
and abstract ideas. It suggests that we can turn our view to an idea in ways that make it 
neither fully abstract nor simply particular. To give a pertinent example for what is to follow, 
my idea of your generosity can be viewed not only as the idea of your particular motive or as 
the abstract idea of generosity, but also as the idea of your motive just insofar as it is a token 
of generosity. Indeed, we must view an idea in this way wherever we observe the 
resemblance between a particular idea of a motive and those ideas of motives called 
‘generosity’, such that we classify it as a motive of generosity. 
Following Hume, I will use the term ‘general notion’ to refer to any idea of an object, 
where the idea is viewed such that the object is considered merely as a token of some general 
type. Hume uses this phrase at only a few points: most notably, in discussions at T 2.3.6.2 
(SBN 424) and T 2.3.6.4 (SBN 426), which we will soon consider, and during a discussion of 
moral judgement at T 3.3.3.2 (SBN 603), which we will consider in Chapter 6. Note that 
objects may be thought of as tokens of types that are more or less general: the general notion 
of a generous motive is in this sense a less general idea than the same idea when viewed as 
the general notion of a useful or agreeable motive. 
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To return to T 2.3.5.1 (SBN 422), I take Hume to be saying that, just as custom makes 
us more skilful at performing certain actions, so it makes us more skilful at forming general 
notions. Where an idea resembles others that we have frequently experienced, we find it 
easier to place it within a relevant revival set, and to name it, than we do where the idea is a 
relatively unusual one.  
Hume then tells us about a further effect of custom: it creates in us a ‘tendency or 
inclination’ to perform actions or conceptions with which we are familiar (T 2.3.5.1, SBN 
422). Drawing on his previous point, this suggests that, whenever we encounter an object with 
very familiar features, so that it closely resembles objects that we have previously 
experienced, we have a strong tendency to place it in the relevant revival set, and to apply the 
relevant general term to it. When we come across anything familiar, we will habitually and 
quickly form a general notion of it as a token of its type. We may immediately categorise 
someone’s motive as a ‘generous’ one, without requiring any conscious reflection to do so, 
but we would be unlikely to so easily categorise or name a token of a less common motive 
type, such as one of asceticism, for example. 
In the next section, Hume claims that, ‘[w]herever our ideas of good or evil acquire a 
new vivacity, the passions become more violent; and keep pace with the imagination in all its 
variations’ (T 2.3.6.1, SBN 424). This appears platitudinous: if I believe in a future pleasure, I 
will of course feel more violent joy than if I simply imagine it. This does not, however, seem 
to be the kind of distinction that Hume has in mind. His point is that ‘the more general and 
universal any of our ideas are, the less influence they have upon the imagination’ (T 2.3.6.2, 
SBN 425). If I form a ‘particular and determinate idea’ of some future pleasure, then I will 
feel a more violent joy than if I form an idea of that pleasure conceived only ‘under the 
general notion of pleasure’ (T 2.3.6.2, SBN 424). This seems to be because I have more to 
believe about the future pleasure when I have a more detailed, particular idea in mind than 
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when I have only a general notion. Ideas must be vivid to cause violent passions, and Hume 
appears to be suggesting that any particular and determinate idea is a highly complex one, 
comprising many vivid, simple ideas. 
Hume’s discussion of this is all very brief. Fortunately, he provides an example. He 
discusses a case from democratic Athens, in which the people were offered a vote on a 
proposed action, about which they were told only two things. They were told that it would 
benefit them all greatly in some way, and that it would be in some way unjust. The 
implication is that each Athenian felt two equally calm desires: one to gain some unknown 
benefit and the other to be just. They voted against the proposal which, Hume observes, may 
seem strange to many, because ‘the advantage was immediate to the Athenians’ (T 2.3.6.4, 
SBN 426). However, he claims that he can explain their actions: 
 
 [Because the potential benefit] was known only under the general notion of 
advantage, without being conceiv'd by any particular idea, it must have had 
a less considerable influence on their imaginations, and have been a less 
violent temptation, than if they had been acquainted with all its 
circumstances (T 2.3.6.4, SBN 426). 
 
The moral seems clear: general notions cause only calm passions. Only particular 
ideas have enough influence on the mind to cause violent passions. If the Athenians had 
formed an idea of some particular potential advantage, then they would have felt a violent 
desire for it, which would have required considerable ‘strength of mind’ to overcome (T 
2.3.3.10, SBN 418). However, they had only the general notion of advantage, and this 
produced only a calm desire. 
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Recall that passions may be made violent by proximity, by uncertainty or opposition, 
or by novelty. All these are factors that are liable to make us focus on a particular object and 
its particular features. In contrast, the features that will make a passion calm are listed by 
McIntyre (2000, 83) as ‘distance, especially in past time’, ‘security’, and ‘familiarity’. Hume 
seems to suggest that, wherever some object is long past, securely ours, or very familiar, we 
pay no close attention to it, so that we do not consider its particular features. We might think 
of something like a familiar painting that has long been in the hall, which we think of merely 
as that painting in the hall. Similarly, if we disbelieve that an object exists, or if we believe in 
an object in some distant land, then we will typically have fewer particular details in mind 
than when we consider nearby objects that we believe to exist. Indeed, many of our ideas of 
distant objects or events, and most of those of distant, future events, will be general notions: 
we will have nothing to form an idea of other than that which we generally associate with 
objects of the relevant type. 
To summarise the key points of Hume’s argument: an idea will typically produce a 
violent passion only where it is highly vivid, which typically or always requires it to be an 
idea of some particular and determinate object. Most violent passions are caused by beliefs 
about particular, nearby, pleasurable or painful objects. Wherever we turn our view to an idea 
such that it functions more generally than this, as with a general notion or an abstract idea, 
the idea will cause only a calm passion. 
We saw in §2.1 that love is caused by a complex idea, comprising an idea of a person 
other than oneself and an idea of something closely related to her that causes a pleasure of 
some kind. As approbation is a calm form of love, it presumably has a similar cause, where 
one or more of the ideas within the complex idea is a general idea of some kind. In Chapter 3, 
I argue that Hume indicates where this idea is to be found, and how it causes approbation, in 
his discussions of ‘delicate sympathy’ (T 3.3.1.8, SBN 577). 
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3. A Calm and General Love: Hume’s Theory of Approbation 
This chapter draws on my arguments from Chapters 1 and 2 to demonstrate that Hume 
understands approbation as a calm form of love which, along with disapprobation, constitutes 
our taste in character traits.  
In §3.1, I argue that Hume believes that all approbation is produced via a ‘delicate’ 
kind of sympathy, that responds to certain kinds of general notions, as discussed in §2.2.2. In 
§3.2, I argue that this allows Hume to distinguish the causes of approbation from those of 
love, so that he may consistently endorse theses (1), (2), and (3), as set out at the start of 
Chapter 1. We will see that Hume claims that approbation is always caused via sympathy 
with non-believed ideas of pleasure. In §3.3, I will argue that Hume can nevertheless allow 
that approbation may, in turn, produce motivationally efficacious desires, in accordance with 
his theory of motivation. Finally, §.3.4 addresses Hume’s later moral Enquiry. I will argue 
that Hume’s Enquiry account of approbation is consistent in all its fundamental details with 
his Treatise account.  
 
3.1. The causes of approbation 
Hume’s arguments about the causes of approbation involve an account of what he calls 
‘delicate sympathy’: ‘Wherever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in the 
possessor, or in other words, is the proper cause of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, 
by a delicate sympathy with the possessor’ (T 3.3.1.8, SBN 576-7). This passage occurs in 
the course of his response to what Cohon (2010, 131) calls the ‘“virtue in rags” objection’. 
Hume sees this as a potential objection to his thesis that all moral sentiments are caused by 
sympathy. We approve of people who want to help others even where we know that they 
cannot help anyone, as where they are isolated in a ‘dungeon or desart’ (T 3.3.1.19, SBN 
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584). In such cases, there can be no beneficiaries with whom we may sympathise, so why do 
we approve? 
Hume answers that sympathy produces approbation in such cases because it is readily 
influenced by custom: ‘General rules create a species of probability, which sometimes 
influences the judgment, and always the imagination’ (T 3.3.1.20, SBN 585). This answer 
builds on arguments from throughout the Treatise. 
 
3.1.1. General rules 
Hume’s Book 1 account of the influence of general rules on the imagination is as follows: 
 
Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv'd from habit and 
experience; and when we have been accustom'd to see one object united to 
another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a natural 
transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it 
(T 1.3.13.8, SBN 147). 
 
 As Hume notes, this is a description of a process of causal reasoning: ‘all reasonings 
are nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but by inlivening the 
imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object’ (T 1.3.13.11, SBN 149). 
However, general rules are those reasoning processes that occur rapidly and unreflectively.  
 Hume implies that we give the names ‘sense and reason’ to only those processes of 
general rules that ultimately produce reflectively endorsed beliefs (T 1.3.13.7, SBN 146-7). 
General rules often cause ideas to come to mind, and to become vivid, regardless of any 
reflective consideration of our situation. These ideas are often incompatible with what we call 
our ‘beliefs’, which are typically only those vivid ideas that we endorse once we have 
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reflected on our situation. Hume does not give a name to our unreflectively enlivened ideas, 
but I will call them ‘quasi-beliefs’. 
It is because general rules produce quasi-beliefs that they are ‘the source of what we 
properly call Prejudice’ (T 1.3.13.7, SBN 146). Prejudice occurs wherever people form quasi-
beliefs about the qualities of others, which continue to ‘influence their judgment, even 
contrary to present observation and experience’ (T 1.3.13.8, SBN 147): 
 
An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity; for 
which reason, tho' the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly 
very agreeable, and of the latter very judicious, we have entertain'd such a 
prejudice against them, that they must be dunces or fops in spite of sense 
and reason (T 1.3.13.7, SBN 146-7). 
 
Hume argues that quasi-beliefs are very often incompatible with our beliefs. In such 
cases, ‘our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other’ (T 1.3.13.12, SBN 
149). For example, Hume describes how someone ‘hung out from a high tower in a cage of 
iron cannot forbear trembling, when he surveys the precipice below him, tho’ he knows 
himself to be perfectly secure from falling’ (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148). The idea of falling is 
associated with the impression of the ground at a great distance below him, just as the idea of 
solidity is associated with the impression of iron. Both ideas come immediately to the 
person’s mind via custom, before he has any time to reflect. They are, however, incompatible 
as beliefs, because the solidity of the iron prevents falling. 
Here, the person in the cage will very likely ‘correct’ for the idea of falling by ‘a 
reflection on the nature of [his] circumstances’ (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148). In this way, he will 
reflectively endorse his vivid idea of his remaining safely within the cage. However, the 
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quasi-belief of falling will persist, and will retain some ‘force and vivacity, which make it 
superior to the mere fictions of the fancy’ (T 1.3.13.9, SBN 148). Part of its superiority, 
presumably, is that it can cause fear and ‘trembling’ (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148).  
This quasi-belief is, we must assume, a particular and detailed idea – that of falling 
from the cage in question – so that it will be a complex idea, comprising many simple ideas 
of what it would be like to fall. These simple ideas are all unbelieved, but each one is still 
vivid to some extent. Therefore, given Hume’s understanding of the causes of violent 
passions, as discussed in §2.2, we can assume that the complex idea will produce a violent 
passion of fear. Moreover, the contrary belief cannot banish this complex idea from the mind: 
general rules precede our reflection and ‘cannot be prevented by it’ (T 1.3.13.8, SBN 147). In 
this way, Hume explains how we may feel fear in cases where we believe ourselves to be 
safe. 
Although this person’s quasi-belief and his belief in his safety within the cage are 
both vivid ideas within his imagination, he is likely to claim that he ‘judges’ that he is safe, 
but that he cannot help vividly ‘imagining’ falling. In such cases, the ‘opposition of these two 
principles [of general rules] produces a contrariety in our thoughts, and causes us to ascribe 
the one inference to our judgment, and the other to our imagination’ (T 1.3.13.11, SBN 149). 
There is, however, no fundamental difference in kind between a vivid, ‘imagined’ idea of 
falling and a ‘reasoned’ belief in one’s safety. 
In Book 2, Hume applies his theses of general rules and of quasi-beliefs to the 
operations of sympathy. He argues that they may cause us to feel passions that we do not 
believe to be felt by those with whom we sympathise. For example, where we encounter 
someone who is clearly not ‘dejected by [her] misfortunes’, we nevertheless associate her 
misfortunes with feelings of dejection, with which we then sympathise (T 2.2.7.5, SBN 370). 
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This is why we feel pained for those people who remain unperturbed in the face of 
misfortune, according to Hume.  
 
3.1.2. Hume’s response to the ‘virtue in rags’ objection  
In Book 3, Hume explains cases of virtue in rags by arguing that we possess a ‘delicate’ kind 
of sympathy, which is so readily influenced by general rules that it ensures that we may 
approve of any character trait that is ‘fitted to be beneficial to society’, even where we do not 
believe that it will cause any happiness (T 3.3.1.20, SBN 585). We approve because we 
associate such traits with causing happiness, so that ‘the imagination passes easily from the 
cause to the effect, without considering that there are still some circumstances wanting to 
render the cause a compleat one’ (T 3.3.1.20, SBN 585).  
If we infer that a person in a dungeon or desert has a benevolent motive, then, even if 
we know that she will never benefit anyone, we will habitually form a quasi-belief about the 
kind of happiness that benevolence typically causes. This idea will cause a sympathetic 
pleasure. We will then experience approbation, because the moral sentiments, like all 
‘sentiments of beauty’, are ‘mov’d by degrees of liveliness and strength, which are inferior to 
belief, and independent of the real existence of their objects’ (T 3.3.1.20, SBN 585). This all 
appears to occur entirely unreflectively and habitually. 
Unlike the man in the iron cage’s quasi-belief about falling, the idea of happiness just 
discussed, with which we may sympathise, must be a general notion, as well as a quasi-belief. 
It is an idea caused merely by a general notion of benevolence, and it can only be conceived 
under the general notion of the kind of pleasure that benevolence typically causes. Any 
sympathetic pleasure that it causes will therefore be a calm passion. 
In Book 3, Hume discusses several, non-moral cases where we may be influenced by 
delicate sympathy. For example, when silently reading some clumsy writing, we may 
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sympathise with the ‘uneasiness’ of someone reading it aloud, simply because we have often 
heard people struggle when reading such writing aloud (T 3.3.1.22, SBN 585-6). We 
presumably have no particular person in mind: the idea of uneasiness will be a general 
notion. Moreover, we will surely not so much as reflect on whether the idea of this 
uneasiness might represent anything real: the idea must be a quasi-belief. This quasi-believed 
general notion of uneasiness can only cause a calm sympathetic pain: a sentiment of taste, 
such that we judge the writing ‘harsh and disagreeable’ (T 3.3.1.22, SBN 586). 
Hume then implies that the kind of sympathy just discussed is the same kind of 
‘extensive’ sympathy ‘on which our sentiments of virtue depend’ (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586). In 
Book 2, he has contrasted extensive sympathy with ‘limited’ sympathy (T 2.2.9.15, SBN 
387). Limited sympathy is that which is caused by particular beliefs about a nearby person’s 
pains or pleasures, as felt in ‘the present moment’ (T 2.2.9.13, SBN 385). It will, therefore, 
typically produce violent sympathetic pains or pleasures. 
In Book 2, Hume’s main discussion of extensive sympathy concerns cases where we 
form beliefs about a person’s life, beyond that which is immediately present to us (T 2.2.9.14, 
SBN 386). If I see a child in poverty, then I may feel a violent pain via limited sympathy. I 
may also form beliefs about her unseen family, or about her future hardships, and I will then 
feel further sympathetic pains, via extensive sympathy. 
As we have seen, delicate sympathy is a different kind of extensive sympathy from 
that discussed at T 2.2.9.14. Delicate sympathy is that kind which occurs where we 
sympathise with quasi-believed general notions of pain or pleasure. Any sympathetic 
pleasure or pain so produced can only be a calm passion. (For simplicity, I will henceforth 
generally refer to quasi-believed general notions merely as ‘quasi-beliefs’. Although some 
quasi-beliefs may be particular ideas, and so cause violent passions, we need not consider 
these further.) 
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In Book 3, Hume mainly discusses delicate sympathy in relation to aesthetic 
sentiments, and in his response to the virtue in rags objection. It is therefore tempting to 
understand him to argue that, although approbation is typically produced via limited 
sympathy, it is in some atypical cases produced via delicate sympathy. However, we saw that 
he implies that our ‘sentiments of virtue’ depend on delicate sympathy (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 
586). Delicate sympathy always causes calm passions, whereas limited sympathy typically 
causes violent passions, as do many cases of non-delicate, extensive sympathy. Moreover, 
Hume defines ‘virtuous’ character traits as those that cause ‘pleasure by the mere survey’ by 
being ‘naturally fitted’ to be useful or agreeable (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591). In the discussion 
leading up to this definition, he has identified only one process – that by which we experience 
a delicate sympathy with quasi-beliefs about pleasure – which causes us to automatically feel 
a calm pleasure towards just those traits that are ‘fitted to be beneficial to society’ (T 
3.3.1.20, SBN 585). This suggests that he intends us to understand this as the kind of process 
by which approbation is always caused. 
Clearly, we do not think that a benevolent person in a dungeon has a less virtuous 
motive than a similarly benevolent but free person, just because she cannot act on her 
benevolent desires. Moreover, we do not need to reflect on or compare these two motives in 
any detail if we are to evaluate these two characters equally. We simply approve of anyone 
whom we take to be benevolent. Hume relies on his accounts of general rules, quasi-beliefs, 
and delicate sympathy to explain this: whenever we see someone with a benevolent motive, 
we habitually form an idea of the kind of happiness that benevolence typically causes, 
sympathise with it, and then experience a strong, but calm, approbation. This all suggests, I 
think rightly, that Hume intends to argue that all instances of approbation are caused purely 
via a process whereby token character traits habitually and unreflectively cause quasi-beliefs 
about pleasure, with which we sympathise via delicate sympathy. 
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Hume thus argues for a distinction, but also a strong parallel, between reflective causal 
reasoning and the kind of unreflective process that produces a moral sentiment. Moral 
judgements are caused via delicate sympathy with quasi-beliefs, and they rely on no 
reflectively endorsed beliefs about the effects of the traits that cause them. However, the 
process by which a quasi-belief is formed is itself a process of the customary association of 
ideas, and of the transference of vivacity, as is any process of reasoning. Although moral 
sentiments are not formed by processes of reflectively endorsed reasoning, they are formed 
by processes that are very similar, and just as reliant on experience, as those that are 
reflectively endorsed. The judgements that these processes produce are not ideas that feel 
believed, but rather passions that feel like believed ideas. 
If all moral judgements are produced by delicate sympathy, as suggested above, then 
Hume must endorse the following thesis:  
 
GENERALITY: All ideas of typically beneficial or pleasing character traits  
    habitually cause approbation, all ideas of typically   
    harmful or displeasing character traits habitually cause  
    disapprobation, and the strength of any moral sentiment is  
    dependent only on the degree of happiness or unhappiness  
    with which the type of trait is generally associated.  
 
According to Generality, the moral sentiments are uniform:  
 
UNIFORMITY: Any kind of evaluative or psychological response is  
    uniform if and only if it is such as to respond in the same  
    way towards all token character traits of any one type,  
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    regardless of how the responder is related to the person  
    whose trait it is, or is affected by the particular   
    effects of the token trait. 
 
These are not, of course, Hume’s terms. I will call a kind of evaluative or 
psychological response ‘variable’ where it is such as to respond differently towards different 
tokens of the same general type of character trait, depending on one’s relation to the person 
whose trait it is, or on the particular effects that the token trait has on oneself. According to 
Generality, approbation is uniform rather than variable: any motive of benevolence, for 
example, will produce a strong but calm, sentiment of approbation, regardless of our beliefs 
about its context or likely effects, via a purely habitual and automatic process. 
Unfortunately, rather than arguing for this directly, Hume argues more generally that 
all sentiments of taste, not just sentiments of moral taste, are caused by general rules and 
quasi-beliefs. His core thesis is that the ‘seeming tendencies of objects affect the mind: And 
the emotions they excite are of a like species with those, which proceed from the real 
consequences of objects, but their feeling is different’ (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586). General rules 
very often produce quasi-beliefs about the typical consequences of token objects, which then 
cause calm passions. Any such passion will be of the same kind that we would also feel 
violently if we were to believe in such consequences. For example, wherever we see a 
building that ‘seems clumsy and tottering to the eye’, we experience a calm ‘fear’, which 
causes (or, perhaps, is) a ‘sentiment of disapprobation’, such that we find the building ‘ugly’ 
(T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586). 
No delicate sympathy is involved in causing the kind of sentiment just discussed. 
Although Hume does discuss delicate sympathy in this paragraph, he does so only to argue 
that we may feel a calm ‘pain and disapprobation’ even where we feel no violent pains via 
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limited sympathy (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586). He does not piece together his arguments 
concerning approbation in any one section. However, we may now do so on his behalf. 
 
3.2 Reconciling Hume’s claims about approbation 
I began Chapter 1 by summarising three core theses within Hume’s theory of approbation, as 
follows: (1) Approbation is a calm form of the ‘indirect’ passion of love; (2) Approbation is a 
sentiment of taste, in virtue of which we come to value useful and agreeable kinds of 
character traits; (3) Approbation is in all cases caused, via sympathy, by an idea of a 
character trait with a ‘tendency to the good of mankind’. We are now in a position to 
reconcile these claims. 
We have seen that love is that violent pleasure caused by a complex idea of some 
person other than oneself, and of something pleasing that is closely related to that person by 
causation or contiguity. Approbation is a calm pleasure that is similarly caused by a complex 
idea, comprising an idea of a person and an idea of some character trait of hers that causes 
one to feel a calm pleasure, via delicate sympathy with a quasi-belief about the type of 
pleasure that one associates with such traits. 
We approve of any ‘character’ that is ‘naturally fitted’ to cause happiness (T 3.3.1.30, 
SBN 591). This is best understood as a token character trait of some generally pleasing type. 
However, Hume clearly assumes that we regard any such trait as a person’s trait. This is 
understandable enough, since any idea of a character trait will be strongly associated with 
that of a person. Any complex idea that causes approbation therefore includes at least an idea 
of a character trait, an idea of some person whose trait it is, and – because the relevant trait is 
one that we take to be ‘naturally fitted’ to cause happiness – an idea of the kind of happiness 
that such character traits generally cause. 
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 We saw in §2.1.1 that Hume often talks of being proud of some possession, such as a 
beautiful house, where he means that one is proud of oneself as the owner of that possession. 
We saw in §1.3 that Hume claims that the object of approbation is always a motive, or other 
character trait, but that he nevertheless frequently discusses our approval of people. In both 
cases, Hume appears to simply assume the idea of a person. Just as pride is always caused by 
a complex idea of oneself as the owner of a pleasing possession, it appears that approbation is 
always caused by the complex idea of a person with a motive, or other character trait, of 
some typically pleasing kind. 
 For any such complex idea to cause approbation, the idea of the motive must be a 
general notion, or a general idea of some other kind, because only general ideas can cause 
calm passions via delicate sympathy. The idea of the person may presumably be either 
general or particular. If we form the abstract idea of a benevolent person, then general rules 
and delicate sympathy will, presumably, ensure that we approve of this general kind of 
person. This is, presumably, what happens whenever we sincerely say, ‘benevolent people 
are virtuous’. 
If we form an idea of a particular benevolent person, then we can turn our view to the 
idea of her motive in at least two ways. We can view it as the idea of the particular motive of 
the particular person, such that we may feel pleasure (whether via limited sympathy or more 
directly) from our impressions of, or beliefs about, its particular effects. Viewed in this way, 
our idea of a person with a benevolent motive may or may not cause the violent passion of 
love, depending on the context. However, we are also very likely to view the idea as a 
general notion, as we will habitually form a conception of the motive as a ‘benevolent’ one. 
We will then habitually form a quasi-belief about the kind of happiness that benevolence 
typically causes, sympathise with it, and experience approbation. 
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This explains the double relation of ideas and impressions that causes approbation. 
The relation of ideas occurs where a general notion (or other general idea) of a person’s 
motive is associated with an idea of the happiness that such motives typically cause. These 
associated ideas combine to form a complex idea of a person with a motive that causes 
happiness. The relatively simple (quasi-believed) idea of happiness produces a calm pleasure, 
via delicate sympathy. The more complex idea then causes a calm pleasure of approbation, 
related to the sympathetic pleasure by resemblance. Approbation is always caused in this 
way. This gives us (1): Approbation is a calm form of the ‘indirect’ passion of love. It also 
gives us (3): Approbation is in all cases caused, via sympathy, by an idea of a character trait 
with a ‘tendency to the good of mankind’. 
Just as a calm fear will occur wherever we see a seemingly tottering building, 
regardless of our beliefs, any token motive of a generally pleasing type will cause 
approbation, regardless of our beliefs: ‘The imagination adheres to the general views of 
things, and distinguishes betwixt the feelings they produce, and those which arise from our 
particular and momentary situation’ (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586). By this, Hume means that we can 
distinguish our calm sentiments of taste, caused by quasi-believed general notions, from our 
violent passions of the same kind, caused by particular beliefs, even where these occur 
together.1 I may disapprove of someone for her cruelty even as I love her for her courage, and 
I will not confuse the calm sentiment with the violent passion. Indeed, I may simultaneously 
love her for her courage, where I view the idea of her courage as a particular idea, even as I 
approve of her for her courage, where the same idea is viewed as a general notion. 
 
1 Any quasi-belief of the building falling that caused a violent fear would have to be a particular idea, 
and so also distinct from the quasi-believed general notion that causes a calm fear. 
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Approbation may therefore be clearly distinguished from love. Along with 
disapprobation, it constitutes our taste in characters, character traits and, derivatively, in 
actions. This gives us (2): Approbation is a sentiment of taste, in virtue of which we come to 
value useful and agreeable kinds of character traits. 
Hume believes that we approve more of virtues that we strongly associate with 
causing great happiness, like justice, than we do of others (T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577). He also 
suggests that ‘natural abilities’ produce an ‘inferior’ ‘sentiment of approbation’ than that 
caused by what we typically think of as ‘virtues’ (T 3.3.4.2, SBN 607). He generally allows 
that approbation feels different when caused by different kinds of virtue, and he explains this 
by reference to the kinds of non-moral pleasure that we associate with each kind of trait. 
Some kinds of traits, like Caesar’s, are pleasurable in such a way that they produce ‘love’, as 
the passion is usually understood (T 3.3.4.2, SBN 608). Other kinds of traits, like Cato’s, are 
pleasurable in a ‘severe and serious’ way, and they are such as to produce a form of love 
which Hume calls ‘esteem’, and which seems to be something like respect (T 3.3.4.2n88, 
SBN 608).2 Hume claims that we approve of both ‘Cæsar and Cato’, but that the approbation 
feels different in each case (T 3.3.4.2, SBN 607; see also M App. 4.6, SBN 316-7). Just as 
our taste in music consists of calm forms of the kinds of passions that we feel towards 
particular pieces of music, so our taste in character traits consists of calm forms of the kinds 
of passions of love and hatred that we feel towards particular traits. 
However, throughout the Treatise, Hume generally assumes that we are all affected 
and influenced in the same ways by our ideas of the same kinds of characters, traits and 
actions. He does not seem to allow that anyone might not approve of all generally useful or 
 
2 This is how Hume uses the term ‘esteem’ throughout Book 2. He frequently refers to ‘love and 
esteem’ in his discussions of love, as at T 2.2.1.4 (SBN 330). Confusingly, however, in Book 3, Hume 
often uses ‘esteem’ to mean ‘approbation’, instead of ‘respect’, as at T 3.3.1.14 (SBN 580-1). 
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agreeable traits, and he is largely oblivious to moral disagreement. He thinks we need not 
worry about whether we can talk of ‘a right or a wrong taste in morals’, because ‘there is 
such an uniformity in the general sentiments of mankind, as to render such questions of but 
small importance’ (T 3.2.8.8n. 80, SBN 547). 
I believe that the theory of approbation, as described so far, constitutes most of what 
Hume takes to be his substantive contribution to ‘our reasonings concerning morals’ (T 
3.1.1.1, SBN 455). He has, he thinks, explained what moral judgements are: calm forms of 
the passions of love and hatred, which constitute our sentiments of taste in characters. He has, 
he thinks, explained how they are caused: via the operations of general rules and of our 
delicate sympathy with the quasi-beliefs so produced. And he has, he thinks, explained what 
it is about character traits that make them such as to cause approbation or disapprobation: 
they are all and only those traits that we generally associate with causing happiness or 
unhappiness to their possessors or to those people around them. These explanations all rely 
on, and cohere with, various theses from Books 1 and 2 of his Treatise: they ‘corroborate 
whatever has been said concerning the understanding and the passions’ (T 3.1.1.1, SBN 
455). 
However, most of Hume’s readers are at least as interested in at least three further 
aspects of his treatment of ‘morals’: his distinction between natural and artificial virtues; his 
arguments that moral judgements are not produced by reason alone; and his discussion of the 
common or general point of view which, he claims, we adopt when we moralise. I will 
discuss the first of these in Chapter 4, the second in Chapter 5, and the third in Chapter 6. 
First, however, there are two further points to address. In §3.3, I will discuss Hume’s theory 
of motivation, to demonstrate that it is compatible with the foregoing. Then, in §3.4, I will 
consider Hume’s account of approbation in his moral Enquiry. 
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3.3. Hume’s theory of motivation 
Of Hume’s many influential theories, his theory of motivation has probably exerted the 
greatest influence on contemporary metaethics. In the late 20th century, Smith (1994, 92) 
described the ‘Humean theory of motivation’ as a contemporary ‘dogma in philosophical 
psychology’. This theory, in its strongest sense, is committed to the claim that all ‘motivation 
has its source in the presence of a desire and means-end belief’, where these two mental 
states are modally distinct from one another (Smith 1994, 92). In this section, I will argue 
that, so construed, it is not Hume’s view.3 This is because, I will argue, Hume allows for 
quasi-beliefs to play the role of beliefs in many cases of motivation. 
For Hume, any motive is an ‘impulse of passion’: a desire (T 2.3.3.4, SBN 415). As 
we saw in §2.2, most desires are caused by the ‘perception of pain and pleasure’, which 
produces aversions for painful objects and desires for pleasurable ones (T 1.3.10.2, SBN 
118). This form of motivation may occur when we experience a feeling of pain or pleasure, 
as when we touch a painfully hot surface. Alternatively, it may occur when ‘we have the 
prospect of pain or pleasure from any object’ (T 2.3.3.3, SBN 414). For example, if I believe 
that a surface would be painful to touch then, according to Hume, this belief will motivate me 
only in conjunction with a distinct aversion to that pain. 
According to the strongest version of the Humean theory of motivation, as applied to 
his own philosophy, Hume denies that beliefs either do or could cause desires or motivating 
passions. For example, Radcliffe (1999, 101) understands Hume to deny this, because a 
‘rationalist might well agree that actions are not caused by beliefs alone’. Given Hume’s clear 
opposition to moral rationalism, she thinks that Hume must intend to assert something that 
rationalists could not agree with. She therefore argues that Hume’s theory of motivation 
 
3 Here, I contribute to a longstanding debate. See, for example, Millgram (1995) and Persson (1997). 
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entails ‘the incapacity of reason to generate the motivating passions in the first place’ 
(Radcliffe 1999, 101). A belief that, for example, the ice cream before me would be 
pleasurable to eat cannot be the proximate cause of my desire to eat the ice cream, according 
to Radcliffe. 
This interpretation is a contested one. For example, Cohon argues that Hume merely 
intended to deny ‘that a causal belief that is not about pleasure or pain can produce a desire 
or aversion. Hedonic beliefs presumably can’ (Cohon 2010, 50, Cohon’s emphasis). Consider 
his claim that ‘when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a 
consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will 
give us this uneasiness or satisfaction’ (T 2.3.3.3, SBN 414). This strongly supports Cohon’s 
argument, for here Hume clearly sees an emotion as being caused by a prospect of pain or 
pleasure. 
Our question now is what, precisely, Hume means by a ‘prospect’ of pain or pleasure. 
The phrase occurs during his arguments to show that ‘reason alone can never be a motive to 
any action of the will’ (T 2.3.3.1, SBN 413). Certainly, therefore, we should assume that 
many such prospects are, according to Hume, reasoned beliefs about pain or pleasure. If 
Hume believes that all such prospects are beliefs, then he endorses a version of the Humean 
theory of motivation. My motivation to eat the ice cream is due to my belief that the ice 
cream will taste nice and to my desire to eat the ice cream, where the desire’s proximate 
cause is the belief. Certainly, the belief and the desire are modally distinct, according to 
Hume (T 1.4.6.16, SBN 259).  
Few readers of Hume believe that he allows for any cases of motivation to be due 
only to desires and non-believed ideas of pleasures and pain. Cohon (2010, 42n. 11) takes 
him to claim that unbelieved ideas can cause desires, but that belief is ‘needed… to enable 
the desire to engage the will (cause action)’. The motivational inefficacy of unbelieved ideas 
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is often assumed, rather than explicitly argued for. For example, Persson (1997, 195) claims 
that reasoning influences action by having an ‘impact on belief and passion’. Similarly, 
Darwall (1993, 423) claims that ideas of pain or pleasure may influence action where they are 
‘sufficient in force and vivacity to constitute beliefs’. 
I think this assumption is sufficiently widespread to call it the ‘standard 
interpretation’ of Hume’s thesis of the relationship between vivacity, ideas and motivation. If 
the standard interpretation is correct, then my interpretation of Hume must be false, because I 
read him as arguing that no beliefs about pleasure are involved in the production of 
approbation. According to the standard interpretation, he cannot allow that any approbation 
strong enough to cause a motivationally effective desire could be caused by anything less 
than a believed idea of happiness, as caused by some relevant motive.  
Fortunately, we have several good reasons to think the assumption false, and so to 
disagree with the standard interpretation. For one, Hume claims that passions may be caused 
by impressions or ideas (T 2.1.1.1, SBN 275). He does not specify that they are only caused 
by impressions and believed ideas.  
Hume appears to allow in several places that quasi-beliefs about other people’s 
pleasures and pains can produce motivationally influential pleasures or pains in us, via habit 
and sympathy. True, belief is ‘almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions’ (T 
1.3.10.4, SBN 120, my italics). However, a close examination of Hume’s theory of causal 
reasoning demonstrates that he allows for several passions to be ‘excited’ by ‘prospects’ of 
pain and pleasure that are not beliefs. 
Consider again Hume’s account of delicate sympathy and taste, discussed in §3.1, 
which allows that our sympathy with a quasi-belief about pain may cause the judgement that 
a book is poorly written. Similarly, Hume argues that a house may be deemed beautiful 
because it ‘is contriv'd with great judgment for all the commodities of life [and] pleases us 
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upon that account; tho' perhaps we are sensible, that no-one will ever dwell in it’ (T 3.3.1.20, 
SBN 584). Clearly, we may be motivated to discard a book because it is displeasing, or to 
take a picture of a house because it is beautiful. Therefore, Hume must allow that these 
aesthetic judgements may be strong enough to produce motivationally effective desires. 
Consider too Hume’s discussions, in Book 2, of the effects of general rules on 
sympathy, also discussed in §3.1. He argues that we may sympathise not only with the non-
existent pains of someone ‘who is not dejected by misfortunes’, but also of those who 
‘behave themselves foolishly before us’ without being ‘in the least conscious of their folly’ 
(T 2.2.7.5, SBN 370-1). Surely our sympathies here may motivate us, to assist the former or, 
perhaps, to have a quiet word with the latter. Similarly, it is only sympathy with obviously 
non-existent pains that can make us feel compassion with those who are murdered when 
asleep or with children in perilous situations that they are too young to comprehend (T 
2.2.7.6, SBN 371). Clearly, we may be motivated by such compassionate feelings. 
Finally, we saw that the man in the iron cage felt fear as a consequence of his quasi-
belief about falling (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148). We surely ought to allow that this passion is a 
motivating one, for a great many people in this person’s position would be moved by their 
fear to leave. Hume does not say as much, but he certainly implies that the man in the cage 
may be so motivated:  
 
His imagination runs away with its object, and excites a passion [of fear] 
proportion'd to it. That passion returns back upon the imagination and 
inlivens the idea; which lively idea has a new influence on the passion, and 
in its turn augments its force and violence; and both his fancy and 
affections, thus mutually supporting each other, cause the whole to have a 
very great influence upon him (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 148-9). 
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 It would be both surprising and wholly implausible if Hume were to deny that the 
‘very great influence’ of fear could not, in this case, be motivationally effective, just because 
the man in question does not believe that he will fall. 
  Certainly, none of the textual evidence here supports the assumption that Hume 
requires belief for all cases of motivation. Although he does not say so explicitly, there appear 
to be many cases of motivation that he aims to explain by reference to quasi-beliefs causing 
motivating passions. In Chapter 4, I will argue that, given my interpretation of Hume’s 
theories of moral judgements and motivation, he therefore has a simpler and more plausible 
explanation for our consistent approval of justice than can otherwise be attributed to him.  
 For this to be a plausible interpretation of Hume, however, it is not sufficient to show 
that he allows for quasi-beliefs to take the place of beliefs in moral motivation: I must also 
show that the moral sentiments can be indirectly motivating, by being such as to cause 
desires. Of course, it is precisely their ‘influence on human passions and actions’ which 
demonstrates to Hume that they are passions, rather than the conclusions of reason (T 3.1.1.5, 
SBN 457). Clearly, Hume thinks we are motivated by our moral sentiments. The important 
question now is: how do we reconcile this claim with his belief that they are calm forms of 
love and hatred? 
This may appear to be a very straightforward question to answer, because we have 
seen, in §2.1.1, that Hume tells us that love and hatred consistently cause desires for the 
happiness or unhappiness of their objects (T 2.2.6.3, SBN 367). This certainly explains why 
we are motivated to reward the virtuous and to punish the vicious, according to Hume. 
However, the explanation is a slightly more complicated one than we might expect. 
Hume claims that ‘the most obvious causes’ of love and hatred are virtue and vice: 
wherever we approve or disapprove of someone, we then feel love or hatred towards her (T 
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2.1.7.2, SBN 295). Our desires to reward or punish such people are at least primarily caused 
only by these non-moral forms of love or hatred: 
 
As to the good or ill desert of virtue or vice, 'tis an evident consequence of 
the sentiments of pleasure or uneasiness. These [moral] sentiments produce 
love or hatred; and love or hatred, by the original constitution of human 
passion, is attended with benevolence or anger; that is, with a desire of 
making happy the person we love, and miserable the person we hate (T 
3.3.1.31, SBN 591). 
 
 Here, then, is Hume’s explanation of our motives to reward the virtuous and to punish 
the vicious. However, this only appears to explain why we feel these desires where we take 
other people to be virtuous or vicious. We saw, in Chapter 1, that he denies that there is truly 
any self-love or self -hatred. This suggests that self-approbation and self-disapprobation are 
forms of pride and humility. However, Hume cannot claim that humility makes us desire to 
punish ourselves for our viciousness, in the way that hatred makes us want to punish vicious 
others. This is because he denies that humility causes any such desires: 
 
The passions of love and hatred are always followed by, or rather conjoin'd 
with benevolence and anger. 'Tis this conjunction, which chiefly 
distinguishes these affections from pride and humility. For pride and 
humility are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not 
immediately exciting us to action (T 2.2.6.3, SBN 367). 
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 It is not entirely clear how, or if, Hume allows that we would be motivated to seek 
rewards or punishments for ourselves, on account of our own moral characters as we perceive 
them. I suspect that, in fact, Hume sees all instances of approbation and disapprobation as 
calm forms of love and hatred, even when directed towards oneself. He argues that we may 
come to ‘hate’ ourselves when we lack certain virtues, and so come to feel a desire to act as if 
we possessed these virtues (T 3.2.1.8, SBN 479). It appears, therefore, that any disapprobation 
felt towards oneself is a calm form of hatred, rather than of humility. Self-love is no real 
passion, according to Hume, but it appears that self-approbation is. 
Of course, motives to punish and reward people are not the only morally relevant 
motives. Hume must also explain why we are frequently motivated to act in accordance with 
our moral sentiments: why we often act because it is virtuous to do so, or because it would be 
vicious not to do so. He does not give a detailed explanation for this, but I think he assumes 
that all double-relation passions may cause desires, simply because they are pleasures and 
pains. Admittedly, as a ‘pure emotion’, pride alone cannot motivate: it is not itself a desire 
and it does not consistently produce any one type of desire, in the way that love consistently 
produces benevolence. Nevertheless, it seems entirely consistent and plausible to allow that 
the thought of owning something that would increase my pride would be produce a desire to 
own that object. As a pleasure, pride may cause desires, even if it does not consistently cause 
any one kind of desire. 
Similarly, approbation and disapprobation are forms of pleasure and pain (T 3.1.2.3, 
SBN 471). They are, therefore, such as to cause desires and aversions, as when we desire to 
perform an action because we approve of the idea of it. We may take it, therefore, that 
wherever we experience approbation, this passion will typically produce a desire to perform 
any relevant action, or to promote the trait or action in question. 
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Hume’s theory of motivation is, therefore, compatible with my interpretation of 
Hume’s theory of moral sentiment. I will now turn from Hume’s Treatise to his moral 
Enquiry, to examine the details of his account of approbation in that work. 
 
3.4. Hume’s theory of moral judgements in his moral Enquiry 
In this section, I argue that Hume’s theory of approbation in the Enquiry is largely consistent 
with that in the Treatise. However, this is not always immediately clear, and Hume does not 
appear greatly interested in vindicating the precise details of his theory in this later work. His 
main aim is to apply the ‘experimental method’ to morality, by gathering evidence from 
history, literature, and our common experiences surrounding moral practice, to demonstrate 
that we typically approve of generally useful or agreeable character traits and disapprove of 
generally harmful or disagreeable ones (M 1.10, SBN 174). 
Throughout most of the Enquiry, Hume is officially neutral on the question of 
whether moral judgements are beliefs or sentiments. Unfortunately, one consequence of this 
is that he typically refers to violent passion by terms like ‘real feeling or sentiment’ and to 
calm passions by terms like ‘general judgments’ (M 5.41n. 24.1, SBN 228).4 Nevertheless, 
his moral sentimentalism is thinly disguised: he cannot resist describing moral judgements as 
‘calm passions and propensities’ (M 6.15, SBN 239). He ultimately defines virtue as 
‘whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation’ (M App. 1.10, SBN 289).  
We will see, in Chapter 6, that Hume greatly improves on his Treatise account of 
moral language in this work. There is only one further, important difference: Hume allows 
 
4 In Chapter 6, we will see that he also uses common language in this way, and with similarly 
confusing consequences, in his Treatise account of the common point of view. 
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for greater variation in our moral sentiments in the Enquiry. He allows that different moral 
norms hold in different cultures, although he thinks that this can be entirely explained by the 
fact that different characters and actions may be useful or agreeable in different cultural 
contexts (M D.37, SBN 336). As a more fundamental change, he now allows that at least 
some individuals within any one culture might contemplate some tokens of generally 
pleasing traits without experiencing strong enough moral sentiments to motivate them. A 
‘sensible knave’ might recognise that it is always just to pay back a loan, but then happily 
decide not to return some money if she believes that little harm will be caused by this (M 
9.22, SBN 282). In the Enquiry, therefore, it appears that Hume treats Generality as only 
typically true, rather than as universally true. This aside, I will argue Hume commits to 
Generality and to his theory of delicate sympathy in this work. 
Capaldi (1989, 240) argues that Hume appears to reject the Treatise account of 
sympathy, when he claims that a ‘real sentiment or passion’ could not plausibly ‘arise from a 
known imaginary interest’ (M 5.13, SBN 217). However, as Vitz (2004, 270) argues in 
response, in the relevant passage Hume is ‘merely claiming that the pleasure that people get 
from utility is not derived solely from an imaginary self-interest’. Hume generally 
understands our violent, ‘real’ passions to be broadly self-interested ones, unlike our moral 
sentiments. Here, his point is that we do not call distant characters ‘virtuous’ just because we 
imagine how they would benefit us or our loved ones if they were nearer.  
As in the Treatise, Hume claims that we feel sympathetic pleasures at the pleasures of 
others and sympathetic pains at their pains (e.g. M 5.23, SBN 221). Moral sentiments arise 
from the ‘principles of humanity and sympathy’ (M 5.45, SBN 231). Moreover, as Debes 
(2007a, 38-39) argues, the Enquiry account of justice remains consistent with the Treatise 
account: Hume argues, as we will see in Chapter 4, that our general approval of justice 
develops from a combination of artifice, self-interest, and sympathy. I therefore agree with 
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Debes (2007a; 2007b), along with others such as Abramson (2001), Penelhum (1975, 147-
148), and Vitz (2004), that we should understand Hume to tacitly refer to sympathy when he 
uses terms like ‘humanity’ and ‘benevolence’ in the Enquiry. 
Hume is often imprecise in his use of the term ‘humanity’, but – particularly in later 
parts of the Enquiry – he frequently uses it as a shorthand for the ‘principle of humanity’ (M 
9.6, SBN 272). I will follow this usage, and I will argue that this principle just is that of 
delicate sympathy, as it responds to quasi-beliefs about pleasure or pain. It is humanity which 
gives us a ‘general approbation of what is useful to society, and blame of what is dangerous 
or pernicious’ (M 5.39, SBN 226). This is precisely the role that delicate sympathy plays in 
the Treatise. Hume sometimes also calls humanity ‘general benevolence’ (M App. 2.5n. 60.1, 
SBN 300). Again, he is not always consistent in his use of this term, but ‘benevolence’ in the 
Enquiry is, at least sometimes, a synonym for sympathy (rather than for the desire to help 
those around us, as in the Treatise). 
Unlike Taylor (2013), I understand humanity to respond to agreeable traits, as well as 
to useful ones. Indeed, the Enquiry’s most explicit example of the influence of humanity on 
moral sentiment has it operating on traits that are immediately agreeable to others (M 8.15, 
SBN 267).5 
As in the Treatise, ‘delicate’ sympathy responds to unbelieved, habitually produced 
ideas of pleasure or pain (M 5.37, SBN 224). Indeed, the Enquiry provides further evidence 
that the kind of extensive sympathy that produces approbation just is delicate sympathy. 
Hume explicitly says that it is ‘delicate’ sympathy that causes us to find any ‘unharmonious 
composition’ of writing ‘harsh and disagreeable’ (M 5.37, SBN 224). In the Treatise, he only 
uses the more general label ‘extensive sympathy’ to describe this kind of response, although 
 
5 Reed (2016, 1151-1152) makes a similar observation. 
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there he explicitly says that it is the kind of sympathy that causes approbation (T 3.3.1.22, 
SBN 585-6; T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586). 
As in the Treatise, this example, of sympathising with an imagined reader, helps 
Hume to explain and defend his account of the causes of moral sentiments. It is analogous to 
his claim that, wherever we associate types of character trait with causing pain or pleasure to 
others, any token trait of any such type brings a quasi-belief about pain or pleasure to mind, 
with which we sympathise. These sympathetic pains and pleasures then produce moral 
sentiments. Hume gives a clear example of this process regarding immediately agreeable 
traits: 
 
We approve of another, because of his wit, politeness, modesty, decency, or 
any agreeable quality which he possesses; although he be not of our 
acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of these 
accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his 
acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives us 
the sentiment of approbation (M 8.15, SBN 267). 
 
Hume tells us that this ‘principle enters into all the judgments, which we form 
concerning manners and characters’ (M 8.15, SBN 267). This is strong evidence that he still 
endorses Generality.  
In the Enquiry, Hume stresses that our verbal moral evaluations are uniform: he 
thinks that ‘in every discourse and conversation’ people can be seen to praise the same types 
of traits, such as ‘honour’, ‘wit’ and ‘gallantry’, even where they are personally unaffected by 
them (M 9.2, SBN 269). He argues that the observable uniformity of our verbal moral 
evaluations is evidence that approbation is uniform: ‘The notion of morals, implies some 
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sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general 
approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision 
concerning it’ (M 9.5, SBN 272). No matter how near or far we are to a character, even one 
‘the most remote’ from us, Hume thinks that we will mostly agree in our moral judgement of 
it. The sentiment responsible for this uniformity in judgement is ‘the sentiment of humanity’: 
that kind of sentiment that arises from the principle of humanity, and so a moral sentiment (M 
9.5, SBN 272). 
The Enquiry implicitly endorses the Treatise view that approbation is a calm form of 
love (T 3.3.5.1, SBN 614). Hume argues, mainly via an unpleasant discussion of an ‘untaught 
savage’, that our non-moral forms of love and hatred are caused by non-delicate sympathy, 
such that we sympathise with the pleasures or pains of individuals with whom we have some 
connection (M 9.8n. 57.1, SBN 274-5). Hume claims that the untaught person ‘regulates 
chiefly his love and hatred by the ideas of private utility and injury, and has but faint 
conceptions of a general rule or system of behaviour’ (M 9.8n. 57.1, SBN 274). Any such 
person who sees his friend struck down in battle will feel only hatred towards his friend’s 
assailant, where this hatred is caused by ‘particular’ benevolence: a sympathetic reaction to 
the pain of someone with whom he has a friendly relationship (M App. 2.5n. 60.1, SBN 298). 
Humanity is absent here: this person lacks any delicate sympathy or ‘general’ benevolence, 
so that he cannot experience moral sentiments (M App. 2.5n. 60.1, SBN 298). 
The non-savage, in contrast, is ‘accustomed to society, and to more enlarged 
reflections’, so that she is aware that fighting for one’s country tends to produce happiness 
for one’s compatriots, whatever one’s nationality (M 9.8n. 57.1, SBN 274). She therefore 
experiences ‘a general sympathy’, or humanity, with the beneficiaries of such happiness, so 
that she feels approbation towards her opponents (M App 2.5n. 60.1, SBN 298). She may 
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also, simultaneously, experience ‘ruder and narrower passions’, by violently hating those 
who harm her friends, even as she approves of their valour (M 9.8n. 57.1, SBN 275). 
The moral and non-moral kinds of love and hatred are therefore distinguished by the 
kinds of sympathy that produce them, as in the Treatise. Where we contemplate a motive’s 
particular effects, we experience particular benevolence and a non-moral sentiment, such as 
love. Where we contemplate a motive just as a token of its general type, we experience 
general benevolence and a moral sentiment, such as ‘general approbation’ (M 5.45, SBN 
231). These processes may occur simultaneously as we contemplate any one motive. 
However, Hume uses an unfortunate phrase, which appears to suggest that they 
cannot occur together. He describes ‘cool approbation’ being ‘converted into the warmest 
sentiments of friendship and regard’ as we get to know someone better (M 5.43, SBN 230, 
my emphasis). Presumably, he means that our approbation continues in such cases, but now 
alongside the warmer sentiments. No plausible theory of moral judgement could allow that 
we cease to approve of someone just because we come to love them. The unfortunate phrase 
is presumably only intended to demonstrate that violent love and calm approbation have very 
similar, sympathetic, causes. 
Hume never says that we only approve or disapprove of motives that we believe will 
benefit or harm others. Instead, he stresses that we approve or disapprove of motives with a 
tendency to benefit or harm others.6 This phrasing is clearly compatible with, and suggestive 
of, Generality. Similarly, while Hume claims that we approve of only useful or agreeable 
traits, he describes utility itself as ‘only a tendency to a certain end’ (M App. 1.3, SBN 286). 
 
6 M 2.22, SBN 181; M 3.8, SBN 186; M 3.24, SBN 193; M 3.40, SBN 201; M 5.4, SBN 214; M 5.16, 
SBN 218; M 5.39, SBN 225; M 5.45, SBN 231; M 5.46, SBN 231; M 7.19, SBN 257; M 9.6, SBN 
272; M 9.7, SBN 273; M 9.8, SBN 274. 
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I am therefore confident that, in the Enquiry, Hume endorses Generality, and that he 
frequently uses the term ‘humanity’ to refer to delicate sympathy, as understood in the 
Treatise. In the next chapter, I will largely return to his Treatise, to argue that Hume our 
consistent approval of justice as evidence for Generality and his thesis of delicate sympathy. It 
is only because of the uniformity of approbation, Hume argues, that we consistently approve 
of all motives to be just. 
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4. Hume on Justice 
 
In Book 3 of his Treatise, Hume gives more consideration to what he calls ‘artificial virtues’ 
than to natural virtues (T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577). Artificial virtues are those that rely on 
conventions of language and behaviour which have arisen for non-moral reasons. Where we 
see that our adherence to any such convention is generally beneficial to society, we are very 
likely to come to view our adherence to it as morally obligatory. 
 The main such virtue which Hume discusses is ‘justice’, by which he means primarily 
a respect for the conventions concerning property rights and property transfer, such as the 
convention to pay back loans of money (T 3.2.1.1, SBN 477). By most interpretations of 
Hume’s theory of moral judgements, there is much that is puzzling about his understanding 
of this virtue. This is particularly the case regarding his understanding of our motivation to 
act justly. Why do we feel obliged to act justly or honestly on those occasions when doing so 
will benefit nobody? Why should we, to use Hume’s example, feel duty-bound to return a 
loan of money to a ‘miser’ or ‘profligate debauchee’ (T 3.2.1.13, SBN 482) when to do so 
will cause only harm to all concerned? 
   Hume clearly recognises that it is possible to feel such motivations. In the moral 
Enquiry, he suggests that only a ‘sensible knave’ would feel comfortable breaking the rules 
of justice, even in such situations (M 9.22, SBN 282-3). In the Treatise, he seems to believe 
that we are all motivated, at least to some degree, to perform all just acts, and that we all 
disapprove of those who do not. Yet why should we consider it vicious to break the rules on 
occasions where no one is harmed? Why are we not sensible knaves? 
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   In a key passage, Hume focuses on two potential motives for justice. These are ‘self-
interest’, which he calls the ‘original motive to the establishment of justice’, and ‘a sympathy 
with public interest’, which he describes as ‘the source of the moral approbation, which 
attends that virtue’ (T 3.2.2.24, SBN 499-500, italics omitted). These appear to be the only 
potential motives to perform just actions, according to Hume. Yet he allows that some just 
actions are both to the detriment of the actor’s interests and such that ‘the public is a real 
sufferer’ (T 3.2.2.22, SBN 497). What, then, is Hume’s explanation of the motivation to act 
justly in cases like this?  
   I will refer to this explanatory requirement as the problem of ‘formally just’ actions. 
A formally just action is one which is morally obligatory (insofar as it conforms to the rules 
of justice), but which the agent considering the action believes will cause no happiness to 
anyone. Indeed, formally just actions may be believed by the agent to cause only harm to all 
concerned. In this chapter, I will focus on Hume’s Treatise account of justice to argue that 
existing interpretations of his treatment of formally just actions all face insurmountable 
difficulties. In contrast, by my interpretation of Hume’s theory of approbation, as set out in 
Chapter 3, he has a simple and straightforward explanation of our approbation of formally 
just actions. Moreover, I will argue, he discusses formally just actions to begin his argument 
that the moral sentiments are all produced via delicate sympathy.  
 In §4.1, I address some of the general aspects of Hume’s discussion of our approval of 
justice. In §4.2, I survey a range of interpretations of Hume’s answer to the problem of 
formally just actions. I argue that they are all subject to insurmountable objections. In §4.3, I 
argue that Hume structured his Treatise so as to use the case of justice, with its prevalence of 
formally just actions, as evidence for Generality, as set out in §3.1.2, and for his thesis of 
delicate sympathy. 
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4.1. Moral obligation and justice 
When Hume first discusses the virtue of justice, he focuses on what appears to be a 
fundamental problem with the notion of duty towards justice. Typically, when we act justly, 
we are motivated by a sense of duty. Indeed, Hume seems to claim that whenever we act 
justly, we do so purely from a sense of moral duty. We ‘have naturally no real or universal 
motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance’ (T 
3.2.1.17, SBN 483). However, Hume acknowledges that this claim appears to conflict with 
another proposition which he holds to be true, that ‘no action can be equitable or meritorious, 
where it cannot arise from some separate motive’ (T 3.2.1.17, SBN 483). By a ‘separate 
motive’, Hume means a motive distinct from the sense of duty. His point is that no action can 
be morally obligatory unless we have some motive other than a sense of duty to perform it.  
   This latter claim is a consequence of Hume’s theory that we take an action to be 
virtuous because we feel approbation towards the motive or desire which led to that action. If 
I decide to be just, benevolent or in any way virtuous, my motivation cannot only be the 
dutiful desire to ‘do the right thing’, or to ‘be virtuous’. This would be ‘to reason in a circle’, 
because, for Hume, ‘virtuous’ and ‘approvable’ are the same thing (T 3.2.1.4, SBN 478). If I 
decide to be virtuous, then I decide to do that which is approved, but what is approved is 
simply what is virtuous. Hume derives from this an ‘undoubted maxim, that no action can be 
virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, 
distinct from the sense of its morality’ (T 3.2.1.7, SBN 479). 
 This antecedent, non-dutiful motive to perform any virtuous action is what Hume 
calls the ‘original motive’ for that virtue (T 3.2.1.13, SBN 482). It is easy to see what the 
original motives are for natural virtues. Hume gives the example of good parenting. We are 
generally not motivated to act in our child’s interests because we think we ought to, but 
because we instinctively want to do so. Hume calls this instinct ‘natural affection’ and claims 
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that it is very clearly ‘a motive to the action distinct from a sense of duty’ (T 3.2.1.5, SBN 
478). Hume allows that someone may decide to help their child from a sense of duty, but only 
because natural affection is already ‘common in human nature’ (T 3.2.1.8, SBN 479). If I 
normally delight in my child’s happiness, then on an occasion when I feel disinclined to act 
to please my child I will be pained by this disinclination. This may lead me to act ‘from a 
certain sense of duty’ (T 3.2.1.8, SBN 479). But this feeling of duty is, as Hume says with 
regard to benevolence, a ‘secondary consideration’ (T 3.2.1.6, SBN 478). If I did not realise 
that good parenting tends to cause happiness, then I would feel no duty to be a good parent. 
 The problem regarding justice is that it seems to have no original motive. I will call 
this the ‘original motive’ problem. Hume allows that there is a strong intuition that we are 
only ever motivated to be just from a sense of duty, and that there is no other obvious motive 
for just actions in many cases. Yet he also seems to claim that we could only feel duty-bound 
to be just if we also possess a distinct original motive towards justice. As Hume 
acknowledges, this appears to be ‘sophistry’ (T 3.2.1.17, SBN 483). 
If we can understand how Hume resolves the original motive problem, such that he 
explains how we come to feel duty-bound to act justly in all cases, then this will resolve the 
problem of formally just actions. However, this is no easy matter. There is a formidable range 
of commentators, including Árdal (1966), Ayer (1980), Harrison (1981) and Gauthier (1992), 
who think that Hume’s account of our motivation for our own, and approval of other 
people’s, just actions is ultimately flawed. Baron (2001, 273) goes so far as to suggest that 
Hume tells a ‘noble lie’, and that he ultimately recognises that we have no moral reasons to 
perform many acts of justice, but refuses to state this, for fear of discouraging just actions in 
his readers. 
 There are however three potential options which Hume appears to have at his 
disposal, each of which will allow him to consistently categorise justice as a virtue and 
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explain our regard for formally just actions. First, he could point to his distinction between 
useful and agreeable virtues (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 590). Hume allows that some virtues, such as 
wit, please immediately, so that we find them agreeable even where we feel no sympathetic 
pleasures. I have argued that he thinks we experience moral approbation towards these 
virtues only via delicate sympathy, and I will return to this point in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, 
if acting justly is always immediately agreeable both in its performance and on witnessing it, 
then this might explain why we are motivated to be just or why we approve of just actions.1 
Second, Hume could argue that, despite appearances in some cases, we believe that all just 
actions do somehow directly produce sympathetic pleasures or prevent sympathetic pains. 
For example, on Stroud’s (1977, 214) interpretation Hume thinks we believe that any 
omission of a just action would cause the institution of justice to ‘collapse’. If this were the 
case, then one’s motive to perform any just action would result, at least in part, from one’s 
desire not to harm society at large. The third option for Hume is to argue that all just actions 
produce pleasures, or avoid pains, which are ultimately but indirectly derived from our 
sympathies with others. We will see that this is the most fruitful available option for Hume, 
and there are several interpretations of his theory which take this line.2 In the next section, I 
will consider all three options, and argue that none of them are defensible as they currently 
stand. 
 
 
 
1 This is suggested by Krause (2004). 
2 This possibility has been suggested, within varying broader interpretations, by at least the following: 
Baier (1991); Besser-Jones (2006); Bricke (2000); Cohon (2010); Darwall (1993); Garrett (2007; 
2015); and Stroud (1977). 
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4.2. Potential solutions to the problem of formally just actions 
In what follows, I will consider each of the three options in turn. I will argue that only the 
final option is plausible, and that it is at its most plausible if we understand Hume to endorse 
Generality. 
 
4.2.1. Is justice an immediately agreeable virtue? 
Hume at least suggests that some character traits are considered virtuous because the actions 
in which they result are immediately agreeable, rather than because they cause happiness in 
those around us (T 3.3.1.27, SBN 589-90). While formally just actions are not useful to 
anyone, they may perhaps be intrinsically pleasing to perform and to witness. For example, 
Krause (2004, 644) suggests that we are taught that acting justly is inherently pleasing, by 
politicians and parents who ‘make us regard the observance of the rules by which society is 
maintained “as worthy and honourable” in their own right, and their violation as “base and 
infamous”’. However, Krause also believes that Hume fails to articulate a persuasive account 
of the motive to justice, because the potential benefits of acting unjustly in such situations are 
so great, and because he has shown no way of assessing these potential pleasures against the 
pleasure of acting justly (Krause 2004, 645). An additional problem is that Hume frequently 
stresses the usefulness of justice, and asserts plainly that ‘a sympathy with public interest is 
the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue’ (T 3.2.2.24, SBN 499). 
 
4.2.2. Do all just actions cause sympathetic pleasures or prevent sympathetic pains? 
Perhaps Hume believes that all just actions produce happiness to those around us, or at least 
prevent pains, despite occasional appearances to the contrary. In other words, perhaps he 
believes that there are no formally just actions. Hume could think this, for example, if he 
thinks that justice is a fragile enough institution to be threatened if any token just action is 
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disregarded, as if any token unjust action could cause the conventions of justice to be widely 
ignored. If this were true, then we would expect painful consequences, or at least a non-
negligible probability of painful consequences, from any omission of a just action.  
 There are admittedly some indications that Hume holds such a view. He offers a 
quasi-historical account of how we came to have rules of justice, which suggests that the 
levels of cooperation we require as human beings in order to live comfortably on limited 
resources require us to develop such rules, initially from self-interest as a pragmatic measure. 
As Cohon (2010, 173) summarises it, we realise that we can ‘invent rules attaching goods to 
individuals, and experience with the fragility of small societies teaches us that it is in our 
interest to conform to these rules’. During this quasi-historical account, Hume suggests that, 
although some just actions may cause unhappiness to all concerned: 
  
every individual person must find himself a gainer, on ballancing the 
account, since, without justice, society must immediately dissolve, and 
every one must fall into that savage and solitary condition, which is 
infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be suppos’d in 
society (T 3.2.2.22, SBN 497). 
 
 However, it does not seem plausible that anyone faced with the choice of repaying a 
miser will believe that society will collapse if they fail to do so. If that is Hume’s argument, 
then he is providing only a forced choice, as Stroud (1977, 210) says, ‘between a world in 
which everyone including himself is always just, and a world in which he and everyone else 
is always unjust’, and so one where a just society collapses. I do not think we should consider 
this to be Hume’s argument in the quoted passage. Here, Hume is not considering the reasons 
why we in a modern society would feel motivated to act justly. He is arguing that, in 
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primitive and small societies, the rules of justice are developed and obeyed from simple self-
interest. It is only later that justice becomes approved of, and is therefore regarded as a 
virtue.  
 In the paragraph in question, Hume is still addressing the origins of the convention in 
a small society. His point is simply that, as soon as people in a small society design property 
rules, they must realise that the rules cannot allow of exception if they are to survive. In a 
small community not yet used to acting according to such rules, this seems plausible. It does 
not follow that in larger societies the same motive will hold. As we have seen, Hume 
acknowledges that we may firmly believe that breaching the rules of justice will have no 
negative effects but still disapprove of someone who does breach the rules, and be disinclined 
to breach them ourselves. Further, Hume has not yet discussed our moral motive to perform 
just actions at all, for he is discussing a point in time where that has not yet arisen. It is in the 
following paragraph that Hume asks ‘[w]hy we annex the idea of virtue to justice, and of vice 
to injustice’ (T 3.2.2.23, SBN 498). 
 If Hume does not think that we (in our current large-society context) would expect 
society to collapse should we omit particular acts of justice, then there is no obvious reason to 
think that all just actions must cause more happiness than their omission. This brings us to the 
third possible solution for Hume, which is to claim that at least some acts of justice are 
motivated by the expectation of other kinds of pleasure than those derived directly from 
sympathy with others. 
 
4.2.3. Do formally just actions cause pleasures not immediately derived via sympathy? 
If justice – and other artificial virtues – can be shown to have a motive which is not directly 
related to sympathy, then this might potentially explain our motivation to perform formally 
just actions. The most commonly suggested motive here is self-interest, or a minimally 
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extended version thereof, because Hume explicitly states that the rules of justice are initially 
developed and pursued out of mutual self-interest and a concern for the well-being of those 
dear to us: what Hume calls ‘confin’d generosity’ (T 3.2.2.18, SBN 495). In this vein, Baier 
(1991), Bricke (2000) and Stroud (1977) interpret Hume as holding that we have self-
interested reasons for universal compliance to the rules of justice. It is for this reason that 
Stroud, who thinks Hume’s position is untenable, claims that Hume makes the implausible 
argument that society could collapse after any one token act of justice is omitted. Bricke 
(2000, 218) similarly takes Hume to believe that it is always in one’s narrow interests to 
comply with the rules of justice. This thesis is so implausible that Bricke (2000, 216) is 
surprised at what he takes to be Hume’s ‘untrammelled confidence’ in it. 
   The main concern with this general interpretation, however, is again that Hume only 
discusses purely self-interested motivations towards just actions as occurring in the early 
stages of the development of the motive to act justly. It is not until after he has concluded his 
account of the origins of justice that he considers why we are morally motivated to act justly. 
He is careful here to say that the reader must wait for the full answer to this, which is in ‘the 
third part of this book’ (T 3.2.2.23, SBN 498). There is therefore no reason to think that 
Hume attempts to explain our motivation to act justly purely on self-interest. The motive of 
self-interest is insufficiently moralised for it to be the motive Hume describes. 
 It may however be that just actions are pleasing because they are generally strongly 
associated with sympathetic pleasures, and that this is sufficient for us to approve even of 
rare token actions which will not produce such pleasures. This is, I think, the only plausible 
solution, but the question is how this association causes approbation in such situations. 
Interpretations along these lines often take Hume to have a complex story about our approval 
of justice. For example, Cohon (2010, 173) argues that there are three stages to the formation 
of an artificial virtue such as justice. The first stage is straightforward, as we create and 
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follow the rules from enlightened self-interest. Then there are two further stages as societies 
grow, which lead to this conformity becoming a moral practice. First, the mechanism of 
sympathy naturally makes everyone approve of other people’s rule-following, because of the 
happiness which such rule-following causes and the misery which it prevents. Then there is a 
second artifice, this time performed by politicians and parents, which causes us to approve of 
honest characters as well as of honest actions. It is only after this second artifice that we are 
morally motivated to perform formally just actions, by the resulting ‘enhanced moral 
sentiment’ (Cohon 2010, 175). 
 By Cohon’s (2010, 174n. 10) interpretation, Hume allows that we initially approve 
purely of just actions, regardless of motive, so long as they conform to the rules. Harris 
(2010) thinks Hume allows this for all cases of our approval of justice. However, Hume 
argues that, for any virtue, we initially approve only of motives: ‘Actions are at first only 
consider’d as signs of motives’ (T 3.2.1.8, SBN 479). Over time, the close association 
between virtuous motives and the actions which they typically produce is likely to cause us to 
approve of the actions themselves. Eventually, we may sometimes lack a token virtuous 
motive but nevertheless perform the associated action, ‘merely out of regard to its moral 
obligation’ (T 3.2.1.8, SBN 479). However, although Hume therefore allows that we can act 
justly because we feel approbation towards the idea of a just action, this can only occur once 
we habitually associate such actions with the relevant motive for justice: the fundamental 
source of this approbation. 
 Perhaps, however, we find justice generally pleasing because we approve of the 
motive to unquestioningly follow the rules, rather than of the rule-following actions 
themselves. This would be the case if the just person’s motive is to regulate her conduct ‘by 
rules she regards as authoritative’, as Darwall (1993, 440) suggests. While he takes this to be 
Hume’s account, he also argues that it is incompatible with Hume’s theory of the will. 
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Darwall (1993, 423) understands this theory to stipulate that all just actions must be 
motivated by desires or aversions, caused by beliefs that pleasures will result or pains be 
avoided by so acting. However, Darwall (1993, 420) argues that the desire to follow a self-
imposed rule would stem from no such belief, so that Hume’s theory of justice can only be 
accepted if his ‘official theory of will is jettisoned’. 
 Besser-Jones (2006) and Garrett (2007; 2015) both endorse Darwall’s rule-regulation 
interpretation, but attempt to exonerate Hume from inconsistency. Besser-Jones (2006, 272) 
argues that the motive to regulate one’s conduct by the rules of justice can be explained by 
reference to agents’ desires to ‘develop a good reputation and so become proud of their 
character’. Because we desire to maintain our reputation and character, both in the eyes of 
others and to ourselves, and because we are proud of our consistent adherence to justice, we 
are motivated to perform all just actions by the belief that this is necessary to preserve our 
pride and reputation. Therefore, Besser-Jones (2006, 262) argues that a rule-regulation 
account is compatible with Darwall’s interpretation of Hume’s ‘theory of the will’. 
 Garrett (2007; 2015) similarly aims to defend the rule-regulation account against 
Darwall’s charge of inconsistency. He argues that Hume allows for motivating passions to be 
caused by beliefs about the benefits and risks of general policies. When self-interest 
motivates people to create the convention of justice, it also ‘gives rise to a new motive that 
could not have existed before: the desire and standing disposition to govern or regulate one’s 
behavior by the rules of property’ (Garrett 2015, 267, Garrett’s emphasis). As we see the 
benefits of the entire scheme of justice, and as we similarly see that it is one which rests on 
everyone’s observance of it, we come to approve of those who follow the rules unthinkingly, 
because we believe that such unthinking adherence to the rules is the best way of ensuring the 
efficiency of the scheme overall:  
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In coming to regulate one’s behavior in this way, one undertakes to refrain 
from weighing up the specific advantages and disadvantages of following 
the rules of property before acting in each individual case, for such 
weighing would often lead to violations (Garrett 2015, 267). 
 
 One worry here is that, while Garrett can explain why we might rarely recognise the 
harmful effects of certain acts of justice before we perform them, it is unclear that he can 
explain why we would feel duty-bound to perform a rule-following action in cases where we 
do, perhaps inadvertently, come to believe that only harmful consequences will result. 
However, there is a more serious problem for both Garrett’s and Besser-Jones’s 
interpretations, and indeed for all rule-regulation accounts. By any such account, Hume is 
understood to suggest a moral motive for justice which is quite unlike that for the natural 
virtues. It is essential to such interpretations that, once the rules of justice are established, just 
persons form a resolution to follow them unswervingly. This resolution is both the motive to 
perform just actions and the mental state we approve of in the just person. Of course, no such 
motive is required to explain our approval of the natural virtues: benevolence does not 
necessarily involve a resolution to consistently help others. Rather, any token desire to help 
others simply causes approbation. However, Hume is thought to require that we resolve to be 
consistently just, because this is deemed necessary for him to explain why we approve of all 
just actions, including formally just actions. 
 However, Hume argues that we can explain our approval of just actions in the same 
way that we explain our approval of naturally virtuous actions. Once the rules of justice have 
been established, ‘the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally, 
and of itself’ (T 3.2.6.11, SBN 533). Admittedly, as Besser-Jones stresses, Hume does also 
suggest a ‘new artifice’ by which ‘the public instructions of politicians, and the private 
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education of parents, contribute to the giving us a sense of honour and duty in the strict 
regulation of our actions with regard to the properties of others’ (T 3.2.6.11, SBN 533). 
However, he minimises the importance of this. He later emphasises, again, that once we have 
developed the relevant conventions and rules, justice is ‘naturally attended with a strong 
sentiment of morals, which can proceed from nothing but our sympathy with the interests of 
society’ (T 3.3.1.12, SBN 579). 
 If Hume believes, not only that our approval of just actions develops ‘naturally’, but 
also that we are typically motivated by this approval, then he clearly means to explain our 
motive for justice in the same way that he explains our moral motivation to perform naturally 
virtuous actions. As desires to regulate oneself by rules are not required to explain the natural 
virtues, Hume cannot require any such motives for his explanation of justice. 
 We cannot simply assume that Hume thinks we are motivated to be just by our 
approval of justice. Árdal (1966) and Baier (1991) understand Hume to argue that, although 
we approve of justice because it serves the public good, we remain motivated to act justly 
purely from self-interest. Certainly, Hume denies that we act from any ‘love of mankind, 
merely as such’ (T 3.2.1.12, SBN 481). This is because no such passion exists: we do not 
instinctively love strangers. He also denies that we look ‘so far as the public interest’ when 
we act justly (T 3.2.1.11, SBN 481). We care little for the abstract idea of the public interest, 
and we do not perform just actions because we reason that they will benefit society. Any 
motive so formed would be too weak to overcome our self-interested desires, as justice 
frequently demands.  
   However, Hume does not conclude that our sole motive for justice is self-interest. 
He argues that our concern for the public good comes, not from instinct or reason, but from 
sympathy with the happiness of others (T 3.2.1.12, SBN 481-2). Once we are accustomed to 
justice, we are pleased – ‘by sympathy’ – that it benefits the public, and we therefore come to 
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approve of justice (T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577). Of course, this cannot explain why we invented 
justice, and so Hume argues that our original motive for justice was self-interest, whereas our 
approval developed later (T 3.2.2.24, SBN 499). 
 Hume believes that we, in our ‘civiliz’d state’, are motivated by a ‘sense of duty and 
obligation’ towards justice (T 3.2.1.9, SBN 479). We follow its rules because of our sense of 
duty, which gives us a ‘regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery’ (T 3.2.1.9, 
SBN 479). Wherever we act from duty, we do so because our human nature possesses ‘some 
distinct principles, which are capable of producing the action, and whose moral beauty 
renders the action meritorious’ (T 3.2.1.8, SBN 479). By this, Hume means that to be 
motivated by duty is to be motivated by our approval of the idea of an action. Ideas of acting 
justly motivate via approbation, while ideas of acting unjustly repel us via disapprobation: ‘a 
considerable motive to virtue’, for those of us who are not knaves (M 9.23, SBN 283). 
Indeed, for non-knaves, these sentiments constitute a sense of moral obligation sufficient to 
motivate even formally just actions. We feel such sentiments because the system of justice 
tends to cause happiness, with which we sympathise (T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577). The question, 
therefore, is how the tendency of justice to cause happiness leads, naturally and via 
sympathy, to our approbation of, and so motivation for, all just acts. 
 In the next section I will argue that Hume believes that we feel morally obliged to 
perform any just action because we generally associate such actions with a ‘tendency to the 
public good’ (T 3.3.1.12, SBN 580). My interpretation certainly resembles the rule-regulation 
views of Darwall, Besser-Jones and, especially, Garrett, but there are two key differences. 
First, I do not take Hume to require that we must resolve to be consistently just in order to be 
consistently just. Second, I do not take Hume to argue that one’s desire to perform a formally 
just action stems from any belief about beneficial consequences, whether of the token action 
or of justice more generally. Our awareness of justice’s tendency to cause public good is 
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sufficient to produce moral desires to act justly, even where we believe that a token just 
action will produce only harm.  
 
4.3. Instinct, artifice and Hume’s arguments about justice 
Consider the three-part structure of the third book in Hume’s Treatise, ‘Of Morals’. The first 
part is concerned to argue for the essential role of passions, over and above reason, in 
morality. The second – and largest – part is devoted to examining the artificial virtues. Here 
Hume argues, among other things, that we are motivated to perform and approve of formally 
just actions. The third part is ostensibly an account of the natural virtues, but in fact draws 
heavily on the prior discussion of the artificial virtues and discusses aspects of morality 
relevant to both kinds. Hume suggests several times in this section that his discussion of our 
approval of artificial virtues has important implications for his theory of our approval of 
natural virtues (T 3.3.1.10, SBN 577-8; T 3.3.1.12, SBN 579; T3.3.6.1, SBN 618). 
 I believe that Hume’s aim in discussing the artificial virtues before the natural virtues 
is to demonstrate that a general association between a motive kind and the happiness of 
others is sufficient to cause approbation towards any token motive of that kind. Because 
Hume thinks this is easier to show for the artificial virtues than for the natural virtues, he 
discusses the artificial virtues first, and then applies this thesis to the natural virtues: ‘We 
have happily attain’d experiments in the artificial virtues, where the tendency of qualities to 
the good of society, is the sole cause of our approbation, without any suspicion of the 
concurrence of another principle’ (T 3.3.1.10, SBN 578). Hume could readily have said that 
the good caused to society by the artificial virtues, or our belief in this good, is the sole cause 
of our approbation towards them, had that been his meaning. Instead, he explicitly refers to 
the tendency of these qualities as being the cause. 
 In the final part of his book on morals, Hume describes the cause of approbation as 
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being the tendency to cause happiness (or that of disapprobation as the tendency to cause 
unhappiness) on no fewer than nineteen occasions.3 As with his moral Enquiry, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, at no point in the Treatise does Hume suggest that we can only be morally 
motivated to perform an action where we hold certain beliefs about the consequences of 
doing so. Of course, this is not conclusive. No doubt one could read a sentence like ‘qualities 
acquire our approbation, because of their tendency to the good of mankind’ as meaning that 
we approve of qualities on token occasions when we believe they will cause some good (T 
3.3.1.10, SBN 578). However, read literally, Hume is saying that we approve of quality types 
simply because they tend to cause good. With this in mind, the frequency and importance of 
the word ‘tendency’ in this final part of the book cannot be denied.  
 There is a good reason for Hume to begin arguing his case by discussing the artificial 
virtues, rather than the natural virtues. It is only with virtues like justice that we are likely to 
observe that some token actions are considered morally obligatory even where we do not 
expect them to cause happiness to anyone. As Hume argues at T 3.3.1.13 (SBN 580), one 
would rarely, if ever, be faced with a situation where one feels duty-bound to act kindly but 
where one knows that only unhappiness will result. It is simply not in the nature of kindness, 
unlike that of justice, for this to be a realistic possibility. Therefore, Hume begins his 
discussion of virtues by analysing the artificial virtues, because these provide crucial 
evidence for his thesis. If he can show that we approve of artificial virtues because they are 
generally associated with causing sympathetic pleasures, then he can claim the same form of 
general association as the cause of our approval of the natural virtues. 
 
3 T 3.3.1.9, SBN 577; T 3.3.1.10, SBN 578; T 3.3.1.11, SBN 579; T 3.3.1.12, SBN 580; T 3.3.1.13, 
SBN 580; T 3.3.1.14, SBN 580; T 3.3.1.19, SBN 584; T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586; T 3.3.1.25, SBN 588; T 
3.3.1.27, SBN 589; T 3.3.1.28, SBN 590; T 3.3.2.15, SBN 601; T 3.3.3.3, SBN 604; T 3.3.4.5, SBN 
610; T 3.3.4.11, SBN 612; T 3.3.5.1, SBN 614; T 3.3.6.1, SBN 618; T 3.3.6.4, SBN 620. 
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 This is why Hume's discussion of justice focuses on the original motive problem, for 
it can only be this original motive which we come to associate with causing sympathetic 
pleasures, and which thereby causes us to approve of all just actions. The distinction between 
the natural and artificial virtues is, as we have seen, predicated on the former having 
instinctive ‘original motives’ which the latter lack. These original motives cause us to act in 
ways which, as we swiftly realise, tend to cause happiness in others.  
 Taylor (1988, 10) perspicaciously notes that “in his sketch of our pre-just moral 
psychology, the motives that Hume focuses on – sexual appetite, affection for children, 
limited benevolence, interest and resentment – are ones he characterizes in Book II as ‘calm 
desires and tendencies’”. These are all desires of the kind that, in §2.2, I called ‘instinctive 
desires’. The instinctive desires are no more inherently moralised motives than is the desire to 
be just. However, some instinctive desires (and other non-artificial traits that are not desires, 
such as cheerfulness) tend to cause happiness to others, so that we come to approve of them. 
These are the natural virtues. 
 Hume explicitly describes the instinctive aspect of natural virtues in ‘Of The Original 
Contract’, where he says that people act in such ways because they are ‘impelled by a natural 
instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all ideas of 
obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility’ (EMPL, 479). This is 
contrasted with artificial virtues, which are ‘such as are not supported by any original instinct 
of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the 
necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were 
neglected’ (EMPL, 480). 
 Garrett (2007, 263) argues that Hume does not mean moral duty by ‘obligation’ here. 
He points to Hume’s discussion of justice in the Treatise, where Hume suggests that we are 
initially motivated to follow the rules of justice by self-interest, and where he calls this 
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motivation a ‘natural obligation’ (T 3.2.2.23, SBN 498). However, Hume does not mention 
the concept of natural obligation in Of the Original Contract. Equally, he would not have 
assumed that his reader would have read the Treatise, given that he had disowned it by the 
time of writing this essay. Furthermore, it is clear from Hume’s description of natural virtues 
that he is referring to a specifically moral obligation. The instincts which cause us to perform 
natural virtues are contrasted with motives arising from ideas of obligation: an obligation 
which arises later when we come to pay natural virtues ‘the just tribute of moral approbation 
and esteem’ (EMPL, 479). 
 By the end of part two of Book 3 of the Treatise, then, Hume has divided all virtuous 
motives into motives for action types that we are instinctively inclined to perform and 
motives for action types that we are not instinctively inclined to perform. These latter virtues 
come into being because of human ingenuity and contrivance, and so are called ‘artificial’. 
The natural and artificial virtues have this in common: in neither case do we initially perform 
the relevant actions with any idea of morality in mind. We are initially motivated to perform 
natural virtues by instinct, and we are initially motivated to conform to the rules of justice by 
our desires for the pleasures that will thereby be caused, or the pains that will thereby be 
avoided, for us and our loved ones. However, in both cases, because acting in these ways 
tend to produce happiness in others, all who witness such actions are frequently pleased by 
sympathy, and become accustomed to feeling pleased in this way. This leads us to approve of 
the motives to perform these actions – whether instinctive or (broadly) self-interested – and 
to categorise them as virtues. From this point on, we will feel obliged to perform such actions 
even when the original motive is absent. Eventually, we will approve of the actions which 
typically result from these motives as well, as Hume explains at T 3.2.1.8 (SBN 479). Our 
approval of justice will cause a calm desire to perform just actions even when we believe that 
nobody will be made happy by them. 
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 Hume is now able to make his central claim about the causes of approbation. If we 
naturally come to approve of justice because the motives and actions involved tend to cause 
sympathetic pleasures in us, then such a tendency is sufficient to cause approval of any trait. 
Justice therefore provides good evidence for Generality. If Hume can show that we are 
motivated to perform formally just actions purely by delicate sympathy, approbation, and the 
desires that approbation can produce, then he can argue from this that all moral motivation is 
of precisely this kind. 
 We saw, in §3.3, that it is generally assumed that Hume allows only for believed ideas 
to motivate, but that this assumption is incorrect. If it were correct, then Hume would have to 
show that we believe that performing formally just actions is either certain or likely to cause 
pleasure or prevent pain, in order to explain why we are motivated to perform them. Hence, 
Garrett (2007, 274) takes Hume to argue that we ‘come to believe’ that it is in our interests to 
resolve to perform all just actions without considering the consequences. By Stroud’s (1977, 
214) interpretation, Hume thinks we have the ‘false belief’ that society will collapse if we 
omit any act of justice.  
 Hume requires no such belief. Once we associate just actions with causing happiness, 
we approve of every motive to act justly and disapprove of every motive to act unjustly. 
Equally, because these motives are strongly associated with the actions themselves, we come 
to approve of every just action and disapprove of every unjust action. Therefore, we feel duty-
bound to act justly even where we believe that the action holds no prospect of pleasure for 
ourselves or others. 
   Not only does this interpretation resolve the problem of formally just actions, but it 
resolves the original motive problem as well. This resolution rests on the fact that Hume only 
claims, as Garrett (2007, 260) also notes, that we naturally have no ‘real or universal motive 
for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance’ (T 
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3.2.1.17, SBN 483). While Hume requires that we have a motive to be just which is distinct 
from moral duty, this motive may occur artificially. I have argued against Garrett that Hume 
does not suggest that artifice leads us to develop an entirely new kind of motive, whereby we 
desire to avoid assessing the consequences of just actions. Rather, he simply means that the 
rules of justice were artificially created, and were initially followed from self-interest rather 
than by instinct. Once we are accustomed to follow the rules, we approve of the self-
interested motivation to do so, in the same way that we approve of the instinctively arising 
motivations to help others or to act in one’s children’s interests. 
 I therefore understand Hume’s treatment of justice to provide very strong evidence 
that he endorses Generality, and that he understands the moral sentiments to be uniform. In 
Chapter 5, I will argue that Hume understands all moral judgements to be moral sentiments, 
and that his is an emotivist theory of moral language. 
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5. Hume’s Emotivism 
 
Thus far, I have focused, as Hume does, on his understanding of the psychological causes of 
moral sentiments. I will continue to examine these causes in further depth, but I also want to 
begin considering how Hume understands moral language. What do we mean, according to 
Hume, when we sincerely call a person’s motive ‘virtuous’ or ‘vicious’? How does he 
understand the relations between such utterances and our sentiments of approbation and 
disapprobation? 
Hume is undoubtedly, as Pigden (2007, 199) claims, ‘widely regarded as the 
grandfather of emotivism and indeed of non-cognitivism in general’. Anyone, reading Hume 
for the first time, will be struck by language which seems to assert that any moral utterance is 
purely an expression of a moral sentiment (e.g. T 3.1.2.3, SBN 471). In this chapter, I will 
argue that Hume asserts precisely this. I will argue that he is an emotivist: he believes that 
any moral utterance derives its meaning purely from its being an expression of a moral 
sentiment. 
There is strong, but not conclusive, evidence for this in Hume’s moral Enquiry. In 
§3.1.2, we saw that Hume sees the moral sentiments as uniform: he believes that approbation, 
for example, responds in the same way towards all tokens of any one generally pleasing type 
of trait, regardless of how we are related to the person whose trait it is, or affected by the 
token trait. In §3.4, we saw that, in his Enquiry, Hume stresses that our verbal moral 
evaluations are also highly uniform: people typically call any act of benevolence ‘virtuous’, 
for example, no matter how the particular action affects them personally. 
The uniformity of the moral sentiments makes them very useful to us, according to 
Hume, because it allows these sentiments to form the basis of a ‘general system of blame or 
praise’ (M 9.6, SBN 273). No other sentiments respond to characters or actions in any such 
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uniform manner. Hume certainly appears to argue that, for these reasons, we developed moral 
terms precisely to express only our uniform sentiments of approbation and disapprobation: 
 
The distinction, therefore, between these species of sentiment [i.e. the 
uniform and the variable] being so great and evident, language must soon 
be moulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar set of terms, in order to 
express those universal sentiments of censure or approbation, which arise 
from humanity, or from views of general usefulness and its contrary (M 9.8, 
SBN 274). 
 
With this in mind, consider Hume’s claim, that, when one person calls another 
‘vicious or odious or depraved, he… expresses sentiments, in which, he expects, all his 
audience are to concur with him’ (M 9.6, SBN 272). Hume certainly appears to mean by 
phrases like this, as indeed I think he does mean, that we express moral sentiments whenever 
we utter moral assertions. 
However, Hume offers no arguments in his moral Enquiry to demonstrate that we 
cannot form and express moral beliefs, instead of or alongside our moral sentiments. Indeed, 
in the same passage just quoted, he suggests that someone who calls a man ‘vicious’ means 
‘to express, that this man possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society’ (M 
9.6, SBN 272). This appears to be an expression of a belief. On my reading, Hume simply 
means by this phrase that any disapprobation expressed via the term ‘vicious’ can only ‘arise’ 
– as suggested at M 9.8 – from the judger’s sympathies with a quality that she associates with 
causing harm or unhappiness. However, Hume does not, unfortunately, make this explicit. 
Nevertheless, Hume’s language in his moral Enquiry strongly suggests that he is an 
emotivist. I will return to his Enquiry discussions of moral language in Chapter 6. There, I 
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will address Hume’s thesis of a moral ‘common point of view’, which appears to suggest that 
many moral judgements are formed or corrected by reasoning (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591; M 9.6, 
SBN 272). I will argue that this appearance is deceptive. However, it should already be 
apparent that there are reasons why readers of Hume might come to think that he allows for at 
least some moral utterances to express reasoned, moral beliefs. 
Certainly, many influential readers of Hume – Pigden included – do not understand 
him to be an emotivist. This is largely because he has yet to be accredited with any 
convincing arguments for this thesis. In the face of this lacuna, those who do see Hume as 
arguing for emotivism generally think he does so unsuccessfully, perhaps because he has not 
sufficiently distinguished emotivism from other, similar but incompatible theses, such as 
subjectivism (e.g. Flew 1963; Harrison 1976; Mackie 1980). Some scholars, such as Cohon 
(2010), Garrett (2002; 2015), and Sayre-McCord (2008), argue that Hume does allow that 
some verbalised moral evaluations are expressions of moral beliefs. Others suggest that 
Hume is only concerned to argue that emotions have an important role in causing moral 
statements, rather than to account for the semantics of such statements, and that he therefore 
provides no considered semantic account (e.g. Árdal, 1966; Penelhum, 1975; Stroud, 1977). 
Of course, given that the conception of ‘semantics’ that we work with now is largely 
inherited from later philosophers, such as Frege, Russell, Tarski, and Davidson, this is hardly 
surprising. However, it is certainly the case that Hume says very little about meaning. 
Nevertheless, I will argue that Hume’s theory is an emotivist one. I do not intend to 
directly compare Hume’s view with those of the 20th Century emotivists, such as Ayer, 
Carnap, or Stevenson.1 As Sweigart (1964) argues, Hume’s understanding of moral 
judgements is based on theories of belief, meaning, reasoning, and passions which are very 
 
1 I will, however, discuss Stevenson’s views in detail in Part 2. 
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different from theirs. They certainly endorse no equivalent philosophical notions to Hume’s 
‘vivacity’ or ‘sympathy’ (Sweigart 1964, 232). Yet these are crucial to Hume’s arguments. 
If we are to understand Hume as an emotivist, we must do so in his terms. To this end, 
I will first argue that he follows Locke in understanding utterances to derive their meaning 
from the ideas (or impressions) that they express, so that his, largely implicit, theory of 
meaning is what we now call an ‘ideational’ one (e.g. Lowe 2006). I will then argue that, in 
his Treatise, Hume offers an important, albeit partially implicit, argument for non-
cognitivism, by which I mean the thesis that no moral judgements are beliefs. Hume believes 
that all moral judgements are sentiments. From these interpretative claims, we can conclude 
that Hume is an emotivist: he believes that the meanings of all verbalised moral evaluations 
are derived purely from their being expressions of moral sentiments. 
Hume’s arguments for non-cognitivism are based in large part on his thesis of 
Generality, which (in the Treatise, at least) entails that moral sentiments are such as to arise 
whenever we contemplate morally relevant objects. Hume also, I will argue, endorses what I 
call a ‘Vivacity Thesis’: that wherever we have a present impression, we cannot hold a vivid 
idea in mind which differs from that impression only in its level of vivacity. Therefore, the 
presence of moral sentiments precludes any possibility of moral beliefs, because moral 
beliefs could only be less vivid copies of moral sentiments, and these cannot simultaneously 
exist. 
Unfortunately, although I am confident that Hume does endorse the Vivacity Thesis, I 
am unsure whether he can consistently do so. We will see, in §.5.6, that the thesis relies on 
Hume’s oft-stated claim that impressions and ideas differ from one another only in their 
different levels of vivacity. However, we have already seen, in §1.4, that Hume appears to 
implicitly allow for a further, fundamental difference: that all ideas are representative, as no 
impressions are. Perhaps Hume’s arguments for emotivism cannot, therefore, be rendered 
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consistent with everything he says. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Hume claims, at 
several points in his Treatise, that impressions and ideas fundamentally differ only in their 
different levels of vivacity. Given this claim, I will argue, the Treatise provides an important 
argument for non-cognitivism. Moreover, we will see several other reasons to think that 
Hume denies the existence of moral beliefs. I will argue that we have sufficient reason to 
conclude that he is a non-cognitivist, and so an emotivist. 
 In §5.1, I address Hume’s ideational theory of meaning. In §5.2, I consider textual 
evidence from the first part of Book 3 that Hume is a non-cognitivist. §5.3 discusses Cohon’s 
and Garrett’s arguments that Hume does allow for moral beliefs. In §5.4, I ask how Hume 
might potentially understand the causes and contents of such beliefs. In §5.5 I argue that, if 
he allows for the existence of moral beliefs, then, given his thesis of Generality, he would 
believe that any moral belief would be accompanied by a moral sentiment. Finally, in §5.6, I 
argue that Hume holds a Vivacity Thesis, which precludes the possibility of any moral belief 
existing alongside a moral sentiment directed towards the same object. I conclude that Hume 
does not allow for the existence of any moral beliefs, so that he is an emotivist. 
 
5.1. Hume’s theory of meaning 
Locke argues that the purpose of language is to communicate our ideas to others. We utter 
words ‘to make them stand as marks for the Ideas’ within our minds (Locke 2008, 254). By 
this, Locke (2008, 254) does not mean that we refer to our ideas when we speak, but rather 
that we express these ideas: we speak so that our ideas ‘might be made known to others, and 
the Thoughts of Men’s Minds be conveyed from one to another’. If I say that something is 
‘red’, then I do so to ‘convey’ that idea to others, so that they then think of it as red. As 
Locke (2008, 257) puts it, people utter words in order ‘to bring out their Ideas, and lay them 
before the view of Others’. 
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Unlike Locke, Hume never provides anything like a theory of meaning. The closest he 
gets to discussing any such theory is to argue against Locke’s theory of the meaning of 
abstract terms. As we saw in Chapter 2, he does so by arguing for his own theory of ‘abstract 
or general ideas’ (T 1.1.7.1, SBN 17). Throughout this discussion, Hume clearly assumes that 
a general term derives its meaning from the general idea that it expresses, just as Locke 
claims. For example, Hume says that ‘the mind’ may consider the ‘collection’ of ideas within 
any one revival set, before it comprehends the general idea that it ‘intends to express by the 
general term’ (T 1.1.7.10, SBN 22). 
Unlike Locke, Hume carefully distinguishes impressions from ideas. He sometimes, 
albeit rarely, explicitly allows that we express impressions as well as ideas. He worries that 
rival philosophers might ‘express a hatred’ of him and his work, for example (T 1.4.7.2, SBN 
264). In Book 3, he argues that different ‘sensations’ of pleasure may ‘be express'd by the 
same abstract term’, provided that they sufficiently resemble one another to be recognised as 
pleasures (T 3.1.2.4, SBN 472). 
Hume’s theory of meaning can, therefore, at least allow that any utterance of a moral 
term can derive its meaning from its being an expression of a moral sentiment. He certainly 
believes that at least paradigmatic moral judgements are moral sentiments. From all that we 
have seen so far, it appears that Hume should understand any utterance of ‘cruelty is wrong’, 
for example, as an expression of disapprobation towards the general idea of cruelty, so that it 
derives its meaning from its being an expression of disapprobation towards the general idea 
of cruelty. I will argue that this appearance is correct, and that Hume believes that all verbal 
moral evaluations acquire their meaning by being expressions of moral sentiments. To do so, 
however, I must show that he denies that any moral judgements can be beliefs. 
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5.2. Hume (and Hutcheson) against the rationalists 
Hume’s most famous discussion of morality, in the first part of Book 3 of his Treatise, 
concerns the question of whether moral judgements can be formed purely via processes of 
reasoning. His first argument in this section is the ‘Motivation Argument’.2 Regimented 
somewhat, this is as follows:  
 
1. morals… have an influence on the actions and affections 
2. reason alone… can never have any such influence [on the actions and affections] 
3. [so, morals] cannot be deriv'd from reason [alone] (T 3.1.1.6, SBN 457) 
 
 Although there are many interpretations of this argument, the most influential one has 
Hume arguing that (1) moral judgments are motivating mental states, that (2) reasoned beliefs 
do not motivate on their own, so that (3) moral judgments cannot be reasoned beliefs.3 
However, as Snare (1975) argues, Hume’s rationalist opponents can simply respond that one 
of the premises is only typically true, but not necessarily so, which allows that some or all 
moral judgments may be beliefs. Their best argument is presumably to say that, although 
experience demonstrates that most beliefs are motivationally ‘inert’, some beliefs can 
motivate on their own, most notably moral beliefs. Unless Hume can demonstrate that beliefs 
necessarily cannot motivate in this way, his argument simply begs the question. As it is, his 
argument appears to offer little to persuade anyone already committed to rationalism. 
 Why would Hume begin his book on morals with such an unpersuasive argument? 
 
2 I borrow this name from Cohon 1997. 
3 Commentators who endorse something like this interpretation of Hume’s argument, such that it is an 
argument about the nature of moral judgements, include the following: Bricke (2000); Harrison 
(1976); Mackie (1980); Penelhum (1975); Snare (1975); and Stroud (1977).  
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Some, such as Cohon (2010) and Garrett (2002), believe that we have misinterpreted Hume, 
and that his argument is stronger than it seems. Cohon (2010, 81-90) claims that Hume means 
to argue only that the process by which we make a moral judgement is not purely a process of 
reasoning, so that he does not argue for anything directly about the nature of moral 
judgements themselves. Garrett similarly claims that Hume’s focus is not on the nature of 
individual moral judgments, but rather on the ‘general question of whether the origin of the 
capacity to make moral distinctions depends only on reason or on something else (such as 
distinctively moral impressions)’ (Garrett 2002, 193, Garrett’s emphasis).  
 However, Hume certainly seems to deny that any moral judgements are beliefs. 
Consider, for example, his claim towards the end of this section, that ‘when you pronounce 
any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your 
nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it’ (T 3.1.1.26, 
SBN 469). Perhaps, as Garrett (2002, 202) argues, we should not take Hume to be offering an 
analysis of the meaning of a moral sentence or utterance here. Nevertheless, it is hard not to 
read this as the claim that every token moral judgement is wholly a matter of sentiment, and 
not of belief. Hume’s final conclusion in this section is ‘that the distinction of vice and virtue 
is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason’ (T 3.1.1.27, SBN 
470). The scope of this claim is less clear, but Hume certainly appears to deny that reason 
ever produces moral perceptions. This, again, seems to preclude that any moral judgements 
can be beliefs. 
 Whether or not Hume’s conclusions in T 3.1.1 clearly assert that all moral judgements 
are matters of sentiment rather than of reasoned belief, his summary of his conclusions at the 
start of T 3.1.2 seem unequivocal: 
 
To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a 
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particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling 
constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no farther; nor do we enquire 
into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, 
because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular 
manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our 
judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our 
approbation is imply'd in the immediate pleasure they convey to us. (T 
3.1.2.3, SBN 471) 
 
 Hume never mentions any cases where a moral judgement might be a belief, and he 
appears to be strongly arguing, throughout T 3.1.1, that no moral judgements are beliefs.  
 Moreover, as Stroud (1977, 173) notes, Hume has already argued, in Book 2, that it is 
a contingent but nevertheless well-evidenced truth that no reasoned beliefs are motivationally 
efficacious on their own, and that all motivation requires passions of some kind. Given this, 
the Motivation Argument appears at least reasonably well founded, even on the standard 
interpretation. Hume may well see it as a good starting point from which to develop his moral 
sentimentalism, by which all moral judgements are passions. If we allow that the Motivation 
Argument is based on Hume’s theories of ideas and of the passions, then it at least 
demonstrates that moral judgements are much more likely to be passions than beliefs, and so 
sets the scene well for Hume to begin developing his sentimentalist theory. 
 I think this is how we should read the Motivation Argument. I think that T 3.1.1 is 
intended to show that, at least given the theories of reasoning, passions, and beliefs for which 
Hume has argued in Books 1 and 2, moral judgements are not beliefs. Unfortunately, 
however, it is not easy to understand how to read Hume in this section. This is largely 
because, as Cohon (2010, 79) stresses, Hume carefully avoids any explicit discussion of 
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moral judgements throughout it. Indeed, his language is frequently, and confusingly, 
ambiguous. He never clearly states what, in his view, it is that cannot be produced purely by 
reasoning. Instead, he makes vague claims, such as that ‘morals’ cannot be ‘deriv'd from 
reason (T 3.1.1.6, SBN 457), that the ‘rules of morality… are not conclusions of our reason’ 
(T 3.1.1.6, SBN 457), or that ‘[m]oral distinctions… are not the offspring of reason’ (T 
3.1.1.10, SBN 458).  
 Why does Hume not employ the terms that he has so carefully defined over Books 1 
and 2 of his Treatise, and claim that we never form moral beliefs, and that what appear to be 
moral judgements are in fact calm passions? Why, too, does he rely on arguments that would 
convince only readers who already agree with his own conceptions of reasoning, belief, and 
passion? I suggest that the answer to these questions can be found in Hume’s desire to 
persuade Hutcheson, and his followers, of the merits of Hume’s own sentimentalist theory. 
 
5.2.1 Hutcheson’s moral sense theory 
Following the arguments of Moore (1994), as well as of Gill (2010, 213) and Harris (2015, 
123-124), I believe that T 3.1.1 was a late addition to Hume’s Treatise discussion of moral 
judgements. Moore (1994, 39) argues – persuasively, to my mind – that Hume wrote T 3.1 
with the primary aim of influencing Hutcheson and his followers to endorse his own 
sentimentalism over Hutcheson’s ‘moral sense’ theory. I suggest that Hume’s language 
throughout most of T 3.1.1 is ambiguous because he uses this section to attempt a delicate 
balance, between convincing Hutcheson and his followers of the similarities between his and 
Hutcheson’s theories, and laying the groundwork for his own, very different, theory. 
 Hutcheson’s Illustrations on the Moral Sense were published only twelve years before 
Book 3 of Hume’s Treatise. In the Illustrations, Hutcheson argues for the existence of a 
‘moral sense’, which allows us to form ideas of virtue and vice, much as other senses allow 
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us to form ideas of secondary qualities, like colours or sounds. Hutcheson (1971, 163) allows 
that these kinds of ‘sensible ideas’ are ‘only perceptions in our minds’. He argues that 
‘approbation cannot be supposed an image of any thing external, more than the pleasures, of 
harmony, of taste, of smell’, but that this does not ‘diminish’ the ‘reality’ of our idea of virtue 
(Hutcheson 1971, 164).  
 Hutcheson also provides several arguments against moral rationalism which are 
strikingly similar to Hume’s arguments in T 3.1.1. Darwall (1997, 73) argues that ‘the main 
lines of [Hume’s] account, as well as significant details, derive directly from Hutcheson’. Gill 
(2010, 213) similarly argues that Hume’s arguments against rationalism ‘do not advance 
significantly’ beyond Hutcheson’s, although Moore (1994, 39) suggests that Hume uses more 
sceptical arguments than Hutcheson’s. Certainly, Hume appears to have been heavily 
influenced by Hutcheson in T 3.1.1.  
 Hutcheson sees moral philosophy as a contest between two camps, both of which are 
internally consistent, but only one of which can be correct. One camp is Hutcheson’s own, 
which claims that ‘we have not only self-love, but benevolent affections also towards others’ 
(Hutcheson 1971, 118). The other is an ‘Epicurean’ camp, which includes Hobbes and certain 
‘Christian moralists’ who claim that all actions are ultimately motivated by self-interest 
(Hutcheson 1971, 117). Hutcheson clearly sees it as his duty to argue against moral 
scepticism and egoism. He also denies that the rationalists form a genuine alternative to these 
two camps, because he believes they have simply confused the moral sense with the dictates 
of reason. They are, he thinks, merely misguided members of his own camp. Therefore, the 
goal of the Illustrations is to examine the rationalists’ theories and ‘to explain more fully how 
the moral sense alleged to be in mankind must be presupposed even in these schemes’ 
(Hutcheson 1971, 119).  
 For Schneewind (1998), the key threat to morality in Hutcheson’s eyes is the cynical, 
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egoist philosophy of Mandeville. Mandeville argues that moral behaviour was unknown in 
the state of nature, and that it is no part of human nature as such. We only came to think in 
moral terms, claims Mandeville, when certain clever people realised that they could 
manipulate us by flattering our self-esteem, and by claiming that following their preferred 
rules made us honourable. To defeat this view, as Schneewind (1998, 336) claims, Hutcheson 
argues for ‘three connected theses’:  
 
He must show that there is an idea of virtue that is different in nature from 
any idea concerned with self-interest. He must show that benevolence alone 
is what we approve of morally. And he must show that benevolence or 
unselfish concern for others is a natural and effective human motive 
(Schneewind 1998, 336). 
 
 With these theses in mind, we can return to T 3.1, to examine how Hume 
treats the same topics. 
 
5.2.2. Hume’s response to Hutcheson’s moral sense theory 
In T 3.1.1, Hume argues, as Hutcheson had done, that moral rationalists are mistaken, 
because we feel virtue and vice, rather than use reasoning to form beliefs about virtue and 
vice. As we have seen, his argumentative strategy closely follows Hutcheson’s own. At the 
end of this section, Hume suggests, much as Hutcheson has done, that vice and virtue ‘may 
be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are 
not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind’ (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468-9). This is not a 
claim that Hume makes elsewhere in his Treatise, or in his moral Enquiry, and it is far from 
clear that he can mean anything substantive by it. Indeed, he has previously argued, in T 
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1.4.4, that there is no meaningful distinction between primary and secondary qualities. All 
qualities that we appear to perceive in objects are ‘perceptions in the mind’, according to 
Hume. 4 
Hume then reassures his reader that his is neither a cynical nor sceptical account of 
morality: 
 
Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of 
pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and 
unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our 
conduct and behaviour (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 469). 
 
 In this way, T 3.1.1 demonstrates precisely those areas where Hume’s theory of moral 
judgements aligns with Hutcheson’s, while carefully avoiding any areas of difference 
between the two. Hume says nothing here of benevolence, or of natural motives, about which 
he has very different views to Hutcheson. 
 One difference between the two theories is purely terminological, albeit with 
important consequences. Unlike Hutcheson, who closely follows Locke in his use of the term 
‘idea’, Hume carefully distinguishes ideas from impressions. Indeed, in his first Enquiry, 
Hume complains that ‘the word idea, seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by 
Locke and others; for standing in for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as 
well as our thoughts’ (E 2.9n1.1, SBN 22). Hutcheson is, almost certainly, one of the ‘others’ 
about whom Hume complains. 
 
4 Blackburn (1993b, 275) similarly argues that Hume merely uses this phrase from ‘piety to 
Hutcheson’, and to stress that moral judgements are not reasoned beliefs.  
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 Hutcheson (1971, 164) claims that we form ‘ideas of virtue and vice’ by sensing 
them, via certain pleasurable and painful feelings. In Hume’s terminology, Hutcheson would 
presumably understand moral approval as an ‘impression of sensation’ (T 2.1.1.1, SBN 275). 
However, Hume carefully distinguishes ‘the passions’ from ‘the impressions of the senses’ (T 
2.1.1.1, SBN 275). Hutcheson’s ‘ideas’ of virtue and vice are more similar to Hume’s 
‘passions’ than to his ‘impressions of sensation’ or ‘ideas’. Hutcheson might not be unhappy 
to hear that Hume sees them as impressions, not ideas. However, if Hume were to explicitly 
claim that moral judgements are calm passions, then he would be arguing against Hutcheson.  
 This is, I suggest, the reason for Hume’s otherwise perplexingly ambiguous language 
throughout T 3.1.1. Hume and Hutcheson agree only to the extent that they both understand 
moral judgements as pleasurable and painful feelings, which cannot be produced purely by 
reasoning. This, and no more than this, is what Hume argues for in T 3.1.1. He employs his 
technical language only to argue that moral judgements are feelings, nothing more. 
 Hume starts T 3.1.1 by carefully setting out his question in general terms: “Whether 
’tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and 
pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?” (T 3.1.1.3, SBN 456). To ‘pronounce an 
action blameable or praise-worthy’ is, surely, to make what would normally be considered a 
moral ‘judgement’. Hume’s question is therefore that of whether what we take to be moral 
judgements are impressions or ideas. His answer, at least for cases where we ‘pronounce any 
action or character to be vicious’, is also clear: we do so only by means of ‘a feeling or 
sentiment of blame’ (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 469). We saw, in Chapter 1, that Hume does not use 
the term ‘sentiment’ in any technical sense: it is sometimes a synonym for taste and it 
sometimes means something like ‘opinion’. Given this, T 3.1.1 seems very carefully worded 
to appeal to Hutcheson. 
  Hume also carefully refrains from mentioning moral ‘beliefs’ or ‘judgements’ 
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throughout T 3.1.1. Indeed, he never once uses the specific phrases ‘moral judgment’ or 
‘moral judgments’ in Book 3. He fairly often talks of other kinds of ‘judgment’ and 
‘judgments’ in Book 3, however. In the Treatise, Hume takes a judgement to be a belief: one 
formed at the conclusion of some process of reasoning. At least, he suggests this meaning of 
the term at T 1.3.13.19 (SBN 153). He argues that what we take to be moral judgements are, 
in fact, impressions, rather than ideas. Therefore, they cannot be beliefs, and so they cannot 
be judgements in Hume’s sense of the term.5 I think we should take him entirely literally 
when he claims that morality ‘is more properly felt than judg'd of’ (T 3.1.2.1, SBN 470). 
 This claim appears at the start of T 3.1.2. Hume then argues, along very Hutchesonian 
lines, as Gill (2009b, 575) observes, that virtue feels pleasurable to contemplate and that vice 
feels painful to contemplate. After this, he asks ‘in general, concerning this pain or pleasure, 
that distinguishes moral good and evil, From what principles is it derived, and whence does it 
arise in the human mind?’ His response to this question, from T 3.1.2.6 to T 3.1.2.10, is 
mainly to reject various Hutchesonian theses: notably, his thesis of benevolence and his 
thesis of moral approval as a natural motive. As Moore (1994) observes, Hume had 
previously attacked these theses in a letter to Hutcheson, sent just before he completed his 
final draft of Book 3, in 1739. 
 In the letter, Hume claims that ‘Were Benevolence the only Virtue, no Characters 
cou’d be mixt, but wou’d depend entirely on their Degrees of Benevolence’ (HL1, 34). In T 
3.1.2.6 (SBN 473), he argues that ‘the number of our duties is, in a manner, infinite’. Hume 
claims that this makes it very unlikely that we have an instinctive moral sense, for there are 
simply too many virtues for us to instinctively respond to. Human nature, according to Hume, 
 
5 Nevertheless, just as Hume often uses common language rather than his own terminology, I will 
continue to discuss Hume’s theory of moral judgements. 
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is unlikely to have developed so many similar but distinct instincts, and so we should 
‘abridge these primary impulses, and find some more general principles, upon which all our 
notions of morals are founded’ (T 3.1.2.6, SBN 473). Throughout Book 3, Hume argues for 
many kinds of virtue, of both ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ kinds, that we come to value via the 
psychological processes of general rules and delicate sympathy, not via brute instinct. 
 Hume also argues, in T 3.1.2, against the claim that ‘the character of natural and 
unnatural can ever, in any sense, mark the boundaries of vice and virtue’ (T 3.1.2.10, SBN 
475). He asks the Hutchesonian question of whether the principles of virtue are natural, and 
he responds that ‘our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, 
than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal’ (T 3.1.2.7, SBN 474). He then 
argues that, whatever definition we choose, we cannot make sense of the idea that virtue is 
natural and vice unnatural. Indeed, he goes so far as to state that ‘nothing can be more 
unphilosophical than those systems, which assert, that virtue is the same with what is natural, 
and vice with what is unnatural’ (T 3.1.2.10, SBN 475). Moreover, in his 1739 letter to 
Hutcheson, Hume says bluntly that ‘I cannot agree to your Sense of Natural. Tis founded on 
final Causes; which is a Consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain & 
unphilosophical’ (HL1, 33). 
 For Hume, benevolence is a natural virtue, but he disagrees with Hutcheson’s 
conception of nature. For Hutcheson, ‘natural’ is a justificatory term. We naturally, and so 
correctly, approve only of ‘impartially benevolent intentions’ (Gill 1996, 27-28). However, 
associations of ideas may cause us to approve of other things which are not truly virtuous, 
and such approval will be unnatural, false and distasteful. As Gill (1996, 24) puts it, 
‘[s]omething is truly beautiful or virtuous, Hutcheson believes, if and only if it would cause 
or occasion the appropriate type of pleasure in someone whose constitution is in its original 
pre-associative state.’ Hutcheson never fully explains why this should be, but Gill (1996, 28) 
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suggests that his idea of nature sits within a ‘theological world-view, and [that] the viability 
of that world-view was not something Hutcheson thought to submit to philosophical 
scrutiny.’ All ‘true explanations ultimately end at God’ and so, when we can no longer 
explain why we feel something, we attribute the feeling to a God-given sense (Gill 1996, 28). 
For Hutcheson, this both sufficiently explains the feeling in question and justifies it. Hume 
clearly does not subscribe to any such view. 
 Hume’s final paragraph of this section begins: 
 
Thus we are still brought back to our first position, that virtue is 
distinguished by the pleasure, and vice by the pain, that any action, 
sentiment or character gives us by the mere view and contemplation. This 
decision is very commodious; because it reduces us to this simple question, 
Why any action or sentiment upon the general view or survey, gives a 
certain satisfaction or uneasiness, in order to shew the origin of its moral 
rectitude or depravity, without looking for any incomprehensible relations 
and qualities, which never did exist in nature, nor even in our imagination, 
by any clear and distinct conception (T 3.1.2.11, SBN 475-6). 
 
 This all strongly suggests two things. First, that Hume believes that what we call 
moral ‘judgements’ are all, properly speaking, feelings of ‘satisfaction’ or ‘uneasiness’, rather 
than beliefs or ideas. And, second, that his arguments for this lie mainly beyond the first part 
of Book 3. T 3.1.1 appears to have been intended to show where Hume and Hutcheson agree: 
in their claims that moral judgements cannot be produced purely via reasoning, and that they 
must be feelings or sentiments. T 3.1.2 appears to have been intended to argue against 
Hutcheson, by showing that we cannot appeal to notions of naturalness or benevolence to 
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either explain or justify our moral sentiments in anything like the way that Hutcheson 
suggests. At the end of this section, having explicitly argued against Hutcheson’s views 
regarding benevolence and our natural dispositions to be virtuous, and having implicitly ruled 
out any of Hutcheson’s theological claims, Hume is left only with the question of how we 
should understand our moral sentiments. 
 Hume certainly never suggests that any moral judgements might be beliefs: ‘Our 
decisions concerning moral rectitude and depravity are evidently perceptions; and as all 
perceptions are either impressions or ideas, the exclusion of the one is a convincing argument 
for the other’ (T 3.1.2.1, SBN 470). Moral judgments, or more properly, moral ‘decisions’, 
are not ideas, and so not beliefs. Even if T 3.1 provides no compelling argument for non-
cognitivism, it provides very good reasons to think that Hume endorses non-cognitivism. 
 Hume’s substantive thesis, that all moral judgements are calm passions, is to come, in 
T 3.2 and T 3.3. We have examined the core tenets of this already. We will see, in §5.6, that 
Hume’s official theories of belief and of the causes of the moral sentiments entail that we 
cannot have moral beliefs alongside moral sentiments. First, however, we must ask what a 
moral belief would look like, if Hume were to allow that they exist. 
 
5.3. Arguments against Hume’s non-cognitivism 
Cohon (2010) and Garrett (2002) suggest two means by which Hume seems to allow moral 
beliefs to be formed. Cohon argues that we can form moral beliefs without inference, and I 
discuss this in in §5.3.1. In §5.3.2, I discuss Garrett’s claim that we can use reason to form 
moral beliefs. 
 Both Cohon and Garrett see an important parallel between Hume’s accounts of sense 
impressions and moral impressions. They suggest that Hume sees virtue as importantly 
similar to a sensory property like redness. We understand that an object looks red because we 
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see it looking so, and we therefore form beliefs about unperceived red objects by having 
vivid ideas of them as having this unanalysable property. Similarly, they argue, Hume 
believes that we understand a character to be virtuous because it feels a certain way, so we 
can form beliefs about absent virtuous characters by forming vivid ideas of them with this 
unanalysable property. 
 In §5.4, I will argue that Hume does not allow this parallel. To perceive something as 
red is just to have an impression of it as red, because Hume denies that colour and form arise 
from distinct impressions. Instead, we see impressions of colour ‘dispos’d in a certain form’ 
(T 1.1.7.18, SBN 25). My belief that a box is red just is a vivid idea of it as a box with that 
property I call redness. However, to take something to be virtuous is to experience 
approbation as caused by that object. I argue, therefore, that any belief that an object is 
virtuous could only be a belief that it is such as to cause approbation; not a belief that it has a 
certain quality of virtue. First, however, I will consider Cohon’s and Garrett’s arguments in 
greater detail. 
 
5.3.1. Humean moral memories 
For Cohon (2010, 138), ‘Hume’s position is that ordinarily I acquire moral beliefs as the 
result of feeling a trait’s goodness or evil – sensing the moral property directly – and then 
forming an idea-copy of my moral sentiment’. She argues for a direct comparison with 
beliefs about colour; ‘normally I obtain my beliefs about what colors things are in response to 
a sensory experience’ (Cohon 2010, 104). If I see a red box, then Hume’s account seems to 
suggest that I will form an idea-copy of its colour which, being vivid, will be a belief that the 
box is red. Surely, argues Cohon, Hume must allow that we similarly form beliefs directly 
from our moral sentiments.  If I feel approbation towards someone, then presumably I will 
likewise form a vivid idea-copy of this approbation; a moral belief. 
 133 
However, Hume does not allow that we form beliefs directly from impressions. He 
claims that we may form a vivid or a non-vivid idea-copy – or, more likely, both – from any 
impression, but neither kind will be a belief. To form a vivid idea-copy is to have a memory. 
These can never be beliefs, because all beliefs exist within the faculty of the imagination, 
which is distinct from that of the memory (T 1.1.3.1, SBN 8). All ideas formed within the 
imagination are ‘perfect’, non-vivid ideas (T 1.1.3.1, SBN 8). Although we can later enliven 
these by causal reasoning, they begin as merely imagined ideas. Any beliefs about whether 
the objects which we perceive are ‘really’ of the colour they appear are formed by reasoning 
about the external world, as Hume argues in T 1.4.2. Therefore, we cannot directly form a 
belief from any impression, whether of a colour or a moral sentiment. 
However, even if Cohon is describing what Hume would understand as moral 
memories rather than moral beliefs, she suggests a non-emotivist interpretation of his account 
of moral judgements. If I feel disapprobation towards Rousseau, then I judge him to be 
vicious. If I remember that I felt disapprobation towards Rousseau, then I have a vivid idea of 
his viciousness. In expressing this memory, I express my judgement of his viciousness, 
without any sentiment occurring. Therefore, I will have to demonstrate that Hume does not 
allow that memories could be moral judgements. 
 
5.3.2 Humean moral beliefs 
Garrett (2002) argues, like Cohon, that Hume must allow that we can form ideas from moral 
impressions, just as we do from sense impressions. He claims that we could therefore reason 
with these ideas, and thereby ‘formulate propositional judgements or beliefs to the effect that 
a particular person is virtuous’ (Garrett 2002, 197, Garrett’s emphasis). We are, Garrett 
suggests, particularly likely to engage in such reasoning where we are too distant from people 
for their characters to readily cause moral sentiments in us. He argues that denying that we 
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can reason about the morality of distant people would be like claiming that we ‘could never 
infer that a box was red or square – say, as the result of someone else’s testimony that it was’ 
(Garrett 2002, 200). 
Garrett’s (2002, 200) example is that someone could ‘infer from the testimony of the 
New York Times that Mother Teresa is virtuous’. Of course, by any account, such a 
judgement will be caused to some extent by reasoning. There will be inferences to the effect 
that Mother Teresa is a real person, that the writer is reliable, and so on. However, Garrett’s 
claim is that Hume would allow that someone could form the judgement that Mother Teresa 
is virtuous by reason alone in this case. If so, then any judgement so formed would be purely 
a moral belief. 
This is possible, according to Garrett, because of Hume’s account of abstract ideas. 
We form our revival set of ‘virtue’ by grouping together all and only those ideas of ‘personal 
characteristics that produce immediate moral approbation’ (Garrett, 2002, 197). Garrett 
argues that, once we have categorised a sufficient number of ideas in this way, we can form 
beliefs about appropriate new members of the set without feeling approbation, by noticing 
resemblances between these traits and ones previously classed as ‘virtuous’. The reader of the 
New York Times understands that Mother Teresa has traits of a kind which she usually calls 
virtuous and so, without any sentiment necessarily occurring, she applies the term ‘virtue’ to 
the idea of Mother Teresa’s character. She therefore believes that Mother Teresa is virtuous. 
If moral reasoning of this kind is possible by Hume’s account, as it currently seems to 
be, then what, precisely, is being believed about Mother Teresa at its conclusion? Garrett 
thinks the belief is that Mother Teresa’s character has an unanalysable property; that what is 
believed ‘can only be expressed by saying that she is virtuous’ (Garrett 2002, 202, Garrett’s 
emphasis). In §5.4, I argue, against Garrett, that any such belief could only be that Mother 
Teresa’s character is such as to cause approbation. 
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5.4.  The vivid idea of virtue 
Any belief about virtue must be a vivid idea of virtue. In the moral Enquiry, Hume ‘defines 
virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of 
approbation’ (M App. 1.10, SBN 289). His account in the Treatise is consistent with this 
definition (see particularly T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591). Therefore, any idea of a virtuous character 
trait just is a complex idea of both a mental action or quality and an associated sentiment of 
approbation. It is because we observe that some complex ideas resemble one another in this 
way that we form the revival set of ‘virtue’. The idea of Mother Teresa’s character could only 
be included, and so sincerely called ‘virtuous’, if it resembles other ideas of virtuous 
characters by bringing to mind a further idea of approbation. Therefore, the belief that 
Mother Teresa is virtuous is the belief that her character is such as to cause approbation. 
Garret can resist this conclusion, because he claims that Hume allows two ways in 
which one can form the abstract idea of virtue, only one of which requires an idea of 
approbation. Garrett (2002, 107) argues that Hume defines ‘personal merit’ as the possession 
of traits which display ‘usefulness or agreeableness to the possessor or others’, and that, 
because all and only such mental qualities cause approbation, Hume considers this to be a 
definition of personal merit and of virtue. If so, then ideas of personal merit would also be 
ideas of virtue, but ones involving no ideas of approbation.  
However, Hume never claims that ‘the possession of useful or agreeable mental 
qualities’ is a definition of virtue. Garrett (2002, 107) only points to one passage to support 
this interpretation, where Hume says that every useful or agreeable trait ‘communicates a 
pleasure to the spectator’, and is then deemed virtuous (M 9.12, SBN 277). Yet this merely 
supports Hume’s explicit definition of virtuous traits as ones which causes approbation. It is, 
for Hume, merely a contingent fact that all and only useful or agreeable traits cause 
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approbation. The idea of virtue is of traits which cause approbation, although the same traits 
are also understood, by causal reasoning, to be useful and agreeable ones. Nevertheless, the 
abstract ideas of virtue and personal merit remain distinct; one could conceive of a useless, 
disagreeable virtue, simply by imagining such a trait causing approbation. 
Therefore, any belief that a character is virtuous can only be, for Hume, a vivid idea 
of it as a potential cause of approbation. If the reader believes that Mother Teresa’s character 
is virtuous – rather than just that the journalist at the New York Times approves of her – then 
she must believe that Mother Teresa’s character is one which she, the reader, associates with 
causing approbation. She need not realise that this is all that there is to virtue, of course. 
Equally, she might not realise that Mother Teresa’s character is such as to cause a sentiment 
of approbation, because Hume allows that we frequently mistake calm sentiments for 
reasoned judgements (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). Nevertheless, whatever she takes approbation to 
be, she would certainly understand that a virtuous trait is one which would cause her to 
approve, if she were in a position to witness it. 
Any such belief could only be formed by causal reasoning. To believe that Mother 
Teresa is virtuous is to have a vivid idea of approbation as caused by her character. This idea 
is believed because of the vivacity transferred to it, from the reader’s impressions of the 
newspaper, via the idea of Mother Teresa’s character. If Hume does allow for moral 
reasoning, then any moral belief so produced will be a belief that a person’s character is such 
as to cause approbation or disapprobation in the right circumstances. We will see the 
importance of this in §5.6. 
In summary, Cohon’s and Garrett’s accounts suggest that we can form moral 
judgements in the absence of sentiment, just as we can form causal beliefs and memories 
about the colours of unperceived objects. All such non-sentimental moral judgements will be 
either memories or causal beliefs. 
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5.5. Implications of Generality 
We have seen that the most plausible interpretations of Hume as allowing for non-sentimental 
moral judgements rely on an analogy between moral sentiments and sense impressions. This 
analogy suggests an argument that, because we form ideas from both kinds of impression, we 
can therefore believe or remember either kind of idea in the absence of the relevant 
impressions. Just as ideas derived from sense impressions can be judgements about 
unperceived objects, so too can ideas derived from moral sentiments be judgements about 
virtue and vice. However, Generality, as discussed in 3.1.2, shows a crucial difference in the 
causes of each kind of impression. This has important implications for any interpretation of 
Hume’s account of moral reasoning. 
 Whereas sense impressions cannot be caused by ideas, a sentiment of approbation 
can – and will – be caused by any idea of a useful or agreeable character, action or sentiment. 
Indeed, Hume’s theories of secondary impressions and of custom entail that, even if I were 
told only that someone was virtuous, with no detail about their character beyond this, I would 
form a general idea of their possessing useful or agreeable character traits, and would 
therefore feel approbation. Hume argues that we all ‘implicitly’ maintain a belief that 
virtuous traits are ones which cause happiness to others (M 9.2, SBN 269). This is 
presumably because the causal relation between happiness and approbation is so strong that 
we are able to make the inference from one to the other without even considering the matter. 
Where we have frequently experienced causal relations, ‘the understanding or imagination 
can draw inferences from past experience, without reflecting on it’ (T 1.3.8.13, SBN 104). 
Any persuasive testimony to the effect that someone is virtuous will cause me to infer that 
they possess character traits which are naturally fitted to be useful or agreeable. As all 
perceptions of such traits cause approbation, this belief will cause approbation. 
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On Hume’s account, therefore, reasoning about virtue is in all cases redundant, 
because whenever we have an idea of a useful or agreeable trait, we will judge it as virtuous 
simply by experiencing approbation. After all, why reason with those ideas derived from our 
sense impressions? Only because sense impressions of the relevant kinds are frequently 
absent when we consider their causes and effects. In contrast, Hume thinks we need never 
reason about the causes of our passions because, wherever we consider the usual causes of a 
passion, we will feel some degree of the passion in question. 
This is similar to a point which Blackburn (1993b) makes about the disanalogies 
between colour perceptions and moral feelings, regarding the corrections we may wish to 
make to our judgements about these. I may be confused about the morality of an action 
because my selfish interests are affecting my judgement, just as I may be confused about the 
colour of an object because of bad lighting. However, Blackburn notes that the differences 
are crucial: 
 
In the latter case we have only a judgement about what we would perceive were 
the light different. We do not have another colour perception alongside 
whatever we are seeing at the time. Whereas in the ethical case, we do have a 
genuinely moral sentiment emerging from the process, another original 
existence to put alongside whatever initial sentiment self-love generated. 
(Blackburn 1993b, 275) 
 
We can transpose this thinking to the question of reasoning about the virtue of others. If I am 
told by a reliable witness that they passed a letter box, then I can infer that it is red, but I 
cannot see its redness. However, if a reliable witness tells me that a person helps others, then 
I have no need to infer that this person is virtuous, for the idea of helping others causes 
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approbation. Equally, if they persuade me simply that a person is virtuous, then I will form a 
belief that their character is useful or agreeable. Again, this belief will cause approbation. 
Generality entails that every moral judgement involves an occurrence of approbation 
or disapprobation. This is because we experience at least one such sentiment whenever any 
morally relevant idea comes to mind. Equally, it demonstrates that reasoning about the 
morality of unperceived objects is simply not necessary in the way that reasoning about 
colour often is. However, this is not sufficient to demonstrate Hume’s emotivism. Hume’s 
claim is that we never form reasoned moral judgements; that every judgement of virtue is 
‘nothing but’ a sentiment (T 3.1.2.3, SBN 471). Even given Generality, we could hold a 
belief about Mother Teresa’s virtue whilst simultaneously feeling approbation towards her. 
Indeed, Garrett (2002, 198) suggests that we may have a moral belief and a ‘corresponding 
moral feeling’ simultaneously. To show that Hume denies this possibility, we must consider 
his account of vivacity once more. We will see that Hume’s understanding of beliefs and of 
impressions compel him to deny that we can ever feel moral sentiments and moral beliefs 
simultaneously. 
 
5.6. The Vivacity Thesis 
The Vivacity Thesis states that, wherever we have a present impression, we cannot hold a 
vivid idea in mind which differs from that impression only in its level of vivacity. Therefore, 
we cannot form a belief about a moral sentiment which, aside from its level of vivacity, is 
identical to a present moral sentiment.  
Admittedly, Hume never explicitly states the Vivacity Thesis. It is however entailed 
by a small number of key claims in Book 1. First, as we saw in Chapter 1, Hume claims that 
any idea of X is identical to an impression of X, except that it is less vivid. Hume claims this 
of impressions and ideas of a particular shade of red, and he argues that ‘the case is the same 
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with all our simple impressions and ideas’ (T 1.1.1.5, SBN 3). Hume allows that there is 
more than one ‘kind of approbation’, but only where different kinds of useful and agreeable 
traits cause variation in the feeling of approbation (T 3.3.4.2, SBN 608). Therefore, Hume’s 
official view is that any believed idea of approbation as caused by an object would be 
identical to, except less vivid than, an impression of approbation as caused by the same 
object. 
Second, Hume says that ‘every distinct perception, which enters into the composition 
of the mind, is a distinct existence, and is different, and distinguishable, and separable from 
every other perception, either contemporary or successive’ (T 1.4.6.16, SBN 259). If I believe 
that a box looks red, at the same time that I see it looks red, then I must be able to distinguish 
between my impression of red and my vivid idea of red. I would only be able to distinguish 
these perceptions by their differing levels of vivacity, as they are otherwise identical. 
Third, Hume claims that we cannot doubt the existence of our perceptions, because 
they are ‘immediately present to us by consciousness’ (T 1.4.2.47, SBN 212). We can 
confuse one kind of perception for another, as when we confuse a calm passion for a 
reasoned belief, but we cannot doubt that the perception exists. If I believe that a box looks 
red, at the same time as I see that it looks red, then I must be able to identify that I have two 
perceptions of redness, which are distinguishable only by their differing levels of vivacity. 
With this in mind, recall from Chapter 1 that all impressions are maximally vivid, 
whereas no beliefs are. If I see a box and have an impression of red, then I am certain that I 
see red, according to Hume; I know I cannot be mistaken here. If I believe that a box looks 
red, then, by definition, I am uncertain that I would see red when looking at it; I recognise 
some possibility of error. To be clear, the belief in question is not that the box is always or 
really red. It is simply a belief that the box looks red. If I were to maintain this belief at the 
same time as I look at the box and see its redness, then I would be in a state of both certainty 
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and uncertainty about what is otherwise the exact same judgement about the box’s redness. 
Given that this is impossible, Hume must hold the Vivacity Thesis. 
For sense impressions, this has only a limited effect. I cannot form a belief that a box 
looks red while I see that it does, simply because at that time I know that it looks red. 
However, if the box is removed from my sight, then the impression of red is gone, and I can 
remember the box’s redness, and form beliefs about its redness. For moral impressions, 
however, the case is different. 
We saw in §5.4 that any belief that Mother Teresa is virtuous would be a vivid, 
complex idea of her character and of approbation as caused by it; a belief that her character 
would cause approbation in the right circumstances. Generality entails that, if I read in the 
New York Times that Mother Teresa possesses any useful or agreeable traits, then I will 
immediately feel approbation. Equally, if it reports simply that she is virtuous, then I will 
habitually form an idea of her as possessing useful or agreeable traits, which will cause 
approbation. If I do not believe that Mother Teresa possesses the traits which I read about, 
then I will merely experience approbation towards the general ideas of the traits; I will 
consider them virtuous but not applicable to Mother Teresa. If, however, I infer that Mother 
Teresa does have such traits, then this approbation will be caused by what I believe to be her 
traits. It will be a judgement of her virtue. 
This impression of approbation as caused by the idea of Mother Teresa’s character 
will be identical to any believed idea of such approbation, except in its level of vivacity. The 
Vivacity Thesis entails that I cannot simultaneously experience these two perceptions. 
Therefore, I can never simultaneously experience the vivid idea of Mother Teresa’s useful or 
agreeable traits and the vivid idea of a consequent approbation, because the former idea 
immediately causes approbation. As any belief about Mother Teresa’s virtue could only 
consist of two such vivid ideas held together, I cannot form the belief that she is virtuous. In 
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other words, I cannot merely believe that approbation is caused by a character while 
approbation is caused by it, any more than I can merely believe that I see a box as red while I 
see its redness. Similar arguments apply to all potential beliefs about virtue or vice. 
Therefore, Generality and the Vivacity Thesis together demonstrate that we cannot ever hold 
beliefs about virtue or vice.  
Equally, moral judgements cannot consist of memories of moral properties, as 
Cohon’s interpretation suggests. In fact, we cannot ever form memory ideas of the 
virtuousness or viciousness of characters. Like beliefs, memory ideas are vivid, but less so 
than the otherwise identical impressions from which they are derived. Therefore, the Vivacity 
Thesis demonstrates that any memory idea of the viciousness of Rousseau’s ingratitude can 
only be formed once I have ceased to feel disapprobation. Generality demonstrates that, if I 
remember Rousseau’s ingratitude, I will once again feel disapprobation.  
Therefore, Hume’s is an emotivist theory: if I sincerely call Rousseau ‘vicious’, then I 
can only be expressing a sentiment of disapprobation towards Rousseau, and my utterance 
can only derive its meaning from its being an expression of a sentiment of disapprobation 
towards Rousseau. 
It is notable that, while the Vivacity Thesis disallows moral beliefs (and other beliefs 
about matters of taste), it allows beliefs about violent passions, because we can distinguish a 
calm passion from a violent one of the same kind. If I imagine a bear in my garden, for 
example, then Hume’s theory of passions suggests I will feel some, presumably very calm, 
fear. I will also believe that I would feel a more violent fear if there was a bear in my garden. 
This belief is therefore distinguishable from my impression of fear, so both can exist 
simultaneously. However, to approve of a future action or distant character is to have an 
impression as calm as any approbation one might believe one would experience. This 
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impression differs from the belief only in its level of vivacity, so the two cannot exist 
simultaneously. 
As a final point, Hume’s theory allows that we can entertain non-believed ideas of 
virtue and vice, and even believed ideas of approbation and disapprobation. If I believe that 
‘the monks perversely believed that silence was a virtue’, then I form a vivid idea of their 
approbation as caused by silence; I believe that they take silence to be virtuous. Further, I can 
imagine approving of silence, so that I imagine that silence is a virtue. In both cases, because 
I do not approve of silence, I experience no simultaneous impression of approbation, and I 
form no belief about the virtue of silence. However, if I come to approve of silence, then I 
will experience approbation, so that, according to the Vivacity Thesis, I will be unable to 
form a vivid idea of my own approbation as caused by silence. I will be unable to believe in 
the virtue of silence. 
Hume’s ideational theory of language, coupled with his thesis that moral judgements 
are all sentiments rather than beliefs, entails an emotivist theory of moral language. 
Admittedly, Hume’s Vivacity Thesis is founded on a claim – that impressions and ideas 
fundamentally differ only in their different levels of vivacity – that Hume appears unable to 
consistently adhere to, as we saw in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, he resolutely adheres to this 
claim throughout his Treatise. Moreover, he appears adamant in his rejection of the notion of 
moral beliefs, in both his Treatise and his moral Enquiry. 
We have one further, and important, aspect of Hume’s theory of moral judgements 
still to discuss: his thesis of a common or general point of view. As we will see, it is often 
believed that this thesis requires that some or all moral judgements are produced or corrected 
by reason. I will argue, in Chapter 6, that this belief is a mistaken one. 
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6. The Common Point of View 
 
In both his Treatise and his moral Enquiry, Hume argues that we would frequently disagree 
with one another when assessing other people’s characters, were it not for the fact that, in 
relevant cases, we adopt a ‘common point of view’ (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591; M 9.6, SBN 272). 
Adopting this viewpoint provides us with a ‘general inalterable standard, by which we may 
approve or disapprove of characters and manners’ (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 603; see also M 5.42, 
SBN 229). In the Treatise, Hume describes this as the process of fixing ‘on some steady and 
general points of view’, in which we consistently ‘place’ ourselves when we assess people’s 
characters (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-2). In this chapter, I will ask how we should understand 
Hume’s thesis of a common or general point of view. (I will generally use the phrase 
‘common point of view’.)  
I have argued that Hume endorses the thesis that, in §3.1.2, I called Generality. 
Generality allows Hume to explain cases of virtue in rags and our consistent approval of the 
artificial virtues, without requiring any additions or caveats to his theory of the causes of 
moral judgements. According to Generality, our moral sentiments are uniform: they respond 
in the same way towards all token character traits of any one type, regardless of how we are 
related to the person whose trait it is, or how we are affected by the particular effects of the 
token trait. In this chapter, we will see that Generality cannot be reconciled with Hume’s 
common point of view thesis, as it is typically understood. However, I will argue for a new 
interpretation of this thesis, which can be reconciled with Generality. This argument will 
conclude my discussion of Hume. 
 There is much debate about Hume’s meaning in his discussion of the common point 
of view, but it is generally agreed that he is arguing for something like the following view: 
The sympathetic basis of our moral sentiments makes them variable in ways that our 
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considered moral judgements are not. For example, we sympathise more with people nearby 
than with those further away, and so we experience stronger moral sentiments towards 
character traits that affect people around us than towards similar character traits in distant 
lands. However, common experience shows that we generally evaluate similar traits by using 
similar moral terms, regardless of these kinds of variations: our verbalised moral evaluations 
are highly uniform. For example, we consistently call anyone who helps others ‘good’ or 
‘virtuous’, no matter where they are or how we may be related to them. The reason for the 
uniformity of our verbalised moral evaluations is that we all recognise that our moral 
sentiments are variable, and we correct for these variations by undertaking an imaginative 
exercise: one that involves the adoption of a common point of view. Our motive to correct 
our judgements in this way is often understood to be, as Baier (1991, 181) has it, an 
awareness of the ‘biases to which we know felt sympathy to be subject’, along with a desire 
to correct for these when moralising. Once we have adopted the common point of view, our 
verbal evaluations are uniform because they are expressions of either suitably corrected 
sentiments or of our beliefs about ‘how we would feel’ if our sentiments were not ‘influenced 
by our particular perspectives’ (Radcliffe 1994, 43, Radcliffe’s emphasis). 
This is, of course, a highly simplified and generalised account. Nevertheless, most 
scholars agree that Hume holds some version of the thesis outlined above.1 Call it the 
‘Correction Thesis’. This holds, roughly, that adopting the common point of view involves 
disregarding immediate and variable (i.e., non-uniform) moral sentiments in favour of more 
 
1 Proponents of this general view include, but are not limited to, the following: Abramson (1999); 
Árdal (1966); Baier (1991); Blackburn (1998); Bricke (2000); Brown (1994; 2001); Cohon (2010); 
Darwall (1994); Garrett (2002; 2015); Gill (2009b; 2010); Hearn (1976); Korsgaard (1999); Mackie 
(1980); Mercer (1972); Radcliffe (1994); Sayre-McCord (1994); Stroud (1977); and Taylor (2002; 
2015). 
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considered, uniform moral judgements.2 These corrected judgments may be understood as 
sentiments or, as we saw in chapter 5, as beliefs. 
Hume is typically thought to argue that we perform this kind of correction via a 
sympathetic exercise, in which we imagine the actual or typical effects of a person’s 
character on her ‘narrow circle’, sympathise with their responses, and thereby judge the 
character more accurately or impartially than we could do otherwise (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 602).3 
In some passages, such as T 3.3.1.15 (SBN 581-2) and T 3.3.1.20 (SBN 584-5), Hume 
stresses the similarities between our assessments of people’s characters and those of beauty. 
This leads some readers, such as Garrett (2015, 121) and Sayre-McCord (1994), to compare 
Hume’s discussion of the ‘general inalterable standard’ of morality with that of the ‘true 
standard’ of taste by which a competent critic judges art (EMPL 240). By these 
interpretations, adopting the common point of view is, roughly, a moral version of the 
process which Hume thinks a good art critic undertakes, when she imagines herself in the 
point of view of the intended audience of an artwork, sympathises with the audience’s 
reaction, and judges the work purely by the resulting, refined sentiments. 
 
2 I use the term ‘roughly’ because my arguments will also oppose variations on this general 
interpretation, such as those by which any truly moral sentiments are only experienced following a 
corrective ‘imaginative exercise’, as Abramson (1999, 343) argues. I see no place for any such 
imaginative exercise.  
3 For interpretations by which we correct our initial moral sentiments by imaginatively sympathising 
with a person’s ‘narrow circle’, see, for example: Brown (1994, 24); Darwall (1994, 71); Gill (2010, 
253-254); Korsgaard (1999, 3); Radcliffe (1994, 42); Sayre-McCord (1994, 219). Taylor (2002; 2015) 
argues that, although Hume claims in his Treatise that the common point of view involves 
sympathising with a person’s narrow circle, he does not hold this view in his moral Enquiry. 
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In this chapter, I will argue that Hume never argues for the Correction Thesis. This is 
important, because the Correction Thesis is typically seen as an integral and prominent aspect 
of Hume’s theory of the formation of moral judgement. Moreover, many commentators claim 
that the thesis entails that at least some moral judgements are beliefs, closely analogous to 
reasoned beliefs, or formed mainly via processes of reasoning.4 Absent the Correction Thesis, 
there appears to be no plausible place for reflective reasoning in Hume’s account of the 
causes of our moral judgements. 
This alone suggests one reason to think that Hume never argues for the Correction 
Thesis.5 In Chapter 5, we saw his uncompromising anti-rationalism throughout T 3.1.1, 
which appears to have been written after his discussion of the common point of view. 
Hume’s arguments in this section contain no mention of the adoption of a common point of 
view. If he saw any important role for reasoning in this process, then we should expect him to 
discuss it in T 3.1.1. 
We must therefore ask what Hume does mean to argue for in his discussions of the 
common point of view, if not for the Correction Thesis. I will argue that he claims that, 
whenever we evaluate motives and characters, we habitually correct for the presence of our 
variable, non-moral sentiments, by expressing only our uniform moral sentiments. To adopt 
the common point of view just is to express only our automatically produced, uncorrected, 
and uniform moral sentiments in our evaluations of character. The process of adopting the 
 
4 Examples include: Aiken (1979); Baier (1991, 179-80); Cohon (2010, 150); Garrett (2002, 203); 
Hearn (1976, 63); Mercer (1972, 69); Norton (1982, 95); Sayre-McCord (2008, 312); Stroud (1977, 
192). 
5 Korsgaard (1999), Mackie (1980), and Stroud (1977) argue for other problems for this thesis. Taylor 
(2002; 2015) argues for problems for Hume’s Treatise account of the thesis. 
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common point of view requires no alteration of our sympathies or moral sentiments, and no 
imaginative exercise. 
Recall, from §2.2, that Hume believes that we may ‘turn our view’ to any one idea in 
several different ways (T 1.1.7.18, SBN 25). In this way, the idea can be a more or less 
generalised one: an idea of a token character trait can function either as an idea of a person’s 
particular trait, or as the general notion of that trait (such that it is thought of simply as a 
token of some general type), or as the abstract idea of that general type of trait. I believe that 
Hume has, at least sometimes, a similar meaning of ‘view’ in mind when he discusses a 
‘common point of view’. To adopt the common point of view is, in both the Treatise and the 
moral Enquiry, to express only the uniform sentiments that are caused, via delicate sympathy, 
when we view our ideas of traits as general notions, as where we think of a motive of 
benevolence merely as a motive of benevolence. 
However, there are important differences between the two works. As Taylor (2002; 
2015) argues, Hume’s account of moral judgement in his Enquiry significantly improves on 
that in his Treatise in its greater focus on moral language. I argue that, in the Treatise, Hume 
claims that we recognise that our moral sentiments are more uniform than all our other 
sentiments directed towards character traits, which compels us to try and alter our non-moral 
sentiments accordingly, or at least to talk as if we have done so. We call a distant benefactor 
and a nearby benefactor equally ‘good’ because we mistakenly believe that we are rationally 
obliged to feel the same violent pleasures towards both benefactors. However, we can only 
successfully talk as if we feel equally about them by expressing only our uniform sentiments. 
In the Enquiry, Hume argues for the simpler thesis that we recognise that our moral 
sentiments are more uniform than all our other sentiments directed towards character traits, 
and that we find this pleasing and socially useful, because it allows for a high degree of 
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convergence in our evaluations of character. Hume argues that, for this reason, we developed 
moral language to express only these sentiments. 
In §6.1, I address Hume’s Treatise discussion of a common point of view. I focus on 
the problem that this discussion is intended to resolve: that of satisfactorily explaining why 
our verbal assessments of character are less variable than most of the passions which result 
from contemplating people’s characters. I call this the ‘uniformity problem’. I argue that 
Hume’s response to it is heavily influenced by a Hobbesian theory of value, which in turn 
influences his claims about how and why we express only our moral sentiments when we 
evaluate characters. In §6.2, I argue that, in the Enquiry, to take up the common point of view 
just is to express our uniform sentiments via moral language. 
 
6.1. The common point of view in the Treatise 
Hume first discusses the common point of view in T 3.3.1, just after he has completed his 
account of the artificial virtues, and during the course of his arguments for Generality. He 
introduces the notion of ‘delicate sympathy’ at T 3.3.1.8 (SBN 576-7). He then argues that 
the case of justice has demonstrated that our ‘sentiment of morals… can proceed from 
nothing but our sympathy with the interests of society’ (T 3.3.1.12, SBN 580). He reminds us 
that some ‘particular’ acts of justice are ‘not beneficial to society’, and that we only approve 
of justice because of its general ‘tendency’ to benefit society, before arguing that we should 
‘ascribe… the same cause to the approbation of [the natural virtues]’ (T 3.3.1.13, SBN 580).  
Hume then addresses two potential objections to his argument so far. One stems from 
cases of virtue in rags, as discussed in §3.1. The other stems from the obvious variability of 
our typical sympathetic pains and pleasures. For example, Hume believes that our sympathies 
with our countryfolk are stronger than those with foreigners, so that we feel greater 
sympathetic pleasures from the happiness of an English person than from the happiness of a 
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Chinese person. However, we ‘give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in 
China as in England’ (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 581). If I believe that a Chinese person is as 
benevolent as an English one, then I will call the two characters equally ‘virtuous’. Yet, 
Hume suggests, if my approval is caused by my sympathetic pleasures, and if I feel more 
pleasure from a beneficial outcome in England than from a similar one in China, then we 
would expect me to express greater ‘esteem’ towards the English benefactor than towards the 
Chinese benefactor (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 581). Following Cohon (2010, 131), I call this the 
‘variability objection’. 
Whatever Hume means by ‘steady and general points of view’, he introduces this 
phrase in response to the variability objection (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-2). And, however we 
understand the details of this objection, it is clearly directed towards Hume’s suggestion that 
our moral judgements are caused via sympathy. Hume believes that sympathy is ‘very 
variable’, and his worry is that ‘it may be thought, that our sentiments of morals must admit 
of all the same variations’ (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 580-1). 
As we have seen, Hume is typically understood to accept that our immediate, 
unreflective ‘sentiments of morals’ are variable, and to argue that the Correction Thesis 
resolves any worries we might have about this. By any such interpretation, the variability 
objection is understood to pose something like the following question: Why are our 
considered moral judgements uniform, given that our immediate and unreflective moral 
judgements are sentiments, which vary as our sympathies vary? However, if this is the 
relevant question, then Hume should reject it, rather than attempt to answer it. This is 
because, as we have also seen, he is in the midst of arguing that our immediate, unreflective 
moral sentiments are uniform. 
Generality entails that, if I contemplate distant benevolent motives, or even 
benevolent motives that lead to painful consequences for me personally, then I will 
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immediately experience strong approbation, precisely as I do in those cases of virtue in rags 
where I approve of futile benevolent motives. There is no need for me to adopt an imagined 
viewpoint to achieve this. Given Generality, adopting an imagined viewpoint could only 
affect my moral sentiments if it resulted in me reclassifying the motive under consideration. 
For example, I might initially take someone to be benevolent but, by reflecting on how their 
peers might see them, decide that they are acting from self-interest. However, this kind of 
correction cannot be what Hume argues for in response to the variability objection, because it 
cannot explain why an English person judges a Chinese benefactor to be as virtuous as an 
English benefactor. 
At this point in the Treatise, Hume has not yet completed his arguments that general 
rules and delicate sympathy cause uniform moral sentiments. He does this just after he 
discusses the variability objection, during his response to the ‘virtue and rags’ objection, at T 
3.3.1.20 (SBN 585). Nevertheless, the thesis that he sets out to defend from the variability 
objection is carefully formulated to be compatible with Generality. It is the thesis that, 
wherever a character ‘has a tendency to the good of mankind, we are pleas’d with it, and 
approve of it; because it presents the lively idea of pleasure; which idea affects us by 
sympathy, and is itself a kind of pleasure’ (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 580, my emphasis). This clearly 
allows that any token act of a typically useful or agreeable type may cause approbation in the 
manner discussed in Chapter 3: via a process whereby general rules produce a quasi-belief 
about happiness, with which we sympathise via delicate sympathy. 
Unfortunately, Hume’s language seems less than careful where he argues for and 
defends this thesis. He frequently refers to violent passions as simply ‘passions’ or 
‘sentiments’, and to calm passions by terms like ‘calm and general principles’ (T 3.3.1.18, 
SBN 584). This is at least partly because he believes that we commonly mistake our calm 
passions for reasoned judgments, so that we wrongly believe that our only passions are 
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violent ones. In T 3.3.1.18 (SBN 583-4), Hume briefly acknowledges that he is following our 
common language in this regard (see also T 2.1.1.3, SBN 276). 
Hume begins his response to the variability objection by rejecting any notion that 
moral judgements are ‘deriv’d from reason’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581). He stipulates instead that 
moral judgements are derived from a ‘moral taste’ and ‘certain sentiments of pleasure and 
disgust’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581). These seem like synonymous terms, but I think they are not. 
Hume is responding to the suggestion that our moral ‘esteem… proceeds not from sympathy’ 
(T 3.3.1.14, SBN 581). I propose that he means that some non-moral ‘sentiments of pleasure 
and disgust’ must cause our moral taste, and that he is defending the thesis that these non-
moral sentiments are sympathetic pleasures and pains. He concedes that these ‘sentiments, 
whence-ever they are deriv’d, must vary, according to the distance or contiguity of the 
objects’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581). His point here, I suggest, is that whether or not the kinds of 
non-moral sentiments that cause our moral sentiments are sympathetic ones, they are clearly 
passions of kinds that typically vary in their violence, depending on the distance or contiguity 
of their objects. He freely allows that sympathetic pleasures are typically variable, although 
he will soon argue that all moral sentiments are caused by uniform, calm, ‘delicate’ 
sympathetic pains or pleasures (as we saw in §3.1.2). 
Hume claims that, when we judge a historical character trait alongside a friend’s trait 
of the same kind, we find a ‘variation of the sentiment, without a variation of the esteem’ (T 
3.3.1.15, SBN 581). Although he appears to mean by this that our initial moral sentiments 
vary, unlike our more considered moral judgements, I think he means that our (non-delicate) 
sympathetic pains and pleasures vary, whereas our moral language does not. His point is that 
we cannot feel the same ‘lively’ pleasure from the virtuous motive of an ancient Greek that 
we feel towards that of a friend, despite esteeming both equally (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581). Of 
course, according to Hume’s official use of the term in the Treatise, all feelings of pleasure 
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are equally and maximally ‘lively’, or vivid, because they are all impressions (T 1.1.1.12, 
SBN 7). Therefore, Hume presumably means that the passions that vary with sympathy are, 
to a greater or lesser extent, violent ones. These cannot be moral sentiments, which are all 
calm passions, and thus easily confused with reasoned beliefs. Hume confirms this point a 
few paragraphs later, at T 3.3.1.18 (SBN 583). 
Hume is asking why it is that, even where we feel more violent sympathetic pleasure 
towards a friend than towards a historical character, our language remains uniform: ‘I do not 
say, that I esteem the one more than the other’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581). His immediate answer 
is that any ‘system’ of moral judgements that conforms to his stipulated requirements will 
face this kind of worry: a proponent of any such system must reconcile the uniformity of our 
moral language with the variability of our typical passions, regardless of whether or not 
‘sympathy’ plays any important role within that system (T 3.3.1.14, SBN 581). Given the 
sympathetic basis of his own system, this suggests that he feels the need to explain why our 
verbalised moral evaluations are uniform, despite the fact that we clearly feel variable 
sympathetic pleasures and pains towards character traits. This, in turn, suggests – I think 
rightly – that the variability objection poses only the following question: if moral language 
expresses sentiments that are caused by sympathetic pains and pleasures, then why is this 
language uniform, when our sympathetic pains and pleasures are typically variable? Why, for 
example, do we call all benevolent people ‘virtuous’, even where they are too distant for us 
to feel any violent sympathetic pleasure from their actions? 
Hume’s theory of delicate sympathy, soon to be fully explained, will provide the core 
of his answer to this question, by showing how approbation occurs uniformly towards all 
motives of any one useful or agreeable type, regardless of any variations in our non-delicate 
sympathetic responses. However, I believe that Hume also aims to respond to a further, and 
generally unappreciated, worry for his theory, which I call the ‘uniformity problem’. This is, 
 154 
in part, the problem of explaining why those sentiments that we call ‘moral’ play greater 
roles in our social lives than any of the other sentiments that we experience towards people’s 
characters. 
 
6.1.1. The uniformity problem 
To help explain the uniformity problem, I should first note that Hume begins T 3.3.1. by 
summarising his claim, argued for in Book 2 and in T 3.1.1, that all motivation and 
evaluation is ultimately grounded in our sentiments and passions (T 3.3.1.2, SBN 574). This 
is not a new position, of course, and Hume and his readers will be aware of Hobbes’s claim 
that ‘Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions’ (L 15.40). We will see 
reasons to think that Hume was influenced in T 3.3.1. by Hobbes’s discussion surrounding 
this claim. 
The uniformity problem demands a satisfactory answer to the following question: 
Why are our verbal evaluations of character uniform, when most of the passions that occur 
when we contemplate characters are variable? Generality cannot fully resolve this problem, 
for Generality only pertains to approbation and disapprobation, and these are merely two 
sentiments among many. Even if I experience the same approbation towards a benefactor in 
China as towards a similar one in England, Hume believes that I also feel more violent, non-
moral pleasures towards the English benefactor than towards the Chinese benefactor, due to 
my stronger sympathies with English people. Given Hume’s theory of value, it seems that he 
should expect me to say that, from my point of view, the English benefactor is better than the 
Chinese one, just because I feel more pleasure from contemplating the former than the latter. 
Of course, we do not talk like this, and Hume needs to explain why not. 
Even if Hume is not directly influenced by Hobbes, it is helpful to consider Hobbes’s 
own moral theory, to see the kind of view that Hume needs to reject: one by which we simply 
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call anything that pleases us ‘good’. In his own, brief, treatment of ‘moral philosophy’, 
Hobbes argues that ‘private appetite is the measure of good and evil’ (L 15.40). Whatever we 
each desire, in whatever way, is what we call ‘good’. Hobbes claims that, because our desires 
are very variable, our assessments of value often lead to conflict, in two important ways. 
First, different people’s desires frequently conflict, so that we each form conflicting 
judgments about ‘what is conformable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of common 
life’ (L 15.40). Second, ‘the same man in divers times differs from himself, and one time 
praiseth (that is, calleth good) what another time he dispraiseth (and calleth evil)’ (L 15.40). 
All that makes us consistently agree on what to call ‘good’ and ‘evil’, so that we avoid such 
frequent conflicts, is the intervention of a strong sovereign: one who makes consistent 
demands on our actions while keeping the peace, so that we all conform in our desires to 
perform these actions, and so ensure peace, more than we desire anything else. 
Whether or not Hobbes’s subjectivist account of value directly influenced Hume’s 
response to the variability objection, they address very similar concerns. Hume agrees with 
Hobbes that what is good is, fundamentally, just what pleases. He too wants to explain why 
we nevertheless frequently agree about what to call ‘good’, in cases where we each feel quite 
different pleasures and pains. However, Hume asks only why our verbal evaluations of 
characters are less variable than our violent passions towards them, and his answer does not 
rest on any desires resulting from our fear of a sovereign’s power. 
Consider how we might talk about people, if our evaluative language was equally 
influenced by the many passions that we feel towards them. Hume hints at two answers, 
which are strongly reminiscent of the two kinds of evaluative disagreement discussed by 
Hobbes. First, ‘a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in a little time, become a familiar 
acquaintance’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581). In any such case, we would increasingly describe the 
person in more positive terms over time, because the increase in familiarity would cause us to 
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feel increasing pleasure. Second, ‘every particular man has a peculiar position with regard to 
others’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581). Therefore, we would frequently disagree with one another 
about whether a person’s character was ‘good’ or ‘bad’, as we would experience different 
passions towards it. In each kind of case, there would be ‘continual contradictions’, or at 
least disagreement, in our evaluative language regarding characters, much as Hobbes 
describes (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581). 
Hume’s discussion of these potential ‘contradictions’ occurs in the same paragraph in 
which he introduces the notion of a common point of view. We have seen that he seems to 
discuss variations in our sympathetically derived, non-moral pains and pleasures in this 
paragraph, which he contrasts with the uniformity of our moral language. This strongly 
suggests that he intends the common point of view to explain why our verbal evaluations of 
characters follow our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation in their uniformity, rather 
than varying as our other passions do. 
To take stock: Hume has argued that all questions of value ultimately reduce to 
questions of pleasure and pain. Any character trait is good just where we feel some pleasing 
passion towards it. Hume has also argued, entirely consistently, that all judgements of moral 
goodness are pleasing sentiments, directed towards character traits. Yet, as Hobbes would 
surely urge, he must also explain why we call all similarly benevolent motives ‘good’, 
despite the fact that many of our non-moral sentiments towards benevolent characters vary 
from case to case. A benevolent motive may sometimes cause painful passions such as 
jealousy, anger and so forth, but we do not call it ‘bad’ in such cases. Why do we ignore 
these sentiments in our ‘general decisions’ concerning the value of characters, in favour of 
our more uniform sentiments? (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 582). This is the uniformity problem. 
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6.1.2. Hume’s response to the uniformity problem 
In §6.2, I will argue that, in his moral Enquiry, Hume responds to the uniformity problem by 
arguing that we find our uniform sentiments so pleasing and useful that we developed moral 
language to express them alone. In the Treatise, however, he develops a significantly more 
complex response. This is very possibly because he feels compelled by his Treatise theory of 
value to allow that all painful or pleasurable passions are, fundamentally, as evaluative as one 
another. This theory of value entails that for an object to cause a negative feeling just is for 
that object to be bad. Hume needs to reconcile this with his theory of moral judgement, by 
which we call characters ‘bad’ only where we feel moral disapprobation towards them. He 
does so by arguing that we mistake our moral sentiments for more appropriately evaluative 
responses than any others, so that we feel compelled to correct the ‘general principle of our 
blame or praise’ – the sum total of our feelings towards characters – by our uniform, calm 
‘principles’, or moral sentiments (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 583). 
Hume claims that, whenever we contemplate any distant character towards whom we 
experience approbation, we feel that we ought to experience equally strong, non-moral, 
‘affection and admiration’ towards them (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 582). However, it is ‘seldom men 
heartily love what lies at a distance from them, and what no way redounds to their particular 
benefit’ (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 583). Therefore, Hume argues, we feel obliged to talk as if we felt 
the violent sentiments that we would feel, if only we were nearer. He claims that this desire to 
use ‘the terms expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain'd in 
one point of view’, ultimately causes us to express only our uniform moral sentiments (T 
3.3.1.16, SBN 582). By expressing only these sentiments, we can ‘fix on some steady and 
general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may 
be our present situation’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-2). 
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Hume begins the paragraph immediately following T 3.3.1.15 with the following 
claim: ‘In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our situation of 
nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blam'd or prais'd, and according to the 
present disposition of our mind’ (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 582). As a ‘general’ claim, this allows that 
the moral sentiments are exceptions. If we think of a historical character, like Brutus, whose 
motives are of useful or agreeable types, then we will immediately experience only one 
strong sentiment: the calm sentiment of approbation. We experience precisely the same 
degree of approbation towards our similarly motivated servant, but here we also feel violent, 
non-moral pleasures of ‘love and kindness’ (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 582). Recognising this 
disparity, we feel obliged to try and summon up similar feelings of love and kindness towards 
Brutus. However, we are unlikely to achieve this, so we merely talk as if we have done so: 
we call the two characters equally ‘good’. We do this by ignoring all our violent passions, 
and by expressing only the uniform calm sentiments that motivated us to correct our 
judgment in the first place. ‘Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our 
[violent] sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more 
stubborn and inalterable’ (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 582). 
Although Hume does not say so here, his arguments concerning the causes of moral 
judgements suggest that our best method of ignoring our violent sentiments is to turn our 
view from the ideas of the particular traits of each person and to the general notions of these 
traits, so as to consider them merely as tokens of their general types. By thinking of any 
benevolent character just as a benevolent character, we can ‘correct the momentary 
appearances of things, and overlook our present situation’ (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 582). 
Hume compares this kind of correction to a case where we call someone ‘beautiful’ 
when we see him at a distance, because we associate our idea of the distant person with an 
idea of the beauty that we would see if we were nearer to him (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 582). In both 
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moral and aesthetic cases, we correct our judgements according to ‘sentiments of beauty’ that 
arise via custom (T 3.3.1.20, SBN 584-5, see also T 3.3.1.8, SBN 576-7). Here, our idea of 
the person’s beauty produces a calm aesthetic pleasure, which we express because we feel 
that only this sentiment responds appropriately to the person’s features. Hume claims that this 
correction occurs via a process of ‘reflection’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 582). I think we should take 
him to be referring to the introspective nature of this process, such that the correction is 
caused purely via associations of ideas and ‘impressions of reflection’, rather than to any 
process of reflective reasoning (T 2.1.1.1, SBN 275). It is simply not plausible to think that 
we must always reflect on whether distant people’s faces are such as to please when they are 
closer before we can sincerely call them ‘beautiful’. Presumably, therefore, this correction 
occurs purely habitually, and so we should assume the same for the moral case.6  
Árdal (1966, 120) is surely correct to read Hume as approving of our habit of treating 
moral value as ‘objective’, because this habit ‘tends to eliminate the friction which arises in 
our arguments about the value of qualities of character’. Hume claims that, if we did not 
correct our evaluations, and so avoid continual ‘contradictions’ (which he must realise are not 
really contradictions), then we could not ‘ever make use of language’ (T 3.3.1.16, SBN 582). 
By focusing on only our moral sentiments, we all consider character traits without reference 
to our own interests, because these sentiments are affected only by the ways that such traits 
generally influence ‘those who have an intercourse with any person’ who possesses them (T 
3.3.1.17, SBN 582). Hume certainly praises the practice of moralising, and sees it as 
beneficial (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 603). Nevertheless, in the Treatise, he argues that our desire to 
 
6 Davie (1998, 286-87) gives a similar argument concerning Hume’s analogy between the adoption of 
a common point of view and the visual corrections by which, Hume claims, we come to understand 
the true sizes of distant objects. People and animals appear to make such corrections without 
conscious reflection. 
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correct our evaluations of characters according to our moral sentiments rests on a profound 
mistake. 
Hume claims that such corrections are ‘common with regard to all the senses’ (T 
3.3.1.16, SBN 582). Looking out across a forest, for example, the more distant trees seem 
tiny, but we correct for this appearance by saying that all the trees are equally ‘tall’. We 
perform this correction because we believe that the trees really are equally tall. Somewhat 
similarly, we feel less violent pleasure towards a distant, benevolent person than towards a 
nearer one, and we correct for this by saying that they are equally ‘good’. In the Treatise, 
Hume does not appear to recognise that this might be because we all implicitly agree to use 
certain, specifically moral terms, like ‘virtuous’, to express only our moral approbation. 
Instead, he argues that we perform this kind of correction because we mistake our calm 
sentiments of approbations for evaluative beliefs. Considered merely as benevolent 
characters, the nearby character and the distant character feel as pleasing as one another. The 
kind of feeling involved is so calm, however, that we mistake the relevant passions for 
beliefs. We think we believe that the similarly benevolent characters are equally good, and so 
we call them both ‘good’, even though we really feel that the nearer character is better, 
overall. Hume is, to this extent, an error theorist in the Treatise: he believes that we only 
moralise as we do because we hold certain, erroneous beliefs. 
In T 3.3.1.18 (SBN 583), Hume argues that, whenever a moral sentiment is caused via 
general rules and delicate sympathy, we mistake it for a reasoned belief about the real value 
of a character. What we take to be a process of reasoning is in fact a ‘general calm 
determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection’. (Recall, from 
§2.2, Hume’s claim at T 2.3.4.1 (SBN 419), that calm pleasures are caused by ‘remote’ 
goods). Hume is surely referring to that kind of process, caused by a general notion of a 
character trait, by which general rules and delicate sympathy produce a moral sentiment. 
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A ‘determination’ is, for Hume, a psychological process that produces ideas by 
habitual association (T 1.3.12.7, SBN 133, see also T 1.3.12.9, SBN 134 and T 1.3.14.29, 
SBN 169). Hume has already argued, at T 2.3.3.8 (SBN 417), that we frequently confuse 
those psychological processes that produce calm passions with the ‘determinations of 
reason’. His argument in T 3.3.1.18 is very brief, but I propose we understand it as follows. If 
we think of any person’s motive of, for example, cruelty, then we habitually form a general 
notion of it: an idea ‘founded on some distant view or reflection’, such that we think of it just 
as a cruel motive. A ‘determination’ will then produce an idea of the type of pain that we 
habitually expect cruelty to cause to ‘those, who have any commerce with the person we 
consider’ (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 583). This can involve no particular idea of anyone who has 
commerce with the cruel person, because Hume is arguing that we will sympathise with this 
idea, and to the same extent, whether we know the cruel person well or merely read about 
her. It can only be a quasi-believed general notion of the relevant kind of pain. We 
sympathise with it, presumably via delicate sympathy, and feel a strong, ‘calm’ 
disapprobation. This entire process – from considering the motive to experiencing the 
sentiment – occurs without conscious reflection. The uniformity of our moral sentiments, 
their calmness, and the habitual, associative manner of their production all cause us to 
mistake them for reasoned beliefs about the real value of token motives. 
However, we also experience various different, violent passions towards different 
cruel people, depending on the ways that they affect us or our friends. We try to ignore these 
violent passions because we think that ‘reason requires such an impartial conduct’ (T 
3.3.1.18, SBN 583). If we read of someone’s cruel action in a history book, and then hear of 
someone who recently performed a similarly cruel action next door, we will mistakenly think 
that we believe that both cruel motives are equally bad. We feel that reason requires us to 
correct our violent passions according to the ‘standard of merit and demerit’ that comes from 
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thinking of each motive merely as a cruel motive (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 583). We therefore 
express only our moral disapprobation towards each cruel motive: we ‘blame equally a bad 
action, which we read of in history, with one perform'd in our neighbourhood t'other day’ (T 
3.3.1.18, SBN 584). 
In the Treatise, a genuinely corrected sentiment of ‘disapprobation’ towards a 
character would be one in which our variable, violent feelings have been brought into line 
with our uniform, calm sentiment of moral disapprobation (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 584). Here, 
following his theory of value rather than his theory of moral judgement, Hume uses the term 
‘disapprobation’ to refer to the sum total of any painful feelings felt towards a character. 
However, this is something of a play on words, I think. Here, Hume is concluding his 
argument that we only mistakenly come to believe that our moral disapprobation is more 
appropriately evaluative than any other painful sentiment, and that this is the only reason why 
we correct our evaluation of any character. We feel that we ought to be as angry towards 
historical cruelty as we are towards cruelty in our neighbourhood, but we cannot meet this 
standard. We can only talk as if we were equally appalled, and we do this by expressing only 
our moral disapprobation towards each cruel motive.7 
In T 3.3.3.2 (SBN 602-3), Hume gives a somewhat similar argument to the one at T 
3.3.1.18. We saw, in Chapter 2, that he thinks we only instinctively desire to help our loved 
ones and children, although he allows that we may also feel compassionate desires to help 
adult strangers, if we experience strong, non-delicate sympathies with their particular pains 
(T 2.2.7.2, SBN 369). In short, we typically only want to help those near to us, and so Hume 
 
7 Similarly, when Hume refers back to this argument in T 3.3.1.21 (SBN 585), he describes our focus 
on our moral approbation over all other pleasing sentiments towards characters as the process of 
correcting the ‘different sentiments of virtue’. However, two paragraphs later, he uses the phrase 
‘sentiments of virtue’ to refer to only moral approbation (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586). 
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claims that we have all learned from experience that people generally only help those in their 
‘narrow circle’ (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 602). He then claims that, wherever we contemplate any 
benevolent or generous person, the ‘natural tendency’ of her motive will cause us to 
sympathise with an idea of the happiness of those with any ‘particular connexion’ to her (T 
3.3.3.2, SBN 602). As at T 3.3.1.18 (SBN 583), this idea cannot be a particular one, because 
we will sympathise with it whether or not we know anything about those who are connected 
to the benevolent or generous person. We ‘forget our own interest’ and instead ‘consider the 
tendency’ of the relevant motive to cause happiness or unhappiness to those around its 
possessor (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 602). We ‘neglect’ all passions that result from our variable 
sympathetic responses, because we find that these are very variable over time and between 
people, in favour of our uniform ‘calm judgments concerning the characters of men’: our 
moral sentiments (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 603).  
By this point, Hume has distinguished the violent ‘passions’ of the ‘heart’ from the 
calm sentiments of ‘taste’, including moral taste (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 586). Here, he claims that 
the ‘heart does not always take part with those general notions, or regulate its love and hatred 
by them’ (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 603). The ‘general notions’ in question are those that provide a 
‘general inalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and 
manners’ (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 603). They are, I take it, general notions of the character traits 
under evaluation, such as benevolence and generosity. We try to ‘regulate’ our passions by, 
for example, feeling violent love towards all benevolent characters, because when they are 
considered just as benevolent characters, they seem equally good. This is, of course, because 
we feel equally strong approbation towards each one. We rarely succeed in summoning up 
violent love in all cases, so we typically express just our moral sentiments towards all such 
traits, so that we may talk as if we have brought our violent passions into line with them. This 
way of talking is ‘sufficient’ for moral ‘discourse’ (T 3.3.3.2, SBN 603). 
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The sympathetic process described in the two passages just discussed – T 3.3.1.18 
(SBN 584) and T 3.3.3.2 (SBN 602-3) – is generally thought to be the corrective exercise at 
the heart of the Correction Thesis. By my interpretation, it is instead the habitual and 
unreflective process by which delicate sympathy responds, via general rules, to general 
notions of character traits. It is this process which ensures that we all feel the same uniform 
sentiments towards the same characters. In the Treatise, then, Hume does not argue for the 
Correction Thesis. To adopt the ‘common point of view’ is to express only our moral 
sentiments, so that we may correct for variations in our non-moral sentiments (T 3.3.1.30, 
SBN 591). No imaginative exercise is involved. 
However, Hume seems somewhat unpersuaded by his own claim that we feel obliged 
to passionately love or hate distant characters: he acknowledges that our violent passions do 
not ‘often correspond entirely to the present theory’ (T 3.3.1.18, SBN 583). Moreover, he 
sometimes hints that terms like ‘virtue’ or ‘disapprobation’ ought properly to apply to any 
pleasures or pains that we feel towards character traits, as at T 3.3.1.18 (SBN 584) and T 
3.3.1.21 (SBN 585). Hume usually reserves these terms for purely moral evaluations. 
However, he has some reason to be wary of doing so. Throughout his Treatise, Hume has 
been arguing for his deeply controversial, Hobbesian theory of value. He may well worry 
that, if he argues that evaluative terms like ‘virtue’ or ‘disapprobation’ should only apply to 
cases where we express calm, uniform sentiments, then this might undermine his argument 
that there is no fundamental difference between moral sentiments and violent passions like 
love and hatred. 
I suspect that a very similar worry might explain another tension, discussed in §1.1, 
between Hume’s suggestion, at T 3.3.1.27 (SBN 589-90) that we approve of some character 
traits simply because we find them immediately agreeable, and his considered view, at T 
3.3.1.29 (SBN 590), that all moral approbation of immediately agreeable traits is caused via 
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the same kind of sympathetic process that causes our moral approbation of useful traits. 
Hume seems torn between two ‘systems of morality’, both of which, he thinks, ‘merit our 
attention’: ‘sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and 
passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particular 
persons’ (T 3.3.1.27, SBN 589). 
Hume freely allows that pleasing sentiments arise in both ways. We often feel 
passions like joy and love from the ‘mere… appearance’ of immediately agreeable traits like 
wit or politeness. We also experience approbation wherever we associate that kind of trait 
with benefitting society or individuals. Hume’s question is whether our violent and variable 
sentiments, like love, should be considered within a ‘system of morality’, such that we count 
them as moral sentiments. His theory of value suggests that all such passions should be 
included. Were Hume to accept this, then his moral system would include our love of wit as a 
moral sentiment, no less than our approval of wit. However, this would undermine his 
carefully observed theory that only our calm, uniform sentiments form the basis of our most 
socially important evaluations of characters. 
It may be a sign of this tension that Hume’s immediate answer to the question is to 
claim that ‘both these causes are intermix'd in our judgments of morals; after the same 
manner as they are in our decisions concerning most kinds of external beauty’ (T 3.3.1.27, 
SBN 590). He opines that ‘reflections on the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest 
influence, and determine all the great lines of our duty’ (T 3.3.1.27, SBN 590). However, he 
concedes the existence of ‘cases of less moment, wherein this immediate taste or sentiment 
produces our approbation’ (T 3.3.1.27, SBN 590). Here, much as at T 3.3.1.18 (SBN 584) 
and T 3.3.1.21 (SBN 585), Hume uses the term ‘approbation’ to refer to a non-moral 
sentiment: here, ‘love and esteem’ (where, confusingly, ‘esteem’ is used, as in Book 2, in its 
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non-moral sense). I take his point to be that we often praise people when we love them for 
their wit, no less than when we morally approve of them. 
Hume ultimately claims that there is an important and fundamental distinction to be 
made between moral approbation and other pleasing passions:  
 
[H]owever directly the distinction of vice and virtue may seem to flow from 
the immediate pleasure or uneasiness, which particular qualities cause to 
ourselves or others; 'tis easy to observe, that it has also a considerable 
dependence on the principle of sympathy so often insisted on (T 3.3.1.29, 
SBN 590). 
 
Hume believes that we can only explain our uniform approbation towards 
immediately agreeable virtues if we ‘have recourse to the foregoing principles’ of, 
presumably, general rules and delicate sympathy (T 3.3.1.29, SBN 590). He concludes that 
our delicate, or ‘constant and universal’, sympathetic pleasures and pains ‘are alone admitted 
in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They alone produce that particular 
feeling or sentiment, on which moral distinctions depend’ (T 3.3.1.30, SBN 591). However, 
in the Treatise, he seems uneasy about fully committing to this moral system. 
In §6.2, I will argue that, in the Enquiry, Hume modifies his account of the common 
point of view. He no longer argues that we feel obliged to alter our violent sentiments, or that 
there is any mistake involved in our coming to moralise. He pays greater attention to the 
social benefits of coming to ‘converse together on… reasonable terms’ about ‘characters and 
persons’ (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581). This allows him to resolve the tension between his theories 
of value and of moral judgement, at least to his own satisfaction. He argues that we possess a 
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unique kind of moral language, but that our moral judgements are nevertheless passions 
which are, fundamentally, no different in kind from any other. 
 
6.2. The common point of view in the moral Enquiry 
In the Enquiry, as in the Treatise, to adopt the common point of view is to evaluate characters 
purely by expressing our moral sentiments. However, Hume now clarifies and expands on his 
treatment of moral language. He argues that we express our ‘general’ sentiments of 
approbation or disapprobation by using ‘a peculiar set of terms’ that we have developed only 
for this purpose: moral terms (M 9.8, SBN 274). 
Hume argues that we can usually come to agree in our evaluations of characters 
because we all possess a ‘general principle of moral blame and approbation’ (M 5.46, SBN 
231-2). This ‘principle’ is our disposition to experience moral sentiments, via ‘humanity’, or 
delicate sympathy. It is a ‘general’ principle in that it produces uniform sentiments. All other 
types of sentiment are stronger and more violent when directed towards token characters that 
affect us or our friends than when directed towards ones that affect strangers, so that we feel 
greater pains and pleasures in the former kinds of case than in the latter kinds. However, we 
each learn to ‘correct these inequalities by reflection, and retain a general standard of vice 
and virtue, founded chiefly on a general usefulness’ (M 5.42n. 25.1, SBN 229). 
Hume’s language of ‘correction’, here and elsewhere, is similar to that of the Treatise, 
but not identical. The similarities are perhaps most noticeable at M 5.41 (SBN 227-8). Hume 
observes that, when we compare a nearby, benevolent statesman to a similarly benevolent 
one in a distant country, we ‘own the merit to be equally great’ in both cases, despite feeling 
a ‘more passionate regard’ towards our countryman (M 5.41, SBN 227). This is the kind of 
case that led to the variability objection in the Treatise. 
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As in the Treatise, Hume’s language in his discussion of this case is by no means as 
clear as we might wish. Here, this is presumably because he is officially neutral as to whether 
moral judgements are beliefs or sentiments. However, assuming that to ‘own’ someone’s 
merit to be great is to express one’s moral approval of them, and that to feel a ‘passionate 
regard’ is to feel violent, non-moral sentiments, his claim is consistent with Generality. Hume 
then argues that, because of this disparity, we correct the ‘inequalities of our internal 
emotions and perceptions’ (M 5.41, SBN 227). Again, the phrase is ambiguous. Hume could 
mean that we correct for the initially different degrees of approbation that we experience in 
each case: in other words, he could argue for the Correction Thesis. Alternatively, he could 
mean that we judge both statesmen only according to our moral approbation for them, so that 
we ignore our non-moral ‘passionate regard’ for our countryman. Only the second of these 
two claims is consistent with Generality. 
In a footnote, Hume claims that such corrections are performed ‘by an easy and 
necessary effort of thought’, for the same kind of reason that ‘the tendencies of actions and 
characters, not their real accidental consequences, are alone regarded in our moral 
determinations or general judgments’ (M 5.41n. 24.1, SBN 228). Just as in cases of virtue in 
rags, we offer the same ‘general praise’ to any action or character of a type that tends to cause 
happiness, regardless of our ‘real feeling or sentiment’. This certainly suggests that we 
evaluate characters by expressing only our uniform moral sentiments, while ignoring our 
violent, non-moral sentiments. 
As in the Treatise, Hume claims that we frequently correct our visual perceptions by 
reference to beliefs about the real sizes of objects, and he argues that this is roughly 
analogous to the corrections that we make when we verbally evaluate motives. However, 
unlike in T 3.3.1.18 (SBN 583-4), he does not argue that we correct these evaluations because 
we mistake our calm sentiments for evaluative beliefs. We do so just because we want our 
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verbal evaluations to be uniform. Both the visual and the evaluative corrections occur where 
a variation of some kind impedes our desire to ‘think’ and ‘talk steadily’ (M 5.41, SBN 228). 
The possibility of error does not seem relevant to the comparison that Hume wishes to draw: 
he only talks of ‘error’ in the case of visual perception (M 5.41, SBN 227). The point of the 
analogy is to show how ‘fluctuating situations produce a continual variation on objects, and 
throw them into such different and contrary lights and positions’ that we find it difficult to 
think or talk about them in any consistent manner (M 5.41, SBN 228).  
Hume claims, as at T 3.3.1.15 (SBN 581), that our evaluations of characters would 
vary, between people and over time, were we to evaluate them in accordance with the many 
‘sentiments… which have a reference to private good’ (M 5.42, SBN 228-9). Any population 
that relied on all their passions when they judged one another’s characters would rarely agree 
in their judgements. Indeed, because of their very different interests and feelings, their 
conversations about such matters would be barely ‘intelligible’ (M 5.42, SBN 228). 
Hume argues that we have avoided this problem by relying only on our ‘general 
preferences and distinctions’ (M 5.42, SBN 228). We realise that we all consistently prefer 
some types of character traits over others, in a calm but uniform way. According to Hume, of 
course, this is because we have sentiments that consistently ‘attach the notion of good to a 
beneficent conduct, and of evil to the contrary’ (M 5.42, SBN 229). We come to rely on these 
sentiments whenever we judge character traits, because doing so allows us to agree in our 
approval of generally beneficial traits and our disapproval of generally harmful ones. This is 
both pleasing and useful, so that we learn to ignore our variable, violent passions in our 
evaluations of character. Unlike in the Treatise, Hume’s argument does not rest on a claim 
that we feel obliged to alter our violent passions. In a modified version of his discussion at T 
3.3.3.2 (SBN 602-3), he still acknowledges that ‘the universal, abstract differences of vice 
and virtue’ rarely cause us to change the violent passions of the ‘heart’ (M 5.42, SBN 229). 
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However, he no longer sees this as a problem for us, to be overcome by talking as if they 
have done so. He simply argues that the moral passions fully meet our social requirements 
when we publicly evaluate characters. 
Unlike in the Treatise, then, Hume does not claim that we want to correct our 
evaluations of character because we confuse moral sentiments for evaluative beliefs. It is, 
however, very possible that he still thinks that the similarities between the above two kinds of 
corrective processes cause us to mistake our moral sentiments for evaluative beliefs. 
Presumably such mistakes are made even more likely by their frequently occurring after we 
have used reason to ‘instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their 
beneficial consequences to society and to their possessor’ (M App. 1.2, SBN 285). Hume is 
clear that all such reasoning serves only to ‘pave the way’ for moral sentiments, by causing 
beliefs about the tendencies of character and action types to produce pleasure or pain, for 
example (M 1.9, SBN 173). Reasoning may allow us to correctly categorise a token motive, 
or it may, presumably over some time, cause us to change some of our habitual associations 
between certain motive types and relevant effects. However, no reasoning is required for us 
to form consistent and socially useful moral judgements. The only necessary processes for 
this are those of our habitual associations of ideas, delicate sympathy, and moral sentiment. 
In fact, Hume makes this point more clearly in his first Enquiry than he does in his 
second:  
 
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of 
taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly 
than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to fix its 
standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste of mankind, or some 
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such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry (E 12.33, SBN 
165). 
 
Despite placing a greater emphasis on morally relevant forms of reasoning in the 
moral Enquiry than in the Treatise, Hume still assumes that people within any one 
community will only rarely come to different moral judgements about the same kinds of 
character traits. Indeed, he sometimes assumes that we all associate the same kinds of traits 
with the same kinds of pleasures or pains, so that the moral sentiments operate entirely 
consistently between people: ‘Whatever conduct gains my approbation, by touching my 
humanity, procures also the applause of all mankind, by affecting the same principle in them’ 
(M 9.8, SBN 274). 
Whether plausible or not, this assumption is very useful for Hume, because it allows 
that approbation, along with disapprobation, can help us agree in our ‘calm judgments and 
discourse concerning the characters of men’ (M 5.42, SBN 229). If we all focus only on our 
calm, uniform sentiments, then we all approve of motives that tend to be socially beneficial 
and disapprove of motives that tend to be socially disruptive. As suggested in Chapter 5, 
Hume argues that this is so useful and pleasing to us that we have developed a kind of 
language to express only our moral sentiments: 
 
General language… being formed for general use, must be moulded on 
some more general views [than those of our private interests], and must 
affix the epithets of praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which 
arise from the general interests of the community (M 5.42, SBN 228).  
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All and only those sentiments that are produced via humanity arise from ‘general 
interests’, in that they are experienced by all members of the community, uniformly, towards 
all character traits of generally pleasing or displeasing kinds. As in the Treatise, Hume allows 
that there is no fundamental distinction to be made between our moral and non-moral 
passions. What has changed is that he has increased his focus on moral language. This allows 
him to fully reconcile his claim that moral judgements are fundamentally like all other 
pleasures or pains with his arguments that they play a central role, unlike that of any other 
passion kind, in our evaluations of character. Although the moral sentiments are of the same 
general kinds as those passions caused by the ‘real accidental consequences’ of actions and 
characters, the language in which we express them is of a very different kind (M 5.41n. 24.1, 
SBN 228).  
For example, I may be pleased by any action that satisfies my ‘vanity’ or ‘ambition’, 
but this pleasure will ‘not [have] a proper direction’ for me to treat it as a moral evaluation 
(M 9.5, SBN 271). It is merely a pleasure at my own particular benefit, and those with whom 
I am conversing are unlikely to feel similarly pleased, or to love the actor as I do, unless they 
happen to be similarly benefitted. Nevertheless, the same action may also cause approbation, 
via humanity. I will expect my interlocuter to share this sentiment, and I will give it the status 
of a moral judgement:  
 
[The] affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong 
as vanity or ambition, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be 
the foundation of morals, or of any general system of blame or praise. 
One man's ambition is not another's ambition; nor will the same event 
or object satisfy both: But the humanity of one man is the humanity of 
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every one; and the same object touches this passion in all human 
creatures (M 9.6, SBN 273). 
 
Of course, we may still express violent, non-uniform sentiments when we evaluate 
people’s characters, but not via moral language: 
 
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his 
adversary, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to 
express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular 
circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the epithets 
of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and 
expresses sentiments, in which, he expects, all his audience are to concur 
with him (M 9.6, SBN 272). 
 
We choose whether or not to evaluate people in moral terms. Hume claims that 
anyone who chooses to use moral language to express only their uniform sentiments has, in 
virtue of making this choice, ‘chosen [the] common point of view, and… touched the 
principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs’ (M 9.6, SBN 272). 
Again, nothing like the Correction Thesis is involved in Hume’s discussion of this common 
point of view. 
 Here, I conclude my examination of Hume’s theory of moral sentiments. In Part 2, I 
will ask what we in the 21st century can learn from it. 
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Introduction to Part Two 
 
The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is 
determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or 
quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice 
the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, 
what actions have this influence: We consider all the circumstances, in 
which these actions agree: And thence endeavour to extract some general 
observations with regard to these sentiments. (M App1.10, SBN 289). 
 
After much consideration of Hume’s metaethics, I now want to apply some of his theses to 
the field of contemporary metaethics. This is not a new ambition, of course; there are many 
‘Humean’ theories and views to be found in 21st century moral philosophy. Indeed, there are 
several different ways that such Humean views may be formed, and so more than one way 
that we could try to learn from Hume. 
One way would be to directly translate as much of Hume’s moral sentimentalism as 
possible into acceptable terms for the 21st century, so that it generally complies with 
contemporary theoretical constraints. This might lead to a theory, perhaps rather like Slote’s 
(2010), in which moral approval is a pleasant feeling caused by our empathy with others. 
Alternatively, we could consider Hume’s wider philosophical commitments and arguments, 
and then aim to develop a metaethical view that relies on these insights at the expense of the 
details of his sentimentalist theory. This is the approach of Blackburn (1993a, 167), who once 
described his expressivist theory as ‘a modern version of Hume’s theory of the nature of 
ethics, but without any commitment to particular operations of passions such as sympathy.’ 
As a third possibility, we could look to Hume the psychologist over Hume the philosopher, 
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and ask how he might inform our understanding of the psychological processes involved in 
moral judgement, according to our best, empirically informed, understanding of these. This is 
the approach of Haidt (2012, 116), who once claimed that Hume ‘laid a superb foundation for 
“modern science,” one that has, in my view, been largely vindicated by modern research’. 
 My approach will involve elements of all three of the methods listed above. However, 
I intend to set myself achievable ambitions, and so I will be constrained in at least two ways. 
First, I cannot begin a theory entirely anew. I therefore aim to work with, and to build on, 
some recent and well-developed theories, particularly those developed by Haidt (2012) and 
Gendler (2008a; 2008b). Following Haidt, I endorse both ‘moral intuitionism’ and ‘Moral 
Foundations Theory’, although the latter will be of lesser importance to my theory. Here, I do 
not intend ‘moral intuitionism’ to refer to theories, like Ross’s (1930), by which the truth of 
some core set of moral propositions is self-evident. Instead, I mean this term to refer to the 
thesis that moral judgements are typically or always produced by intuitive rather than by 
reflective thought processes. I will explain this in detail in Chapter 7. Following Gendler, I 
will endorse the theory of ‘alief’. I will explain Haidt’s theories in chapter 7, and Gendler’s in 
chapter 8. I will add to Haidt’s arguments for moral intuitionism in chapter 8. 
My second constraint is due to the fact that I cannot hope to consider the viability of 
every aspect of Hume’s theories. I will therefore focus on his thesis of Generality, as 
discussed in §3.1.2, and on the automatic, associative processes that he claims are involved in 
the causes of moral judgements.  
I have chosen these two constraints because they are closely related. Haidt and 
Gendler, along with many others, are involved a recent resurgence in attempting to 
understand our automatic, associative thought processes. Indeed, as Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2006) claim, a ‘major theme’ of current psychological research is the notion of 
automaticity:  
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Many aspects of human behavior that have previously been assumed to 
have their roots in higher order processes of deliberate reasoning are now 
viewed as resulting from automatic processes that may occur spontaneously 
and outside of people’s awareness or control. (Gawronski and Bodenhausen 
2006, 692) 
 
I will argue, as Haidt does, that moral judgement is one such aspect of human behaviour. I 
will use Gendler’s theory of alief as the framework within which to argue for this. In so 
doing, I will follow Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley’s (2014, 452) deliberately broad 
definition of ‘moral judgement’: ‘A judgment is a moral judgment if and only if the judger 
does, or would, think of it as similar enough in relevant respects to judgments that that judger 
takes to be exemplars or paradigm cases of moral judgments’.1 If someone calls an action 
‘wrong’, and they do so because they take it to be wrong in much the same way that they take 
 
1 I think that, for any theory of the psychological nature and causes of moral judgements, a broad 
definition of ‘moral judgement’ is required, to avoid excluding candidates merely by terminological 
fiat. Haidt (2001, 817) similarly employs a broad definition, defining moral judgements as 
‘evaluations (good vs. bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a set 
of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture’. Here, it seems that ‘virtue’ is used purely 
descriptively, just to mean some kind of action that is treated as obligatory for all people, or for some 
class of people, within a certain culture or subculture. I think Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley’s 
definition is preferable to Haidt’s, so I will endorse this throughout. However, so far as I can see, 
nothing of importance rests on which of these two definitions I employ. 
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paradigmatically morally wrong actions to be wrong, then the mental state that plays the 
relevant causal role in their utterance of this statement is a moral judgement.2 
In what follows I will, broadly, address two questions: How should we understand 
moral judgements themselves? And how should we understand the meanings and pragmatics 
of moral terms and language? In the spirit of Hume, I will assume throughout that we require 
naturalistic answers to all such metaethical questions: answers that only invoke properties 
and objects of kinds that are acceptable within scientific explanations. However, unless stated 
otherwise, I will reject Hume’s terminology in favour of contemporary terminology. I will 
henceforth focus more on our judgements of actions than of character traits, although I will 
consider both. 
In the first two chapters of Part 2, I consider the psychological causes of moral 
judgements and, as Hume suggested in the quotation with which I began, ‘endeavour to 
extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments’: notably, that we approve 
of token actions and character traits of types that we associate with causing happiness 
(broadly construed) and that we disapprove of token actions and motives of types that we 
associate with causing harm (broadly construed). In the final two chapters, I at least begin 
developing a theory of moral language, by which the meaning of a moral term like ‘virtue’ 
may indeed be defined as ‘whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing 
sentiment of approbation’. Like Hume, however, I argue that such simple definitions bely the 
fact that moral language plays an important and complex pragmatic role in our social lives. 
 
2 It is very hard to define the ‘relevant’ causal role here. I assume that, whatever the relation is 
between moral judgements and sincere moral utterances, there is some relevant causal role between 
the former and the latter, such that the former plays a crucial causal role in the occurrence of the 
latter. 
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In Chapter 7, I provide some background and context to my arguments, along with an 
overview of Moral Foundations Theory and moral intuitionism. In Chapter 8, I argue that, 
given our current state of knowledge, we should understand paradigmatic moral judgments as 
‘occurrent aliefs’: mental occurrences with representational, affective and behavioural 
components, caused via processes of which the aliever is not consciously aware (Gendler 
2008a).  
Then, in the final two chapters, I defend an ‘emotive subjectivist’ account of moral 
language, which marries a simple subjectivist theory of meaning with a more complex, 
‘emotivist’ account of the pragmatics of moral language. In Chapter 9, I set out the details of 
theory. I also argue that we can plausibly endorse an ‘opacity thesis’, by which much of our 
moral thinking is unavailable to conscious reflection, and that this allows for ambiguities in 
the meanings of moral terms that we pragmatically exploit in moral discussion. In Chapter 
10, I conclude that emotive subjectivism has the resources to vindicate ordinary moral 
language and practice by borrowing strategies from Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist’ expressivism, 
although I also argue that we must rethink some our assumptions about what ordinary moral 
language and practice looks like. 
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7. Moral Intuitions and Moral Foundations Theory 
 
It may now be ask'd in general, concerning this pain or pleasure, that 
distinguishes moral good and evil, From what principles is it derived, and 
whence does it arise in the human mind? To this I reply… that 'tis absurd to 
imagine, that in every particular instance, these sentiments are produc'd by 
an original quality and primary constitution... Such a method of proceeding 
is not conformable to the usual maxims, by which nature is conducted, 
where a few principles produce all that variety we observe in the universe, 
and every thing is carry'd on in the easiest and most simple manner. 'Tis 
necessary, therefore, to abridge these primary impulses, and find some more 
general principles, upon which all our notions of morals are founded (T 
3.1.2.6, SBN 473). 
 
In this chapter, I will address a potential worry for my theory in advance. In Chapter 8, I will 
argue that any paradigmatic moral judgement is a certain kind of occurrent alief. Moral 
Foundations Theory (MFT) states that there are several distinct moral ‘foundations’, so that 
different moral judgements may take different kinds of action or character trait as their 
objects (Graham et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2011; Haidt 2012; Haidt and Graham 2007). This 
may suggest that, as Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley (2014) argue, moral judgement cannot 
be plausibly understood as a single kind of mental state or occurrence. I will argue, against 
this claim, that MFT is entirely compatible with the view that moral judgements are of a 
single, unified kind, even where they stem from different foundational areas of concern. 
My conclusion in this chapter will be limited to the claim that typical moral 
judgements plausibly have a common, unifying property. I will argue for this by applying a 
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fairly general thesis of Humean moral learning to MFT’s understanding of moral judgement. 
MFT at least appears to suggest that different moral judgements are produced by different 
psychological systems, that we acquired at different points in our evolutionary past. I will 
argue, as Hume does in the passage quoted above, that it is more plausible that moral 
judgements have the unifying property of being learned in some particular way than that 
different moral judgements are produced in distinct ways by different kinds of ‘original 
instincts’ (T 3.1.2.6, SBN 473). 
We saw, in Chapters 3, and 6, that Hume argues that different types of traits may 
cause us non-moral pleasures in very different ways, by being either useful in some way or 
agreeable in some way, but that all traits that we associate with causing non-moral pleasures 
in any way will cause moral approbation via only one kind of habitual, unreflective process: 
that of general rules and delicate sympathy. I will argue for something broadly similar. 
I accept MFT’s claim that there are several distinct, foundational psychological 
systems, or ‘foundations’, which may dispose us to treat very different types of action (or 
character trait) as morally right or wrong. However, I will argue that this is compatible with 
the claim that there is only one kind of moral learning. MFT allows that we may learn to 
respond morally to any type of action that is appropriately related to any (one or more) of the 
foundational areas of concern. Nevertheless, this allows that all and only paradigmatic moral 
judgements may share the property of being produced by at least broadly the same kind of 
process. Indeed, I will argue for an account of just such a process: an intuitive process which 
occurs, in response to any token action of any type that is appropriately related to any of the 
foundational areas of concern, if and only if actions of that type are associated, by the judger, 
with causing (some relevant kind of) happiness or unhappiness to those around her. 
I will argue for this conclusion mostly independently from my arguments, in Chapter 
8, for a ‘moral alief theory’. This is so that each argument may stand or fall on its own merits. 
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In particular, if we wish to reject the moral alief theory, I believe that we may still apply 
some broadly Humean theory of moral learning to MFT’s understanding of moral judgement, 
and so allow for a unifying property for all typical moral judgements. 
 In §7.1, I provide an overview of MFT, focusing only on those aspects of the theory 
that will be relevant to my arguments to come. In §7.2, I provide a similar overview of what I 
call ‘moral intuitionism’: the thesis that moral judgements are typically or always produced 
by intuitive rather than by reflective thought processes. This thesis is generally accepted by 
the proponents of MFT. In §7.3, I argue that typical moral judgements plausibly have a 
unifying feature, in virtue of the habitual way in which we learn to respond morally to certain 
action and character kinds. Therefore, we cannot infer, from MFT, that paradigmatic moral 
judgements may not form a unified psychological kind. This will clear a path for me to argue, 
in Chapter 8, that all paradigmatic moral judgements are occurrent aliefs of a unified 
psychological kind. Finally for this chapter, in §7.4, I suggest that, if typical moral 
judgements share a unifying feature in the way that I suggest, then this can explain an 
otherwise puzzling feature of Haidt’s research into intuitive moral judgements: our tendency 
to claim that actions we deem morally wrong are harmful, even when they clearly are not. 
 
7.1. Moral Foundations Theory 
MFT is a theory about the psychological systems that ultimately cause human beings to make 
the moral judgements they do (Graham et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2011; Haidt 2012; Haidt 
and Graham 2007). Clearly, our education and cultural influences play a large part in 
determining what types of actions (or character traits) we evaluate in moral terms. According 
to MFT, there are several psychological systems, or ‘foundations’, that render action types 
morally salient, although we are not all equally influenced by each of these foundations. 
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As Haidt (2012, 181) summarises it, MFT ‘says that there are (at least) six 
psychological systems that comprise the universal foundations of the world’s many moral 
matrices’. Each of these systems involves ‘innate but modifiable mechanisms’; each has a 
unique evolutionary history; and each plays a fundamental causal role in the development of 
some set of locally recognised virtues and vices (Graham et al. 2009, 1030). For example, the 
Care/harm foundation is that set of psychological mechanisms, largely involved in empathy 
and parent-child attachment, that ultimately produces the ‘widespread human concern about 
caring, nurturing, and protecting vulnerable individuals from harm’ (Graham et al. 2009, 
1031). It is thus the foundation of all those moral judgements that concern harmful actions or 
motives. 
So far as I am aware, no MFT theorist has claimed that the psychological mechanisms 
that are involved in empathy, attachment and so on are directly implicated in the causes of 
each individual judgement that a harmful action is morally wrong. MFT certainly does not 
claim that only these mechanisms are involved in such judgements (Haidt et al. 2015). 
Instead, the thesis is the more general one that humans only judge harmful actions to be 
wrong because we have evolved the relevant foundational set of psychological mechanisms. 
These mechanisms cause people to be distressed by the harms of others in a way that has led, 
over time, to their taking actions that harm others to be salient for moralising and liable to be 
disapproved of. 
Other foundations include Liberty/oppression, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, 
Authority/subversion and Sanctity/degradation (Haidt 2012, 153-154). Without giving detail 
to them all, some further examples will help. The Sanctity/degradation foundation is or 
involves the psychological systems that produce disgust, and it leads to the types of moral 
framework in which it is wrong to enter a temple without the right clothes, or to behave in 
sexually unconventional ways (Haidt 2012, 103-4; 148-150). Again, for this area of moral 
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concern, it is only because people have evolved the psychological mechanisms of disgust that 
they take such actions as salient for moralising, so that they are likely to morally disapprove 
of such actions. 
Authority/subversion is closely related to the kinds of instincts that move dogs and 
chimpanzees to find and maintain a place in an ordered hierarchy. It is the foundation of 
moral disapproval towards any threat to one’s social order, such as rebellion or disrespect to 
authorities (Haidt 2012, 142-144). Had human beings never evolved such instincts, according 
to MFT, nobody would ever disapprove of rebellion or disrespect to authorities as such. 
 These foundational areas of concern are understood to be unevenly distributed across 
moral judgements, in two ways. First, for any individual, some foundations may be more 
prominent than others. Concerns about Care/harm are typically more morally salient to us 
than other foundational concerns (Haidt et al. 2015). Second, liberals, and only liberals, 
typically endorse only virtues that result from the Care/harm, Liberty/oppression and 
Fairness/cheating foundations (Haidt 2012, 184).  
A ‘liberal’ is here understood as a typically highly educated person in a democratic, 
Western society, with at least a relatively liberal political outlook. Liberals are very unlikely 
to think of an action as morally wrong unless they consider that action to be potentially or 
actually harmful, oppressive or unfair. However, this appears to be very unusual behaviour 
compared to most people in the world, who will typically morally disapprove of at least some 
actions just because they deem them disgusting, disrespectful or disloyal. 
I am a liberal myself, as are most people who read or write academic philosophy or 
psychology in the West, according to Haidt (2012, 96-97). Moral judgements appear to many 
of us to share the feature of being somehow concerned with actions that cause, prevent or 
allow harm. However, psychological research indicates that this appearance is deceptive. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that many people judge some actions as wrong, such as an 
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act of consensual incest or of the desecration of a national flag, even where they explicitly 
allow them to be harmless (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 
2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007). According to MFT, most liberals are very unlikely to consider 
an action wrong just because it is disgusting, disrespectful or disloyal (in the sense that being 
unpatriotic may be conceived as ‘disloyal’). Non-liberals, however, are very likely to 
consider some actions wrong for just these kinds of reasons. 
 MFT is clearly not a theory that stresses the commonalities between moralisers or 
between moral judgements. According to MFT, moral judgements are not unified by any one 
kind of foundational concern. The judgement that is wrong to smack children is only related 
to concerns about harm, whereas the judgement that it is wrong to privately use one’s 
country’s flag to clean a toilet is unrelated to such concerns. Moreover, these two judgements 
are, in some sense, founded on different psychological systems. The former is related to 
Care/harm; the latter is not. Although liberals and non-liberals presumably share the 
psychological system that causes non-liberals to disapprove of using a national flag to clean a 
toilet (as I will discuss further in §7.3), this system only makes such actions morally salient to 
non-liberals. It appears to play little or no role in the moral psychology of liberals. 
 It is therefore tempting to see MFT, as Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley (2014) do, as 
providing strong support for the thesis that there are no commonalities between all moral 
judgements: that moral judgements have no unifying feature. Here, I follow Sinnott-
Armstrong and Wheatley (2014, 454) in understanding a ‘unifying feature’ of moral 
judgements as one that can ‘support generalizations that hold for all moral judgments and 
only for moral judgments’. Any unifying feature must also be distinct from the trivial feature 
of being categorised by us as moral judgements. Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley provide a 
detailed survey of moral judgements – including their content, phenomenology, associated 
brain states, force, form, and function – and argue that there are no unifying features of moral 
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judgements. In other words, after much careful consideration, they see no evidence that there 
is anything, over and above being classified by us as a ‘moral’ judgement, that all and only 
moral judgements have in common. 
Several theorists have recently challenged this claim, by arguing, against MFT, that 
people only sincerely call any token action ‘wrong’, even one like the private desecration of a 
national flag, because they take it to be such as to cause or to risk harm. For example, Schein 
and Gray (2015, 1149) suggest that, wherever someone appears to judge an action wrong 
because they think it degrading, they do so only because they think that the action in question 
is degrading in some way such that it will cause or risk harm. More generally, they argue 
that, given a sufficiently broad understanding of ‘harm’, people only morally disapprove of 
actions where they are concerned that the actions are harmful (Gray et al., 2014; Schein & 
Gray 2015; Schein & Gray 2018).  
De Villiers-Botha (2020) similarly suggests that, even where people are unconcerned 
about interpersonal harm, they might be concerned about harm to other kinds of victims, like 
the self, gods, or communities. DeScioli et al. (2012, 143) also believe that ‘victims’ are 
‘central to moral judgments’. They allow that we may often judge an action wrong before we 
locate a victim, but they argue that we then apply a psychological ‘moral model’ to the 
action, which includes understanding it as harming a victim of some kind (DeScioli et al. 
2012, 148). In many cases, they suggest, this requires us to ‘fabricate’ victims (DeScioli et al. 
2012, 147). 
 I cannot disprove these claims here, but I find them unlikely. We have seen that Hume 
focused on several cases where we judge harmless, victimless actions wrong, and there do 
seem to be many such cases. Drawing on the research behind MFT, Sinnott-Armstrong and 
Wheatley (2014, 458) provide a short list of actions that may be judged wrong even if they 
are known to be harmless, such as disrespecting or disobeying one’s parents or elders, for 
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example, which may be disapproved of even if one’s parents or elders are known to be 
unaware of, or even pleased by, such disobedience. It is fairly easy to think of other 
examples. Here, I assume that MFT is correct in claiming that not all token actions that are 
judged wrong are taken, by the judger, to harm victims. Nevertheless, as Haidt et al. (2015) 
stress, this leaves much to be said about the psychology of individual moral judgements. 
MFT states that individual moral judgements may address different fundamental types of 
concern, but it does not state any precise role for the foundational systems in the production 
of individual moral judgements (Haidt et al., 2015). 
 Indeed, MFT suggests some important similarities between individual moral 
judgements. MFT accepts that, regardless of their foundations, moral judgements are 
typically produced intuitively: we typically evaluate actions and character traits ‘without any 
conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring 
a conclusion’ (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, 188). This is the thesis I call ‘moral intuitionism’. I 
will consider this thesis in §7.2, before arguing, in §7.3, that moral intuitionism suggests that 
moral judgements share a unifying feature, in virtue of the psychological mechanisms that lie 
behind moral learning, and so behind individual moral judgements. This is, I argue, 
consistent with MFT. It is also a species of unifying feature that Sinnott-Armstrong and 
Wheatley do not address. Before considering this, however, I must address moral intuitionism 
more generally. 
 
7.2 Moral intuitionism  
As I will use the term ‘intuition’, it is to be contrasted with reflective thinking, rather than 
with a posteriori reasoning, or reasoning more generally. Reflective thinking is thinking that 
requires conscious attention. In contrast, intuitive thought processes are automatic or 
‘autonomous’: they do not require controlled attention or conscious thought, because they 
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automatically produce outputs of some kind whenever the relevant stimuli are encountered 
(Evans and Stanovich 2013, 236). Intuitive thought processes are typically (and perhaps 
always) unavailable to conscious awareness, either during their occurrence or afterwards, 
whereas the products of such processes may or may not be available to conscious awareness 
(Evans and Stanovich 2013; Gendler 2008b, 557). As Nagel (2014, 224) notes, this use of the 
term ‘intuitive judgement’ – to mean a judgement formed immediately and without any 
reflective reasoning – can be traced back to at least Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding.1 
 Given this meaning of ‘intuition’, I use ‘moral intuitionism’ to refer to the thesis that 
moral judgements are typically or always produced by intuitive rather than by reflective 
processes. I take it that Haidt is a moral intuitionist in this sense, although he describes his 
theory a ‘social intuitionist’ one, because he allies his thesis of moral intuitions to a claim that 
moral reasoning typically occurs socially rather than individually (Haidt 2001; Haidt and 
Bjorklund 2008; Haidt 2012, 48). Haidt (2001, 817) says that the ‘central claim of the social 
intuitionist model is that moral judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions and is followed 
(when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral reasoning’. Reflective moral reasoning is 
typically only ‘needed’, and so only employed, after a judgement has been made, if we want 
to justify or defend our judgement, as when we are challenged on it (Haidt & Bjorklund, 
2008, 189-194). 
I will return to the topic of conscious moral reasoning in Chapter 8. For now, I will 
not address this topic, and I will not use the term ‘social intuitionism’ because I do not want 
to commit myself to everything entailed by it. Instead, I follow Haidt merely in being a moral 
 
1 Hume roughly followed Locke in this language, by describing ‘relations [that] are discoverable at 
first sight’ as falling ‘under the province of intuition’ (T 1.3.1.2, SBN 70). He would not have allowed 
that moral judgements are produced intuitively, in this sense. 
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intuitionist. I take the central claim of moral intuitionism to be that moral judgements are 
typically produced via purely intuitive processes, which may or may not then be reflectively 
endorsed (Haidt 2012, 44-51). I will aim to explain this now. 
 There is much debate about the nature of intuitive judgements and processes, and 
about how these may be distinguished from reflective judgements and processes. I do not 
intend to enter such debates, and I will generally follow Gendler’s and Haidt’s understanding 
of such matters.2 Here, I will consider the core elements of recent theories of intuitive 
thought, and then examine how Haidt applies these to moral judgement. 
 Nagel (2014) cites Sloman (1996), who presents two anagrams which helpfully 
demonstrate some of the differences between reflective reasoning and intuitive reasoning. If 
you are asked to solve an easy anagram such as ‘involnutray’, and if you are a reasonably 
accomplished reader of English, you will very likely only use intuitive reasoning. It will 
probably seem to you that, simply by looking at these letters, you think of the word 
‘involuntary’. The solution to the anagram comes immediately to mind, and the process by 
which it does so is automatic and unavailable to consciousness. As such, it is an intuitive 
judgement, as understood here. 
When we are asked to solve a harder anagram such as ‘uersoippv’, however, the case 
is different: 
 
[We] go through partially introspectable cycles of mental activity, 
experimenting with different consciously available contents involving 
various transpositions of letters until we find the solution. [This] type of 
 
2 Gendler and Haidt sometimes use different terminologies. However, I do not see that there is 
anything incompatible in their various theses. 
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thinking depends on working memory not just to present the original 
problem, but also to take us via a series of stages towards a solution. Each 
of these individual stages is itself intuitive, just as Locke observed. (Nagel 
2014, 227) 
 
 Nagel (2014, 226) focuses on working memory because it is intimately connected to 
conscious thinking. The key point here is that, while we do not require or employ any 
conscious attention to solve an easy anagram like ‘involnutray’, we will probably need to 
apply some degree of conscious attention to the second anagram, before we can see that it is 
an anagram of ‘purposive’. Intuitive processes are involved in both kinds of case, although 
they are typically only noticeable to us where they are not operating as elements of more 
complex, partially reflective processes. 
 Much research into intuitive processes focuses on ‘implicit attitudes’: those which 
‘manifest as actions or judgments that are under the control of automatically activated 
evaluation, without the performer's awareness of that causation’ (Greenwald et al. 1998, 
1464). These are the kinds of attitudes that may cause us to unconsciously expect someone of 
a certain gender or skin colour to be incompetent or untrustworthy, even where we 
reflectively believe that such sexist or racist attitudes are reprehensible (Gendler 2011). Such 
implicit biases are liable to occur in the minds of all of us who live in societies that frequently 
depict certain groups in a negative (or positive) light. 
 As the example of implicit bias may suggest, the automatic and non-conscious aspects 
of intuitive processes make it difficult for us to alter or to prevent the occurrence of implicit 
attitudes. In many cases, our behaviour is influenced by implicit attitudes without our being 
consciously aware of any thought processes during their production or of the attitudes so 
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produced. We may only be able to say afterwards that something or someone did not feel 
quite right, without being able to explain why. 
Indeed, our motivation is very often influenced by feelings of positive or negative 
affect that may go unnoticed at a conscious level. Lebrecht et al (2012) call such feelings 
‘micro-valences’. They argue that, even where one is engaged in the seemingly coldly 
unemotional task of choosing a mug from a cabinet, one is likely to be motivated to choose 
one mug over the others just because one experiences the most pleasing micro-valence from 
it (Lebrecht et al 2012; see also Zajonc and Markus 1982, 128). It is unlikely that many 
micro-valences are consciously noticed or considered in such cases. As Cunningham et al. 
(2004) demonstrate, the brain states that correlate with valences are activated considerably 
more frequently than we might expect, and they may activate regardless of our intentions. 
This suggests that emotional ‘arousal/intensity and valence are basic aspects of evaluative 
processing that likely occur automatically’ (Cunningham et al. 2004, 1723). That is, it 
appears likely that any kind of evaluation will involve, as a central feature, some kind of 
valence or affect – some barely perceptible kind of positive or negative feeling, in other 
words – that will occur automatically.3 
So understood, intuition and micro-valence are similar in at least two ways: they are 
at least typically unnoticed by us at a conscious level, and they appear to have the 
psychological function of facilitating quick reactions or decisions without requiring complex 
 
3 I do not see that there are any important differences between terms like ‘valence’, ‘affect’ or 
‘feeling’ in such contexts. What matters is that they are always either positive or negative, so broadly 
pleasurable or painful, as Hume suggests. As such, I take it that they must be to some extent available 
to consciousness. However, we may not be able to consciously identify them as individual pleasures 
or pains, aside from our general awareness of our overall state of positive or negative feeling. 
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cognition. Indeed, intuitive processes often cause barely perceptible feelings, as Haidt (2001, 
818) stresses. 
These are merely brief discussions of very complex kinds of mental states and 
process, about which there is still much debate and much that is unknown. However, to 
summarise my understanding of these:  
Intuitive processes are ones that do not require conscious attention. A typical intuitive 
process is, inter alia, an automatic and associative one, which involves or produces some 
positive or negative feeling (or valence, or micro-valence, or affect, or ….), which may be 
very minimal and so unnoticed by conscious reflection.4  
An associative process is, much as Hume describes, one where any occurrence of a 
particular mental representation (which may be produced by perception or otherwise, and 
which may or may not be consciously accessible) reliably causes a different mental state or 
occurrence. Typically, an associative process is due to some prior process of unconscious 
learning. An example of such an associative process would be that by which the mental 
representation of a mug causes a pleasing micro-valence to occur, because of some previous 
pleasant experience(s) involving that mug or one resembling it.  
Automatic processes are, in this context, associative processes that occur regardless of 
any conscious effort or volition, as where the mere sight of the mug automatically produces 
the relevant micro-valence. I assume that automatic processes are typically unavailable to 
conscious attention, but that the products of such processes may or may not be available to 
conscious attention. 
 
4 This understanding is due, in large part, to Gendler’s (2008a; 2008b), which she discusses in her 
arguments for the existence of ‘aliefs’. I will discuss her theory in detail in Chapter 8. 
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Reflective processes require conscious attention, but they typically or always include 
one or more intuitive processes. However, in what follows, I will generally assume a broad 
dichotomy, between intuitive (purely automatic and purely associative) processes and 
reflective (neither purely automatic nor purely associative) processes. I recognise that not all 
intuitive processes may be automatic or associative, but I take it that they very typically are, 
so that it should be relatively unproblematic to make this assumption here. 
With this context in mind, we can consider Haidt’s (2001) distinctions between moral 
‘reasoning’ – by which he means reflective reasoning – and moral intuition: 
 
The most important distinctions… are that intuition occurs quickly, 
effortlessly, and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is 
accessible to consciousness, whereas reasoning occurs more slowly, 
requires some effort, and involves at least some steps that are accessible to 
consciousness. (Haidt 2001, 818) 
 
To say that the outcomes of moral intuitions are ‘accessible to consciousness’ is not to 
say that they are all consciously noticed, or at least not to the extent that we are likely to 
report their occurrence. Haidt (2012, 45) suggests that, throughout even the most mundane of 
activities, we may experience ‘many tiny flashes of condemnation that flit through [our] 
consciousness’. He claims that, although in some cases these condemnatory ‘flashes’ may be 
‘embedded in full-blown emotions’, they are typically much more subtle than this in their 
feeling (Haidt 2012, 45). According to Haidt (2012, 45), moral intuitions typically feel no 
more emotional than where we can just ‘see, instantly’ that it would be better to save the lives 
of five strangers than to save just one. 
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Here, we might suggest that saving five people rather than one just feels right, in 
something like the way that ‘involuntary’ just feels right when we initially look at the letters 
‘involnutray’. Haidt argues that experiences such as the former are experiences of moral 
intuition, and he explicitly connects this thesis to the moral sentimentalism of Hume, 
Hutcheson, and Adam Smith: 
 
[M]oral intuition can be defined as the sudden appearance in consciousness 
of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-
dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of 
searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion. Moral intuition is 
therefore the psychological process that the Scottish philosophers talked 
about, a process akin to aesthetic judgment: One sees or hears about a social 
event and one instantly feels approval or disapproval. (Haidt 2001, 818) 
 
Haidt defines (reflective) moral reasoning as follows:  
 
[M]oral reasoning can… be defined as conscious mental activity that 
consists of transforming given information about people in order to reach a 
moral judgment. To say that moral reasoning is a conscious process means 
that the process is intentional, effortful, and controllable and that the 
reasoner is aware that it is going on. (Haidt 2001, 818) 
 
Haidt’s evidence for his moral intuitionism is largely empirical, although he also 
appears to endorse some of Hume’s philosophical arguments (Haidt 2001, 816). Much of the 
empirical evidence for moral intuitionism came from studies in which Haidt (2001, 817) 
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presented people with scenarios about actions that were ‘offensive yet harmless’, such as 
using a national flag to clean a toilet or masturbating by using a dead chicken. Most 
respondents immediately judged these actions wrong, but were then unable to explain or to 
justify their judgements. They often initially claimed that the actions were harmful, 
somehow. When they were convinced that the actions were not harmful, they were often 
‘morally dumbfounded’: they would ‘stutter, laugh, and express surprise at their inability to 
find supporting reasons, yet they would not change their initial judgments of condemnation’ 
(Haidt 2001, 817). Moreover, their ‘affective reactions to the stories (statements that it would 
bother them to witness the action) were better predictors of their moral judgments than were 
their claims about harmful consequences’ (Haidt 2001, 817). What matters here is not the 
considerations about judgements of harm, but simply that these moral judgements closely 
correlated with affective reactions. They appear to have all the distinguishing features of 
intuitive judgements, and none of those of reflective judgements. 
In Chapter 8, I will consider the plausibility of moral intuitionism in more depth. In 
§7.3, I will argue that, granted some independently plausible psychological theories, MFT, 
along with moral intuitionism, suggests at least one unifying feature of moral judgements. 
MFT requires that, for any action or motive to be morally salient to us, it must be 
appropriately related to one (or more) of the relevant psychological foundations. It also 
suggests that each of us must learn which actions and motives to morally praise or condemn. 
We should therefore ask whether, for example, we learn to call certain actions ‘wrong’, or 
certain motives ‘bad’, via a particular form of learning. I will argue that this is very plausibly 
the case, so that paradigm moral judgements comprise a distinctive set of intuitively 
produced, habitually learned responses to various kinds of socially unacceptable actions and 
motives. This gives us a unifying feature of moral judgements. 
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Nothing like this suggestion is considered by Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley. While 
we would need empirical research to demonstrate the truth of this thesis, I will argue that it 
represents a serious possibility. In Chapter 8, I will argue that moral judgements form a 
unified psychological kind, and I will develop a more detailed account of the relevant kind of 
moral learning. 
 
7.3. MFT and moral learning 
Haidt and Joseph (2008, 367) argue that ‘morality might be partially innate, by which we 
simply mean organized, to some extent, in advance of experience’. Whatever the psychology 
of our occurrent moral intuitions, our moral development relies not only on our psychological 
foundations, but also on learning and cultural understanding (Graham et al. 2009, 1030-
1031).  
These foundational psychological systems ‘provide parents and other socializing 
agents the moral “foundations” to build on as they teach children their local virtues, vices, 
and moral practices’ (Graham et al. 2009, 1030). Haidt and Bjorklund (2008, 205) describe 
each foundation as ‘a “learning module” – a module that generates a multiplicity of specific 
modules during development within a cultural context (e.g., as a child learns to recognize in 
an automatic and module-like way specific kinds of unfairness, or of disrespect)’. 
MFT does not rest on any complex theory of modularity, such as Fodor’s (1983). 
Instead, ‘module’ is used fairly loosely, to refer to some bit of ‘mental processing’ that is ‘to 
some degree module-like’, in that its operations are to some extent independent of knowledge 
‘contained elsewhere in the mind’ (Haidt and Bjorklund 2008, 205). For example, ‘knowing 
that two lines are the same length in the Müller-Lyer illusion does not alter the percept that 
one line is longer’ (Haidt and Bjorklund 2008, 205). Merely to the extent that seeing the 
illusion is psychologically independent of knowing that the lines are of the same length, 
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Haidt and Bjorklund consider these psychological outputs to be produced by distinct 
modules. 
It is useful to see the kinds of processes that MFT envisions occurring within moral 
learning modules:  
 
[I]f there is an innate learning module for fairness, it generates a host of 
culture‐specific unfairness detection modules, such as a “cutting‐in‐line 
detector” in cultures where people queue up, but not in cultures where they 
don’t; an “unequal division of food” detector in cultures where children 
expect to get exactly equal portions as their siblings, but not in cultures 
where portions are determined by age (Haidt and Joseph 2008, 379). 
 
 The claim that each foundation is a learning module may suggest six (or more) 
distinct ways of learning to moralise. However, given the deliberately loose meaning of 
‘learning module’, it is also compatible with the claim that there is one way of learning to 
moralise, and six (or more) ways in which an action or character trait may become morally 
salient, or apt for such learning. This suggests, in turn, something like the following thesis: If, 
and only if, a person intuitively and negatively responds to a foundational type of action or 
character trait (where a ‘foundational’ type is just one that is apt to activate one or more of 
the relevant psychological systems), and that person has learned to treat such actions or 
motives in some culturally appropriate, negative manner, then the intuition will be, or will 
cause, a judgement that the action or motive is morally wrong. For example, if a person 
intuitively and negatively responds to a token case of someone destroying their national flag, 
then they will judge the action itself as morally wrong only if their intuitive response is 
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connected to their having learned, in some particular way, to treat the destruction of the 
national flag morally negatively. 
If this is correct, then all and only paradigmatic moral judgements are produced in at 
least broadly the same way: by an intuitive process that occurs in response to an action or 
character trait that the judger has learned to respond to in some (as yet undefined) way. This 
is compatible with the claim that different moral intuitions are related to different 
foundational areas of concern. Presumably we must allow for some variation, possibly 
including potential exceptions to the paradigmatic norm, given the complexities of human 
psychology. Nevertheless, this appears to provide a sufficiently unifying feature of moral 
judgements, as understood by Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley. 
For this to be plausible, we must allow that each of us can distinguish those of our 
intuitions that are produced in this way from all other intuitive responses toward actions or 
motives. There appears to be no phenomenological feature common to all and only moral 
judgements (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley 2014). However, 
beyond morality, many intuitive reactions occur to us as affective responses of some kind, 
and may influence our behaviour accordingly, even where the relevant feelings remain 
unnoticed by conscious reflection (Gendler 2008a; 2008b; Haidt 2001; 2012). We have seen 
that many intuitively produced judgements are ‘micro-valent’: they involve motivationally 
influential but barely noticeable feelings, which cause us to behave in consistent, habitually 
developed ways towards similar objects (Lebrecht et al. 2012). In such cases, we often 
recognise that we are responding in similar ways towards similar objects, without 
consciously recognising any phenomenological similarities between these responses. 
Although there is much that we still do not understand about this, we should allow that moral 
intuitions may be distinguished from other intuitions even if they are not phenomenologically 
unified. 
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Granted this claim, MFT suggests a hitherto unappreciated form of unifying feature 
for moral judgements: paradigmatic moral judgements share a unifying feature in virtue of 
the kind of intuitive processes involved in their proximate causes. They are, or they are 
caused by, all and only those intuitions directed toward objects that we have learned to 
respond to in some particular way, where we can learn to respond to objects in this way only 
if they are appropriately related to at least one foundational area of concern. This thesis 
requires an accompanying theory of the kind of learning involved in moral development. 
Of course, the kind of moral learning that I have in mind is a Humean, associative 
kind. Astute readers will have noticed that micro-valent intuitions bear more than a passing 
resemblance to Hume’s ‘calm’ passions. MFT is heavily influenced by Hume. As I interpret 
Hume’s metaethics, he can support MFT yet further, via arguments that we judge token 
actions as morally right or wrong just where we have learned to associate the relevant type 
of action with causing happiness or unhappiness to those around us. Here, I consider how 
the essential features of such a theory could cohere with MFT to suggest a plausible account 
of moral learning.  
 For Hume, as for MFT, moralising is a fundamentally social kind of behaviour. We 
learn to approve or disapprove of certain motive kinds by witnessing the effects of such 
motives, via the actions that they typically produce, on the people who possess them or those 
around such people. We have seen that Hume’s theory of moral judgement is strongly 
influenced by cases (reminiscent of those used in the empirical studies that led to MFT) in 
which we judge harmful actions as virtuous, as where we repay a loan to a ‘miser, or a 
seditious bigot’ (T 3.2.2.22, SBN 497). Putting aside the many technicalities of Hume’s 
argument, his thesis is that, wherever we have come to associate certain motive types – like 
the desire to repay loans – with the happiness of those around us, we consistently, habitually 
approve of any further tokens of these types. Moreover, this consistency in attitude produces 
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sufficient consistency in behaviour for us to develop and generally adhere to various social 
systems, such as the generally honest use of money, obedience to governments, and so on. 
 Haidt (2012, 206) argues that, in the evolutionary development of morality, a crucial 
role was played by our ‘ability to learn and conform to social norms, feel and share group-
related emotions, and, ultimately, to create and obey social institutions, including religion’. 
Apart from Haidt’s belief in the moral importance of religion – something that Hume 
assiduously ignores – the two theorists suggest a very similar understanding of the social 
pressures that caused, and that may be managed by, the human tendency to moralise. 
Here, we may ignore the complex psychological theories underlying Hume’s account 
of moral judgement. Consider merely his claim that we learn to treat certain types of action 
and character trait as morally wrong just where we associate them with causing unhappiness 
to those around us. If MFT is correct, then we come to treat certain action and motive types 
as morally wrong because we have evolved innate but malleable psychological systems that 
dispose us to intuitively evaluate them in some negative manner. Combining the two theses, 
we can suggest that typical moral development involves a sensitivity to the attitudes and 
feelings of people around us, along with a tendency to take as morally salient those cases 
where foundational types of action and motive are associated with certain positive or negative 
attitudes or feelings. Further, we can suggest that wherever any kind of foundational action or 
character trait becomes associated with causing, inter alia, anger or distress to those around 
us, we learn to treat it as morally wrong. This coheres neatly with MFT’s view of foundations 
as ‘the psychological systems that give children feelings and intuitions that make local 
stories, practices, and moral arguments more or less appealing’ throughout their moral 
development (Graham et al., 2009, 1031). 
This suggests, for example, that where a person judges a token action wrong just 
because she thinks it disloyal, she has learned to judge actions of that type as wrong by 
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associating such actions with some kind of harm or unhappiness, very broadly construed, to 
those around her. This may be the case even if the action is in not related to her Care/harm 
foundation in the appropriate way for it to be judged wrong because it is harmful.  
Now, note Haidt and Bjorklund’s (2008, 183) general psychological claim that ‘some 
things are easy to learn (e.g., fearing snakes), while others (fearing flowers or hating fairness) 
are difficult or impossible’. For example, we find it hard to develop the intuition that we 
ought to treat everyone equally (Haidt 2012, 182). In contrast, the Loyalty/betrayal 
foundation readily facilitates the development of intuitions that desecrating a symbol of one’s 
nation is wrong (Haidt 2012, 140). Perhaps only a few experiences of such actions causing 
anger or distress to members of one’s own social group are required. However, common 
experience of, for example, parts of the UK demonstrates that, where our community remains 
unperturbed by such actions, we are unlikely to judge them as wrong. It therefore appears to 
be only where action types are both foundational and suitably associated with upsetting 
people around us that we learn to experience moral intuitions towards them.  
The input of one or more of the moral foundations, at some developmental stage, 
appears to be psychologically necessary to make any action or character trait morally salient 
to us. However, once any action or character trait is made morally salient, we may 
nevertheless learn to treat it in moral terms in the same way as with every other action or 
character trait, and via a form of learning that is unique to the moral domain. At least, this 
suggestion is consistent with MFT. 
Consider Haidt’s (2012, 3-4) story about someone masturbating with a dead chicken 
before eating it. Liberals were unique in their responses to this, in that they ‘frequently 
ignored their feelings of disgust and said that an action that bothered them was nonetheless 
morally permissible’ (Haidt 2012, 96). MFT’s best explanation for this is presumably that, 
although many liberals are disgusted by the performance of sexual acts with dead chickens, 
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most typically display very little displeasure toward people who perform disgusting but 
harmless actions. At least, any displayed displeasure seems to be too weak, or perhaps not 
censorious enough, to easily produce the kinds of associations that cause us to intuitively 
judge such actions as morally wrong. Therefore, paradigm wrongness intuitions require 
associations of some such kind. They presumably just are those intuitions that are directed 
towards some foundational type of action or motive that is associated, by the judger, with 
causing some relevant kind of displeasure to people around her. Therefore, they all share this 
unifying feature. 
In the next chapter, I will argue that moral judgements do not merely share a unifying 
feature in this way but that, more strongly, they form a unified psychological kind. For now, I 
will conclude this chapter by briefly suggesting how even the weaker thesis discussed here 
may help answer an otherwise puzzling question: Why do people frequently, but not always, 
mention harm when they are pressed to explain or justify their moral judgements, even where 
the relevant actions are clearly harmless? 
 
7.4. The puzzle of moral dumbfounding 
We saw, in §7.1, that De Villiers-Botha (2020), DeScioli et al (2012), Gray et al. (2014), and 
Schein and Gray (2015; 2018) all argue, in different ways, that people only judge actions 
wrong if they think that they are harmful. If MFT is correct, as I assume here, then people 
often judge token actions wrong which they do not think are harmful. Nevertheless, Gray et 
al. (2014, 1609) present a strong argument against MFT, suggesting that people may 
intuitively evaluate actions as harmful even where they reflectively believe otherwise. They 
note that, if Gendler (2008a) is correct, then such clashes of intuition and reflective belief 
occur reasonably frequently. Moreover, they suggest that this kind of clash explains why 
people often cite harm as a justification of their wrongness judgements, even where no harm 
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appears likely. For example, Haidt (2012, 24) notes that, when he asked people to evaluate 
stories which were ‘carefully [written] to remove all conceivable harm to other people’, 38% 
of 1,620 respondents ‘claimed that somebody was harmed’. 
This objection from Gray et al. certainly suggests that the relevant moral judgements 
involved some kind of intuitive association between actions being judged as wrong and harm, 
even where the judger reflectively believes the action to be harmless. Indeed, a further study, 
developed to test a very similar claim, found that ‘participants who condemned [ostensibly 
victimless] behaviors as wrong perceived a victim 89% of the time’ (DeScioli et al. 2012, 
145). 
To repeat, I do not intend to provide detailed objections to the claim that all 
wrongness judgements are directed towards token actions that are thought to cause or risk 
harm to some (real or fabricated) victim. However, we should note the tendency of such 
theories to rely on unusually broad definitions of ‘harm’ and ‘victim’. For example, Schein 
and Gray (2018, 47), require a definition broad enough to encompass ‘damage to the body, 
the future self, the soul, or society’. Using a somewhat narrower definition of ‘harm’, we 
might, consistently with MFT, explain why people frequently think of harm when they judge 
clearly harmless actions to be wrong. 
This is best illustrated with an example. Even as a self-identifying liberal, I would 
disapprove of keeping money that was accidentally deposited in my account, even if I knew 
that nobody could be harmed. If I contemplate doing this, I find that I am disposed to think 
not only of my own guilt, but also of the disappointment, distress and anger of those people 
who are important to me. These thoughts are broadly thoughts of harm, although by a 
narrower definition of ‘harm’ than Schein and Gray’s. Just as Hume argued that we 
habitually think of harm whenever we contemplate stealing, even where we know that no one 
would be hurt, I appear to intuitively think of harm to the people that I care about when I 
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think of performing this action. This suggests only an indirect relation between my 
wrongness judgement and thoughts of harm: one grounded in my moral learning, and in my 
associations between this action kind and negative reactions from my social circle. However, 
if people often think of harm when moralising in this way then, when they want to justify 
their moral judgements and in the absence of any other available reason, it seems quite 
plausible that many of them would cite harm as a justifying reason for their judgement. This 
is not, of course, to vindicate their doing so, but merely to suggest a potential explanation for 
the phenomenon.  
 In this chapter I have, aside from setting out the details of MFT and moral 
intuitionism, argued that moral judgements very plausibly share a common, unifying feature, 
in virtue of the habitual, associative manner in which learn to moralise. I have argued that all 
and only moral judgements are likely to be produced via a certain kind of intuitive process, 
given this understanding of moral learning. Moreover, I have argued that, if we learn to judge 
actions as wrong because we associate them with causing harm or distress to those around us, 
then this may well explain why people often cite harm when pressed to explain or justify 
their judgements that token harmless actions are wrong. In Chapter 8, I will suggest a theory 
by which all and only moral judgements are of a certain psychological kind: moral alief. 
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Chapter 8. The Moral Alief Theory 
 
Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally 
indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means. It 
is requisite a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a 
preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. This sentiment can 
be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of 
their misery; since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a 
tendency to promote (M App1.3, SBN 286). 
 
In this chapter, I will combine some core elements of Hume’s theory of moral judgements, 
notably his thesis of Generality (as set out in §3.1.2), with Gendler’s account of ‘alief’, to 
provide a novel account of the metaphysics of, and causes of, moral judgements. I will argue 
that every paradigmatic moral judgement is caused by a thought or perception (in the typical, 
non-Humean sense of the word) of an action or character trait of a kind which the judger 
generally associates with causing happiness to others (for positive moral judgements) or harm 
to others (for negative moral judgements). Here, ‘happiness’ and ‘harm’ are to be understood 
very broadly. By this account, moral judgements are, or include, occurrent aliefs. I will leave 
open the possibility that paradigmatic moral judgements are something more than occurrent 
aliefs: my key claim is that they are at least occurrent aliefs.1 It is in virtue of these aliefs that 
 
1 Given the complexity of human psychology, we must allow for at least the possibility that some 
moral judgements are distinct from aliefs. What follows suggests that, if such judgements occur, they 
are rare. 
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we possess ‘a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery’: they 
play the metaethical role of Hume’s moral sentiments. 
The resulting theory of moral aliefs builds on Kriegel’s (2012) argument that, 
although some moral judgements are beliefs, others are aliefs. Kriegel (2012, 470) argues that 
moral beliefs, but not aliefs, feel as though they are about ‘objective’ matters of fact, whereas 
moral aliefs, but not beliefs, are directly motivating. I argue, more strongly, that moral 
judgements are typically moral aliefs. The moral alief theory therefore entails moral 
intuitionism, as discussed in §7.2. This is because, as Kriegel (2012, 474) argues, Gendler’s 
occurrent aliefs ‘play the theoretical role’ of the products of our associative, intuitive 
psychological system(s). In other words, if Gendler’s general theory is correct then intuitions 
just are aliefs. 
Given the above, I do not claim that the moral alief theory is entirely original: many 
of its core theses are already well supported by the work of Kriegel and Haidt, among others. 
However, I aim to build on their research and arguments, primarily by providing an account 
of the content of moral aliefs, via a consideration of their causes.2 To do so, I will build on 
Hume’s thesis of Generality.  
The resulting moral alief theory states that, for any paradigmatic moral judgement, at 
least three key psychological states are in play: the moral judgement itself – an occurrent alief 
– which is caused by a thought or perception of an action or character trait, where this causal 
relation should be understood by reference to a background, associative state of the kind 
which Gendler (2008a, 645) calls a ‘dispositional alief’. For negative moral judgements, 
relevant dispositional aliefs associate types of action and trait with the harm, unhappiness, 
 
2 I stress that nothing in this chapter is intended as an account of the semantic content of moral 
utterances.  
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distress, pain or displeasure of others (hereafter, simply ‘harm’). The cause of any negative 
moral judgement is thus a thought or perception of an action or trait of a type which the 
judger generally associates with harming others. For positive judgements, relevant 
dispositional aliefs associate types of action and trait with pleasing or benefitting others. The 
cause of any positive moral judgement is a thought or perception of an action or trait of a type 
which the judger generally associates with causing beneficial consequences for others. 
Gendler understands aliefs as distinct from beliefs. I concur, although what follows is 
compatible with the claim that alief is a subset of belief. Whichever view (if either) is 
ultimately accepted, aliefs typically motivate actions, regardless of one’s (other) beliefs. If 
aliefs are distinct from belief, therefore, then my theory is potentially incompatible with the 
‘Humean’ theory of motivation, which asserts, inter alia, that motivation necessarily involves 
relevant beliefs (e.g. Smith, 1994; Sinhabubu 2017).3 In what follows, where I talk of 
‘beliefs’, I intend to refer to only those beliefs that are not aliefs. 
In §8.1, I consider the details of Gendler’s account of alief. In §8.2, I argue that, if we 
understand paradigmatic moral judgements as aliefs, then we can easily explain cases where 
we disapprove of harmless token actions of generally harmful types. In §8.3, I argue for five 
further reasons to endorse the resulting theory of moral judgements. §8.4 addresses what is 
surely its most serious challenge: that of coherently and plausibly explaining the role of 
reflective thought and reasoning in the formation of many moral judgements.  
 
 
3 Kriegel (2012, 480) provides a compelling argument to suggest otherwise, by noting that a moral 
alief may ‘involve a cognitive attitude towards one content and a conative attitude towards another, 
where the attitudes are modally separable’. This seems compatible with a broad form of Humeanism 
and with the moral alief theory. However, the moral alief theory can afford to be neutral on the truth 
of Humeanism, so I leave this topic here. 
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8.1. Aliefs 
Consider the motivation behind the following action: 
 
Debauchee: Sally owes money to a friend, who has recently been spending all  
   his spare money on alcohol. She believes that both she and her  
   friend will be better off if she does not return the money, and she  
   would like to keep it. However, she judges that it would be wrong  
   to do so, so she returns the money. 
 
We understand that Sally returns the money because of her moral judgement that it 
would be wrong not to. Here, I offer answers to two questions about such judgements: What 
are moral judgements? What are their causes? 
Hume discusses a situation like Sally’s when he asks why we are motivated by moral 
duty to perform some actions, such as repaying a ‘profligate debauchee’, which we believe 
will cause no happiness to anyone (T 3.2.1.13, SBN 482). I will call these kinds of actions – 
ones we judge as wrong, and which we take to be harmless tokens of typically harmful types 
– ‘harmless wrongs’. In Chapter 3, we saw that Hume sees a parallel between our disapproval 
of harmless wrongs and those feelings of fear that we may experience when we are high up 
but believe ourselves to be safe, as when suspended in a ‘cage of iron’ (T 1.3.13.10, SBN 
148). 
With this in mind, consider the motivation behind the following action: 
 Iron Cage: David is suspended from a high tower in an iron cage and is  
   appreciating the view. He believes himself perfectly safe, but he  
   is frightened, so he leaves. 
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David leaves the cage despite his belief in his personal safety and his desire to remain. 
He acts on a conflicting desire to leave which he experiences because he judges (at least in a 
loose sense of the word ‘judges’) his situation unsafe. 
Gendler discusses a similar case, concerning people who feel a fearful reluctance to 
step onto the Grand Canyon Skywalk – a glass walkway some 4,000 feet above the floor of 
the Grand Canyon – even though they ‘wholeheartedly believe that the walkway is 
completely safe’ (Gendler 2008a, 635, Gendler’s emphasis).4 These people, like David, 
appear to somehow judge their situation unsafe. Gendler argues that we should not 
understand this last kind of judgement as a belief, and that beliefs play no role in our 
motivation to flee in such cases.5 Instead, the role typically ascribed to belief is taken by an 
alief: ‘a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective and 
behavioral, and that is activated – consciously or nonconsciously – by features of the 
subject’s internal or ambient environment’ (Gendler 2008a, 642). David’s alief causes him to 
act as if he believes himself unsafe.  
David’s fearful reaction is an occurrent alief, comprising a mental representation (R), 
an affective response (A) and a behavioural response (B). Gendler (2008a, 635) understands 
 
4 Gendler (2008b, 562) also notes Hume’s discussion of the iron cage. She follows Loeb (2005) in 
attributing to Hume the claim that the man in the cage experiences contrary beliefs. In Chapter 3, I 
argued that we should think of at least one such putative belief as a ‘quasi-belief’. 
5 I shall not attempt to explain the distinction between motivation and (mere) causation here, but 
simply stress that David’s alief has desire-like content, and that it is likely to cause reflective desires. 
This may allow us to say that he has a motivating reason to flee the cage (e.g. Schroeder 2007; Smith 
1994). Even if not, David’s alief may certainly cause him to act to achieve a goal, so he is surely 
motivated in some minimal sense (e.g. Alvarez 2010). 
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an alief like David’s to have ‘roughly the following content: “[R:] Really high up, long long 
way down. [A:] Not a safe place to be! [B:] Get off!!”’.  
Gendler also describes dispositional aliefs: 
 
A subject has a dispositional alief with representational-affective-behavioral 
content R-A-B when there is some (potential) internal or external stimulus such 
that, were she to encounter it, would cause her to occurrently alieve R-A-B. 
(Gendler 2008a, 645) 
 
Dispositional aliefs are so constituted that, whenever a subject experiences a 
perception or thought with representational content R, the relevant occurrent alief occurs 
automatically: ‘without the intervention of conscious thought’ (Gendler 2008b, 557). 
David’s occurrent alief can only be understood by reference to a dispositional alief, 
which has been shaped by previous experiences over his lifetime, of thoughts or perceptions 
of people being suspended high up, immediately followed by thoughts or perceptions of them 
falling to their injury or death.6 These experiences have produced in David a dispositional 
alief such that he associates being high up with injury and death. Therefore, wherever David 
perceives himself as high up, a mental representation of being high up will automatically 
activate, alongside a fearful affective response and an aversive behavioural response. These 
are associated such that the former psychologically cannot occur without the latter. 
Aliefs include, but are not limited to, (some) paradigmatic emotional reactions, like 
David’s fear reaction. For some aliefs, however, the affective component may be much less 
 
6 It is possible that, although many dispositional aliefs are produced by experience, some may be 
hereditary. If it transpires that the fear of heights is hereditary, the example of David’s alief may be 
transposed, mutatis mutandis, to any learned fear. 
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phenomenologically noticeable. For example, Gendler (2011, 44) argues that someone who 
chooses to invite a person with a stereotypically white name to a job interview, rather than a 
similarly qualified person with a stereotypically black name, may do so because they alieve 
that white people are more competent than black people. This racist alief is unlikely to 
involve any observable, emotion-like feeling. Equally, an alief’s behavioural component may 
sometimes merely ready the aliever to action, without producing noticeable movement, as 
when a frightened person acts bravely. Gendler intends ‘alief’ to cover a broad range of 
automatic judgements, not just obviously emotional responses like David’s. 
 
8.2. Moral aliefs 
For Hume, to judge something morally wrong is to experience a calm sentiment of 
disapprobation towards it. We saw, in Chapter 3, that he believes that disapprobation is 
always caused via unreflective, associative, and automatic processes. It is caused by a quasi-
believed idea of a character trait, where the trait is considered merely as a token of some 
general type, and where that type of trait is one that we generally associate with causing 
harm. As we saw in Chapter 2, Hume at least sometimes calls these kinds of generalised 
ideas, ‘general notions’. We also saw, in §3.3, that disapprobation may cause a calm 
aversion: a desire to avoid or to demote such traits. 
We in the 21st century should, I suggest, similarly understand a paradigmatic moral 
wrongness judgement as being, or including, a disapproval alief. What Hume calls 
‘disapprobation’ is, very roughly, similar to the affective component of an alief. The kind of 
calm aversion that Hume understand to be caused by disapprobation is, very roughly, similar 
to the behavioural component of an alief. And, I suggest, a general notion is, very roughly, 
similar to the representational component of an alief. Indeed, we saw in §3.1.1 that Hume 
believes that what we would now call ‘implicit bias’ is due to quasi-believed ideas about the 
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characteristics of people of certain groups. These ideas are caused by unreflective, 
associative, and automatic thought processes – general rules – and they may cause us to 
entertain ‘a prejudice’ against people, ‘in spite of sense and reason’ (T 1.3.13.7, SBN 146-7). 
Without wanting to overstate the similarities between this and Gendler’s (2011) theory of 
implicit bias aliefs, which are certainly founded on very different assumptions about human 
psychology and reason, there are undoubtedly some interesting parallels between Hume’s 
account of ‘general rules’ and Gendler’s account of the processes that produce occurrent 
aliefs (T 1.3.13.8, SBN 147). 
Of course, many moral judgements involve no obvious feelings. However, we saw in 
Chapter 7 that Gendler is not alone in arguing that affective responses are frequently involved 
in motivation, even where they go unnoticed. Hume’s concept of calm passions appears at 
least somewhat vindicated. 
If moral judgements are, or include, aliefs, then we must ask what the content of any 
such alief might be. We have seen that Gendler describes an alief like David’s as having 
‘roughly the following content: “Really high up, long long way down. Not a safe place to be! 
Get off!!”’ (Gendler 2008a, 635, emphasis added). However, she also claims that any 
creature that is ‘capable of responding differentially to features of its environment that 
impinge upon its sensory organs has aliefs’ (Gendler 2008b, 558). Therefore, she cannot 
assume that aliefs have linguistic content, for such content is unavailable to many creatures 
with aliefs. We should, I think, understand her meaning as follows. ‘Really high up, long 
long way down’ specifies the content of a non-linguistic representation of being high up. This 
is accompanied by what Gendler (2008a, 643) understands as ‘the experience of some 
affective or emotional state’ (A), and ‘the readying of some motor routine’ (B). For David, A 
is a feeling of fear (‘Not a safe place to be!’) and B is a psychological readying to leave (‘Get 
off!!’). 
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Now consider that human dispositional aliefs must be able to represent not just token 
experiences, such as that of being high above the ground, but also general types of 
experience. For example, David might be told that he will, at some future point, have an 
experience which will be in some unknown way similar to that of being suspended in a cage, 
and the thought of this might activate a further, similarly fearful, occurrent alief. Our 
evolutionary past has, presumably, integrated our propensity to form aliefs with more 
recently evolved propensities, such as those involving the use of language and conceptual 
thought. Certainly, conceptualised types of situation or event – such as ‘being high up’ or 
even ‘perilous situation’ – must sometimes be represented within aliefs, if only because we 
sometimes respond fearfully to thoughts of these, just as we do to experiences like David’s. 
What, then, would be the content of the R component of a disapproval alief? Here we 
should note that Sally presumably disapproves of keeping her friend’s money just because 
she thinks that doing so would be stealing. The stimulus for Sally’s moral judgement is thus 
the thought of keeping the money owed to her friend, where this action is conceptualised by 
her as ‘stealing’. Following Hume, I suggest that it is only because Sally generally associates 
actions of this conceptual type with causing harm that she disapproves of this token action. 
Of course, this is not to claim that wherever Sally associates any action with causing harm, 
she will deem it wrong all things considered. I return to this point in §8.4. 
Presumably, from a very young age, Sally – like everyone – has developed and 
refined a conceptual framework of actions, so that she readily takes a wide range of token 
actions to be of certain general types. If Sally sees someone bend their knees and propel 
themselves upwards, she conceptualises the action as ‘jumping’. If Sally sees someone take 
an object that she understands to belong to someone else, she conceptualises the action as 
‘stealing’. 
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Also, from a very young age, Sally – like everyone – has witnessed and heard about 
many token actions that have caused harm to others, and many token actions that have 
benefitted others. Over time, she has witnessed strong correlations between actions 
conceptualised into certain categories (like ‘kindness’) and beneficial consequences. Equally, 
she has witnessed strong correlations between actions conceptualised into different categories 
(like ‘stealing’) and harmful consequences. Like all of us, as part of her moral education, she 
has been told repeatedly that actions of these types generally have such effects. Many real 
and fictitious examples have been impressed on her. All this will have caused Sally to 
associate some action types with the property of benefiting others, and other action types with 
the property of causing harm to others.  
If Hume is broadly correct then, wherever these kinds of associations are sufficiently 
strong (and, I am assuming, provided that the action types are appropriately related to a 
foundation, as discussed in Chapter 7), Sally will be disposed to experience approval towards 
any token action of the first general type, and disapproval towards any token action of the 
second general type, regardless of her beliefs about their particular consequences. Thus, she 
disapproves of harmless wrongs. 
In many or all cases, therefore, action types must be represented within dispositional 
aliefs, where sufficient tokens of such actions have caused harm, so that any future action 
which is taken to be of the same type will also activate disapproval. The action that Sally 
contemplates in Debauchee is not thought by her to cause harm, and it does not obviously 
resemble any action which is considered harmful, except insofar as it is conceptualised as an 
act of stealing. It is disapproved of because it comes under the concept ‘stealing’. Therefore, 
we should take it that a representation of the action type ‘stealing’ is included within Sally’s 
dispositional disapproval alief. 
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This putative dispositional alief is such that the thought of stealing automatically 
produces an occurrent alief with content R-A-B: roughly, ‘Stealing. Guilt! Avoid!!’. We can 
generalise from this example to the claim that every judgement that one’s own action is or 
would be wrong is, or includes, an alief with similar content, where R represents the action 
type in question. If one judges that someone else’s act of stealing (for example) is wrong, we 
can take it that the content of the alief would be roughly, ‘Stealing. Blame! Punish!!’ 
One reason to think that moral judgements are aliefs is that this thesis explains why 
we disapprove of harmless wrongs. Aliefs are produced by automatic processes, which 
perform a different psychological role from that of (paradigm) beliefs. The habitually 
acquired, automatic nature of an alief means that it cannot be easily resisted or altered 
according to the available evidence on any token occasion. To return to our parallel with a 
fear alief, wherever one has come to associate heights with danger, one cannot easily avoid 
feeling fear when high up. In contrast, Gendler (2008b, 565-566) argues that beliefs aim to 
‘track truth’, by being ‘evidence-sensitive’: ‘The man suspended in the cage believes that he 
is safe because if he were to gain evidence to the contrary, his attitude would change 
accordingly’. However, we know that he cannot, and so will not, quickly change his alief in 
response to evidence. Gendler thus understands beliefs to be evidence-sensitive in a way that 
aliefs are not. A belief that one is in danger will typically change to (or be replaced by) a 
belief that one is safe, even if one still appears to be suspended high up, if one has strong 
evidence, aside from this appearance, that one is safe. In contrast, a fear alief like David’s 
will not easily alter so long as one appears to be suspended high up, no matter what 
additional evidence one has of one’s safety. 
Nevertheless, many aliefs are to some degree evidence-sensitive, even if not in the 
same way as beliefs. David’s dispositional alief is sensitive to the evidence that being at a 
great height generally causes harm. Implicit racist biases are sensitive to racist messages in 
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society, which falsely indicate that black people generally have negative properties (Gendler 
2011). Aliefs can only be generally sensitive, because of the automatic and psychologically 
necessary relation between perceiving relevant stimuli and experiencing the relevant thoughts 
and attitudes. The R components of dispositional aliefs represent object types where these are 
associated with certain types of event, and this is sufficient to activate an occurrent alief in 
response to any token of the relevant object type, whether the associated event is believed to 
be imminent or not. 
I therefore understand Gendler to mean by the ‘evidence-sensitivity’ of a judgement 
that the judgement is sensitive to the evidence regarding token situations, as with David’s 
belief that the token experience of being high up is safe, because he is in the cage. This belief 
is sensitive to evidence about the strength of the cage and so on, whereas his alief is not. 
Sally’s disapproval alief is insensitive to the evidence that, in the circumstances of 
Debauchee, an act of stealing would benefit all concerned. However, it is sensitive to the 
evidence that, generally, stealing causes harm.  
Because everyone has different experiences, we are liable to differ to some extent in 
the types of actions which we associate with harming or benefiting others. Some of this 
diversity of moral judgement is explored in detail by MFT, as we saw in Chapter 7.  
This diversity of judgement is consistent with the moral alief theory. For example, in 
conservative cultures any subversion of authority is likely to be deemed morally wrong, 
whereas in more liberal cultures such actions appear morally neutral, perhaps even laudable 
(Haidt 2012, 142-144). Moral concerns about subverting authority are made salient by the 
Authority/subversion foundation. In conservative cultures, actions that challenge authority 
clearly cause more unhappiness than they would in more liberal cultures, where they are 
more readily accepted. Children who grow up in conservative cultures are therefore much 
more likely to associate such actions with harm (in our broad sense of the term) than their 
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liberal counterparts would. Presumably, the representations within a person’s moral aliefs 
may, in many cases, be caused by the moral attitudes of parents and others. All that is 
required for someone to judge an action wrong is for them to possess a disapproval alief, such 
that they associate the type of action in question with causing harm, where ‘harm’ includes 
unhappiness and distress. If one’s parents strongly disapprove of an action type, then their 
disapproval may be sufficient to cause that association, particularly if they are visibly upset 
or offended by any reference to such actions. 
Indeed, someone brought up in an ascetic household may frequently witness other 
people’s disapproving or angry attitudes towards generally pleasurable action types, and so 
associate such actions more with these attitudes – and with the unhappy consequences of 
these attitudes – than with their directly pleasing effects. In many such cases, it might be that 
the original non-moral reasons for these action types being the cause of distress are forgotten 
by all concerned, although the moral distress remains.  
Nevertheless, there is clearly much consistency across moral judgements, especially 
across wrongness judgements. Most people, whatever their cultural background, are 
distressed when they see other people being physically or psychologically harmed. MFT is 
consistent with the claim that most moral judgements in most cultures are directed towards 
actions that are seen to be physically or psychologically harmful in some way (Haidt et al., 
2015). The moral alief theory adds to this that all paradigmatic moral judgements are at least 
indirectly related to harm, broadly construed: they are directed towards actions of types that 
tend to produce unhappiness or distress within the judger’s cultural context. This is not to 
say, of course, that this relation would be cited by the judger in any justification of her 
judgement. 
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Given this complexity and more, all I can provide here is the beginnings of the moral 
alief theory. Nevertheless, one reason to endorse it is that it explains our tendency to 
disapprove of harmless wrongs. In §8.3, I argue for five further reasons to endorse the theory. 
 
8.3. Five arguments for the moral alief theory 
8.3.1 Motivation 
The moral alief theory readily explains the frequent connection between moral judgements 
and (defeasible) motivations to act in ways deemed appropriate in light of these judgements. 
This connection is apparent even to those who deny motivational internalism: the view that 
moral judgements are necessarily motivating, at least to some degree (e.g. Smith 1994). 
Whatever the truth of this thesis, moral judgements are typically closely related to 
motivation, and this must be explained. Kriegel (2012, 478) argues that all aliefs are 
‘inherently’ motivating, although Gendler (2008a, 644) allows that some atypical aliefs may 
not be motivating. If moral judgements are aliefs, therefore, then they will be at least 
typically motivating, and perhaps necessarily so. 
 
8.3.2 Intuition 
The process by which an occurrent alief unfolds is, we have seen, an intuitive one: it is 
automatic, associative, and unavailable to consciousness. We have also seen that Haidt (2001; 
2012) has argued that many moral judgements are produced intuitively, partly by showing 
that people frequently form such judgements rapidly, and then struggle to justify them.  
Consider too Hume’s claim that ‘vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose 
existence we can infer by reason’ (T 3.1.1.26, SBN 468). He argues that, if we reflect on why 
we form any one moral judgement, then we will be unable to explain any reasoning that led 
to the judgement, because we do not use reason to infer that the action is wrong. His 
 218 
argument suggests that, if people are asked why they take actions of the type called ‘murder’ 
to be wrong, then they will generally be unable to provide any satisfactory reasoning for this, 
so that the judgement that murder is wrong cannot be a reasoned belief. This is presumably to 
be contrasted with cases where people make – and can satisfactorily argue for – similarly 
widespread non-moral judgements, such as the judgement that most birds can fly. Hume 
would certainly allow that this is a reasoned belief, because we can clearly identify and report 
on the ideas and reasoning that we employ when coming to this judgement. 
Of course, people may give reasons why they take actions to be wrong, but such 
reasoning generally rests on further moral claims, as when someone argues that eating meat is 
wrong because it causes unnecessary harm, and that causing unnecessary harm is wrong. In 
such cases, a full explanation of why one judges eating meat to be wrong would include an 
explanation of why one judges causing unnecessary harm to be wrong. Hume’s argument 
suggests that people generally cannot explain these kinds of foundational moral judgements. 
This seems plausible: ask a range of people if it is wrong to harm or kill others for personal 
gain and most will assent, but ask them to explain why it is wrong and most will struggle to 
do so in any detail. While some philosophers and psychologists will give (frequently 
contradictory) detailed reasons, most laypeople will be unable to do this. They may refer to 
relevant facts, like the painful effects of such actions, but most will be unable to provide any 
supporting premises to argue from such non-moral facts to their conclusion. Press them and 
they will likely be dumbfounded: they will simply assert that some types of things are wrong, 
while realising that they cannot give reasons for this. 
If moral judgements are typically formed via reflective processes, then we should 
expect to be able to explain the reasoning behind these judgements in some detail, as we can 
for reflective beliefs like ‘most birds can fly’. However, if they are produced automatically, 
without involving conscious attention, then the relevant processes will be unknown to us, and 
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we should not expect to be able to provide detailed explanations of our reasons for forming 
them. 
Haidt’s research demonstrates that many moral judgements are intuitive. Hume’s 
argument suggests that even our most universally agreed and foundational moral judgements 
are intuitive. Therefore, the most parsimonious theory of moral judgements will explain them 
as all being formed, in large part, by intuitive processes of some relevant kind. I will deal 
with a pressing objection to this conclusion – resulting from the prevalence of reflective 
reasoning in moral discussion – in §8.4. For now, note that the moral alief theory meets this 
requirement. 
 
8.3.3 The Puzzle of Moral Dumbfounding, revisited 
In Iron Cage, we assume, David will not simply feel fear and run. He will try to make sense 
of his fearful response via reflective consideration. Although his fear alief activates just 
where he perceives himself to be high up, and it involves no representation of falling, he will 
surely entertain thoughts of falling to his death. Reflecting on these thoughts will help him 
explain his behaviour to himself. 
This kind of interplay between alief and other forms of thinking seems typical: for 
humans, where any alief represents object type O because O is associated with event type E, 
then any occurrent alief activated by a token of O will typically cause a thought of E. While a 
dog suspended in a cage may, perhaps, simply fear being high up, because this is all that the 
relevant alief represents, David’s is a fear of falling as well as of heights, because thoughts of 
falling swiftly follow his fear. 
Something similar is suggested by Gendler’s (2011) argument that implicit racist 
biases are aliefs. Gendler never details what she takes the R-A-B elements of racist aliefs to 
be, but she does allow that they cause thoughts of – to use her example – black people as 
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lazy, poor, criminal and so on (Gendler, 2011, 43). Indeed, without these thoughts of 
complex properties, such aliefs would be merely affectively negative and aversive towards 
black people. If we are to explain why implicitly racist people frequently judge black people 
as criminal, for example, we must allow that implicit bias aliefs consistently produce, or 
otherwise accompany, consciously available and relevant thoughts. Such thoughts may be 
relatively simple, intuitively-produced ones – perhaps of a single word like ‘criminal’ – but 
without them these aliefs could not cause the kinds of racist effects which we know implicit 
biases cause. To give an example, a racist alief may have roughly the following content: 
‘White person. Unwelcoming! Avoid!!’, and it may engender a thought of the white person 
as hostile. 
Therefore, if the moral alief theory is correct, then we should predict that people will 
typically think of broadly harmful consequences (E) when they judge an action (O) wrong, 
even where they believe that the action is harmless. Haidt’s (2001; 2012) research, which we 
considered in Chapter 7, suggests that this is the case. I have already argued that something 
like the moral alief theory can explain what I called the ‘puzzle of moral dumbfounding’: our 
propensity to cite harm when we judge actions wrong, even where there is clearly no risk of 
harm. I now argue that the moral alief theory predicts something like this phenomenon.  
Recall that, in Haidt’s studies, people were asked to morally evaluate actions, each of 
a type that generally would cause harm or distress, but each of which is described in the 
scenario as causing no harm or distress. For example, Haidt (2012, 38) tells a complex tale of 
incest in which all risk of harm is removed: nobody other than the siblings know about it, 
they are secure from psychological harm, pregnancy is avoided and so on. Approximately 
80% of people judge this action to be wrong, even where they acknowledge that no harm is 
involved. 
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We saw that, when people were asked to justify their disapproval of the actions in 
these scenarios, 38% of respondents explicitly claimed that they were harmful (Haidt 2012, 
24). This is a surprisingly high percentage of people who claim that harm is present in a short 
scenario precisely designed to exclude it. As Gray et al. (2014, 1609) argue, the fact so many 
people cited harm suggests that they intuitively associate harm with the wrongness of the 
scenario. Moreover, it seems likely that more than 38% of respondents entertained some 
thought of harm, given that many who did so would surely not mention it as a reason, 
because they would realise that it had been specifically excluded. 
Haidt’s research therefore indicates that, even where people do not believe that an 
action which they deem wrong will cause harm, many of them are disposed to think of it as 
being harmful, and to relate this thought to their reason for judging it wrong. This relation 
between judging something harmless as wrong and thinking of it as harmful requires an 
explanation. In Chapter 7, I argued that any broadly Humean, associationist theory of moral 
learning could provide such an explanation. Here, I claim that, given that aliefs typically 
operate such that any occurrent alief activated by a token of object type O will typically cause 
a thought of event type E, we should predict that judgements of moral wrongness will 
typically corelate with thoughts of harm, broadly construed. It is therefore unsurprising if at 
least some people cite harm in their explanations or justifications of such judgements, even if 
their judgements are directed towards clearly harmless token actions. 
 
8.3.4. The unity of wrong actions 
The moral alief theory is well placed to explain and, to some extent, vindicate a common 
intuition: that all and only wrong actions share some feature or property in common, aside 
from their being the objects of our disapproval. 
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It is certainly tempting to think that something unites those objects which we call 
‘wrong’, beyond their all being the objects of our disapproval.7 As Jackson et al. (2000, 94) 
argue, it is a ‘platitude’ that non-moral similarities and differences in acts are ‘relevant to 
moral similarities and differences in acts’.8 We act as if we can demonstrate the wrongness of 
actions by referring to relevant non-moral features. 
This behaviour may seem perplexing, however, when we consider the research 
underpinning MFT, and the many kinds of actions which may be judged wrong. These 
actions seem to form, as Prinz (2007, 48) puts it, a ‘hodgepodge’ of different kinds, 
seemingly united only by our disapproval of them. This apparent disunity is partly why so-
called ‘Cornell realists’ argue that ‘wrongness’ must refer to something like a ‘homeostatic 
cluster’ of properties, rather than a single property (Boyd 1988, 196). Indeed, McDowell 
(1981) claims that no one non-moral property could be shared by all and only wrong actions 
because, if it were, then someone could potentially identify this property and thereby grasp 
the extension of ‘wrong’: all without sharing or even understanding the moral concern. 
McDowell is surely not alone in finding this prospect highly implausible. 
Nevertheless, I think that Jackson et al. (2000, 87) are right to argue that, because we 
use the predicate ‘wrong’ to mark a distinction between wrong actions and other actions, 
something must unify wrong actions by distinguishing them from others.  
Consider McDowell’s worry first. As Roberts (2011) argues, we may simply find the 
prospect of identifying a unifying, non-moral property of wrong actions implausible because 
the relevant property is no part of the meaning of ‘wrong’. Therefore, no reductive analysis of 
 
7 I assume that this claim, and relevant arguments, can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to other moral 
terms. 
8 More strongly, Blackburn (1984, 187) argues that it would be ‘absurd’ to deny that two or more 
‘naturally identical states of affairs compel the same moral description’. 
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the term is possible, so that it is highly unlikely that anyone could successfully grasp the 
extension of ‘wrong’ without moralising. Perhaps the property exists, but research is required 
to discover it. If so, and given our assumption that we seek a naturalistic theory of wrongness, 
then any plausible and comprehensive metaethical theory must include an account of a 
unifying, natural property of wrong actions, where this property is no part of the meaning of 
‘wrong’. Note that this requirement avoids potential problems from Moorean open question 
arguments (Moore 1903). 
It is unlikely that any non-disjunctive, non-moral, natural property is intrinsic to all 
and only wrong actions, or we would presumably have observed this property by now. It is, 
however, entirely possible that all and only wrong actions share a non-disjunctive, non-moral 
relational property, so that certain actions – each with quite different intrinsic properties – 
affect us in some way such that we disapprove of all and only these actions, and thus call 
them ‘wrong’. Note that this is purely a claim about the psychological causes of moral 
judgements. As such, it is potentially compatible with some forms of moral realism, like 
Cornell realism, but also with other, very different, metaethical views like subjectivism and 
expressivism. 
Of course, the relevant relational property cannot simply be that of causing 
disapproval, because we are seeking this property to explain why only some intrinsic 
properties of actions make us disapprove of these actions. Further, this property must be 
something of which we are largely unaware via reflection or introspection, otherwise we 
could easily categorise wrong actions in non-moral, relational terms (as if, to give an 
implausible example, we called all and only actions which sadden us ‘wrong’). This 
consistent lack of reflective awareness is independently plausible, given that moral 
judgements appear to be intuitively produced: it is very likely that the relevant relational 
property is unavailable to conscious attention. We form wrongness judgements without 
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realising precisely why, and we therefore struggle to identify the unifying property of wrong 
actions. However, if we are even dimly aware that something unites those actions that we call 
‘wrong’, aside from their being the objects of our disapproval, then this could certainly 
explain why we expect all and only wrong actions to share one or more non-moral properties. 
Therefore, we should expect that, for any moral judger S, all those actions that S 
sincerely judges by negative (or positive) moral judgements are so judged because they have 
a non-disjunctive, non-moral, naturalistic, and relational property in common, which causes S 
to disapprove (or approve). 
This expectation is met by the moral alief theory. The relational property of any 
action which results in it causing disapproval is that of being intuitively associated by the 
judger with causing harm to others. All and only such actions are judged wrong, although this 
is clearly not what we mean by calling an action wrong. Moreover, this is consistent with the 
claim that we judge different actions as wrong for different reasons; indeed, we may do so for 
fundamentally different kinds of reasons, as MFT suggests. Nevertheless, as we saw in 
§8.3.3, we appear to be influenced in our conscious thinking by our associations between all 
those actions that we call ‘wrong’ and harm. This suggests that we do appear to be at least 
dimly aware that something unites those actions that we call ‘wrong’, aside from their being 
the objects of our disapproval. 
 
8.3.5 The fundamental importance of harm to wrongness 
Here, I present a brief argument that is closely related to the one in §8.3.3, that the moral alief 
theory predicts something very like the phenomenon that I called the ‘puzzle of moral 
dumbfounding’. I want to build on my claim, in §8.3.4, that we frequently assume that 
something unites all wrong actions beyond our disapproval of them. The moral alief theory is 
ideally placed to reconcile two highly plausible but jointly perplexing claims: that people 
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often judge harmless actions to be wrong, and that many of us assume that all wrong actions 
are somehow related to harm. Even those who argue against this assumption note the 
temptation to make it (e.g. Prinz 2007, 48; Haidt 2012, 4). Indeed, if we did not assume a 
relation between wrong actions and harm then we would feel no need to explain our 
disapproval of harmless wrongs. 
The moral alief theory states that we all associate all wrong actions with harm, so that 
we are disposed to think of them as harmful. I suggest that this may plausibly allow us to 
explain why many people assume that only harmful actions are wrong, despite the obvious 
existence of harmless wrongs. Where we are disposed to think of each token of some type of 
action as harmful, as we do with each token morally wrong action, it is surely unsurprising if 
many of us assume that the type itself is closely related to harm. 
 
8.4. Moral reflection, reasoning, and belief 
I have argued that all paradigm moral judgements are occurrent aliefs. Yet occurrent aliefs 
unfold purely via unconscious, intuitive processes, whereas many moral judgements are 
formed only after much reflective reasoning and debate. According to social intuitionism, 
most moral reasoning is post hoc, and primarily undertaken with the aim of persuading 
oneself and others that one’s moral judgement is correct (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, 189-190). 
Yet even Haidt (2001, 819) suggests that some moral judgements may be reflectively 
produced. Kennett and Fine (2009) argue that relatively few moral judgements are intuitive, 
because there is evidence that people often override their moral intuitions by reflective 
reasoning, and so form judgements which oppose these intuitions. How can we reconcile the 
fact that moral judgements frequently occur after significant moral reasoning and deliberation 
with the claim that these judgements are aliefs, given that paradigm aliefs occur without any 
reflective thought? 
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Kriegel avoids this problem by arguing that many moral judgements are beliefs. He 
cites as evidence the phenomenology of moral judgement, which, he claims, ‘often involves a 
feeling as of homing in on an objective matter of fact’ (Kriegel 2012, 470). In fact, recent 
psychological evidence suggests that most people sometimes talk as if this were so, but at 
other times they clearly allow that moral judgements are subjective responses (Goodwin and 
Darley 2008; 2012; Pölzler and Wright 2019). This is consistent with Kriegel’s view, for it 
may be that people take pure moral beliefs to be about objective matters of fact and pure 
moral aliefs to be subjective responses.  
However, I argued in §8.3.2 that the most parsimonious theory of moral judgements 
would explain them as all being formed, in large part, by intuitive processes. Hume and Haidt 
have each, I suggested, provided good reasons to think this is the case. Moreover, if Gendler 
(2008b, 554) is correct, then aliefs are extremely prevalent in our thinking of all kinds, even 
if we only notice them where they conflict with our reflectively produced beliefs. I therefore 
suggest that all typical moral judgements are aliefs, although we may often form complexes 
of reflective, non-moral belief and moral alief. 
Here, I can only provide the basis of an account of how such complexes might be 
formed, but I believe this demonstrates that a plausible account of moral reasoning can be 
reconciled with the moral alief theory. A clue lies in the complex roles which moral aliefs 
play in our lives, compared to most aliefs. Loosely put, the function of a fear alief, for 
example, is to provide a quick and powerfully motivating aversion to anything which 
generally causes harm. Moreover, this is how we typically understand the role of such fearful 
reactions. Therefore, where one feels fear but simultaneously believes that one is safe, one’s 
fearful reaction is seen as mistaken. In Iron Cage, David understands his reaction as a fear of 
falling and, as such, he takes it to be misrepresentative. 
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Moral aliefs are atypical because they do not simply enable us to manage individual 
situations, but to manage the interpersonal coordination of actions over time. It is sometimes 
noted, as by expressivists like Stevenson (1963) and Blackburn (1998), that a crucial 
advantage of moralising is that it allows for a coordination of behaviour between people with 
different interests. Moral discussion allows us to agree – to some extent – on which actions 
are to be encouraged, permitted or discouraged. I suggest that this is achieved via the 
automatic activation of moral aliefs whenever tokens of relevant action types occur. By 
forcing us to be consistently influenced by the general effects of actions like stealing, moral 
aliefs cause us to generally converge in our disapproval of such actions, even in many cases 
where the effects do not otherwise displease us. In this way, these aliefs strongly assist the 
coordination of our actions. If each of us reacts with at least some disapproval to the idea of a 
token act of stealing, whatever we each take to be its likely effects, then this will ensure that 
we are all inclined, to some degree, to abstain from and demote it. Moral aliefs therefore help 
us to agree on what is to be done. 
Here, my argument partly follows that which I take Hume to be employing in his 
discussion of a common point of view, as discussed in Chapter 6. At least within one culture, 
moral aliefs – somewhat like Hume’s moral sentiments – are to some extent uniform, in that 
they typically respond in similar ways towards all tokens of any one type of action, regardless 
of how the particular token actions otherwise affect us (for example, stealing almost always 
causes disapproval). I do not think they are anything like as uniform as Hume assumes, 
because of the clear extent of moral diversity even within any one culture or society. 
Nevertheless, there is much moral agreement, and, to this extent, there are many action types 
towards which many of us will experience similar moral aliefs. 
Moral aliefs therefore allow us to converge on our evaluations of actions in a way that 
we could not easily do otherwise. Consider an act of shoplifting, for example. Perhaps those 
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who know the shoplifter and the difficulties she faces will judge that, as the supermarket 
owner will hardly suffer, this is an understandable and forgivable act. The supermarket head 
of security, however, faced with many cases of shoplifting and aware of the cost of these, is 
likely to judge that each theft is part of a greater harm, and must be punished. In many such 
cases, it would be difficult to agree on the degree to which an action should be punished, and 
similar ones discouraged, if each of us judges only from what Hume calls ‘our particular and 
momentary situation’ (T 3.3.1.23, SBN 587). 
 Hume argues from this, as we have seen, that the coordination of our actions requires 
‘some other standard of merit and demerit, which may not admit of so great variation’ (T 
3.3.1.18, SBN 583). This seems correct; we require a means of judging actions which 
generally causes us to agree, and which generally supports us in negotiating our various, and 
often conflicting, desires and interests within a complex society. This cannot be easily 
achieved by considering only our non-moral preferences on particular occasions. However, if 
we all broadly agree, at least within the confines of any one culture or society, on which types 
of actions are to be permitted, discouraged or promoted, then this helps us to agree about the 
best ways to treat token actions in particular situations. Focusing on our moral aliefs helps us 
to agree in this way. We have seen that, once an action is conceptualised as a token of a 
relevant type, like ‘stealing’, then a moral alief automatically follows. If this occurs for all of 
us in at least roughly the same way, then we will at least have the basis of a means to agree 
about how best to respond to any token act of stealing. 
Of course, we may have very different moral priorities, by this or any plausible theory 
of moral judgement. One person may feel greater disapproval towards stealing than she does 
towards social injustice, whereas another person may feel the opposite. Here, the former 
person would be likely to treat an impoverished shoplifter more harshly than the latter person 
would want to allow. Nevertheless, both people may still be in broad disagreement that, 
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insofar as the action is one of stealing, it is wrong to some extent, even though it is also an 
injustice – and so also wrong – that anyone in a wealthy society should be required to endure 
poverty. They have something of a shared evaluative framework within which their debate 
may proceed. 
A further complication is due to the fact that it is not always a straightforward matter 
to decide how best to conceptualise any token action. This is particularly the case since we 
may conceptualise an action without applying a clear name or label to it. For example, an act 
may surely be conceptualised as one that is ‘unlikely to cause harm’ or ‘understandable in the 
circumstances’, just as much as it may be conceptualised as ‘stealing’. Some people may 
experience disapproval aliefs towards actions conceptualised as ‘harmful’, ‘subversive’, 
‘disgusting’ or even ‘other than that action that is likely to cause the greatest amount of 
happiness in the circumstances’. These are all plausible conceptual categories for actions to 
fall under, and, for all I know, we may also mentally categorise actions into kinds that we 
have no terms for. Each type of conceptual category may produce different occurrent moral 
aliefs, to different degrees of strength.  
Moreover, there seems no reason why one person could not possess all the above 
kinds of intuitive association. I will argue that the interplay between these as we consider any 
one action can explain much of our moral indecision, reasoning and argument. As Haidt and 
Bjorklund (2008, 191) note, we do not typically engage in moral reasoning by calmly 
asserting reasons, but instead aim to ‘trigger the right intuitions in others’, by making 
emotive claims. We use reflective reasoning to try and cause intuitive judgements in others 
which, we hope, will make them see things our way. 
The primary type of argument involved in moral reasoning is, if I am right, a form of 
what Stevenson (1963) calls ‘persuasion’, rather than empirical reasoning or logical analysis. 
These latter types of reasoning may often be involved in morally relevant decision-making, 
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of course, as where we want to decide on which of our available actions causes the least 
harmful outcome. However, moral disagreement as such typically involves a focus on 
persuading others, primarily by the use of affective language, to agree with us in their moral 
judgements. We may attempt to persuade our opponents to apply a ‘laudatory title’ to an 
action of which we approve, or a disparaging title where we disapprove, so that we may 
influence their affective response to it (Stevenson 1963, 44). A friend of Sally’s may say, ‘it’s 
a kindness to keep the money’, or ‘it would be cruel to let him buy more alcohol’. In this 
way, he tries to make her question the type of action under discussion, so that she responds to 
the token action differently. If he can persuade her to reconceptualise the action from a type 
with a negative moral association to a different type with a positive moral association, then 
her disapproval of the action is highly likely to wane. 
Consider how moral reasoning very often proceeds. If we want to make someone 
approve of an action, we may describe it in moral or non-moral terms, but we almost always 
use terms associated with benefitting others. Similarly, we typically use (moral or non-moral) 
terms associated with harm to persuade people to disapprove of an action, even if our reasons 
for our own moral judgement do not rest on the claim that it is harmful. The anti-abortionist 
is pro-life: preserving life is generally very beneficial. He may call his opponent uncaring, 
content to kill and murder. His opponent is pro-choice, and she stresses the harm caused to 
women by denying their freedom to choose. Abortion is a right, but also a medical 
procedure: something with strongly positive associations in a world where medicine helps 
many. Each disputant tries to make the other (or, perhaps more realistically, any undecided 
listeners) conceptualise abortion in terms which activate the relevant moral aliefs for their 
view.  
Of course, any action may be conceptualised into many distinct categories 
simultaneously, but in moral disagreement we aim to make some categories seem more 
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salient than others. If Sally is persuaded that, despite being in one sense an act of kindness to 
keep her friend’s money, when all is said and done it would still be stealing, then this may 
cause sufficient intuitive disapproval for her to reflectively endorse it, so that her overall 
judgement is that the action is wrong. Her disapproval may still be countered by some degree 
of approval, given that the act of stealing is, in this case, a kind and helpful one. Nevertheless, 
stealing is very strongly associated with harm, so that persuading someone that an act is best 
considered as an instance of stealing is highly likely to lead to an overall judgement that it is 
wrong.  
Sally’s reflectively endorsed judgement may be a very complex one, involving, 
among other things, a belief that the action is (best conceptualised as) an act of stealing.9 This 
allows us to address one worry about the moral alief theory: that moral judgement seems to 
us more like belief than like a paradigm alief such as a fear alief. We often experience moral 
judgement as, to use Horgan and Timmons’s (2006, 263) phrase, ‘a matter of psychologically 
“coming down” on whatever issue is under consideration’. This is much the same way that 
we experience the process of coming to form a belief after deliberation. I think we can 
explain this by reference to the fact that a moral judgement will often be formed only after 
much discussion and reflective reasoning, as beliefs about matters of fact often are. 
Moreover, as with many kinds of alief, a moral alief typically involves no obvious feeling. It 
is, therefore, unsurprising if its phenomenology is similar to that of a belief about a matter of 
 
9 Perhaps Sally’s moral judgement sits within a complex that comprises further beliefs too. For 
example, if she is both a moral realist and a rule utilitarian, she might believe that the action under 
consideration instantiates a property of wrongness, and that it is prohibited by a rule which, when 
uniformly adhered to, causes the greatest possible happiness. It is an interesting question how these 
beliefs might relate to her overall judgement that the action is wrong, but I do not pursue this question 
here. 
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fact.10 Nevertheless, according to the moral alief theory, Sally’s reflectively endorsed moral 
judgement is a disapproval alief: it is only in virtue of this that she judges that the act of 
stealing is morally wrong. 
In this way, moral intuitionism is consistent with the claim that moral reasoning may 
be effective in changing our minds, and for good, justifiable reasons. I agree with Horgan and 
Timmons (2007, 282) view, that moral ‘reason-giving’ can, on Haidt’s view, appear to be 
nothing other than ‘confabulation’, and that we should resist this notion.11 Although we 
should allow, as Haidt does, that moral reasoning always follows moral intuition, we should 
also see this as a frequently iterative process. We often consider reasons for viewing token 
actions and characters in different ways, and we are likely to come to different moral 
judgements about them, depending on how we end up understanding them. Haidt’s 
‘theoretical stance’ may entail, as Horgan and Timmons (2007, 291) suggest, that ‘the 
phenomenology of reason-based appropriateness [of some moral judgements] is a systematic 
illusion’, but we need not alter it much to remove this worry. There are more or less 
appropriate ways of categorising actions and characters, and moral reasoning involves 
reasoning about these. 
According to Haidt (2001, 819), almost all genuine moral reasoning is performed in 
inter-personal discussions and debates. It should be clear that I agree that inter-personal 
 
10 This is, of course, very similar to Hume’s argument that, because the moral sentiments are ‘calm’, 
they ‘are very readily taken for the determinations of reason’ (T 2.3.3.8, SBN 417). 
11 Horgan and Timmons (2007, 286-287) argue for what they call ‘morphological rationalism’ which 
is, very roughly, the view that our moral principles ‘guide’ the formation of our moral intuitions, so 
that our reasons for these principles indirectly inform our moral intuitions. This allows that any post 
hoc reasons are likely to be good ones, but it does not allow, as my view does, for genuine reasoning 
to occur during moral deliberation about particular cases. 
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reasoning is of particular importance to us (and I will say more about this in Chapters 9 and 
10). However, I stress that this type of reasoning may also occur alone, where we deliberate 
about the best way to think of an action or character. I am not convinced that we only rarely 
engage in moral reasoning to question our own moral attitudes, as Haidt believes. 
The moral alief theory therefore allows, as any plausible theory of moral judgements 
must, that our moral practices involve much reflective reasoning and debate, of which much 
but not all concern considerations of harm. It also allows that moral reflection and argument 
often produce beliefs about the nature and effects of actions, and about how they should 
therefore be conceptualised. Further, these beliefs may cause us to overturn our moral 
judgements, as Kennett and Fine stress. Yet, however long and reflective the chain of 
reasoning is which leads to any moral judgement, we have seen very good reasons to think 
that the judgement itself will be, insofar as it is a moral judgement, an intuitive one. Once 
Sally has finally determined that the action is best conceptualised as stealing, then she 
disapproves, no matter what evidence she has about the actual effects of the action on 
people’s happiness. Her moral judgement is thus insensitive to evidence. To this extent, it is 
an alief. 
I cannot, of course, hope to develop a fully satisfactory and detailed account of moral 
reasoning in one chapter. However, I believe that I have suggested the basis of one plausible 
account of moral reasoning that is compatible with the moral alief theory. Moreover, I hope 
to have shown that the moral alief theory is a viable one, although I have only been able to 
provide the basis of what must surely be a very complex theory here. I strongly suspect that 
further empirical work will be required to determine the plausibility or otherwise of this 
theory, but for now I present it as a viable option, deserving of further consideration.  
In Chapter 9, I will consider how this theory of moral judgements might best cohere 
with a semantic account of our verbalised moral evaluations.  
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9. Emotive subjectivism 
 
[W]hen you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean 
nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or 
sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it… And this discovery in 
morals… is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative 
sciences; tho'… it has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be 
more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and 
uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, 
no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour (T 
3.1.1.26, SBN 469). 
 
The moral alief theory may tell us something about the nature of typical moral judgements or 
moral reasoning, but it says little about moral language. If it is true, then what do we mean 
when we call an action, motive or character ‘wrong’, for example? In this chapter and the 
next, I present one potential answer to this question. I argue, along with others like Barker 
(2000), Copp (2001; 2009), Finlay (2014), and Strandberg (2012), that what we imply when 
we use moral language is as important to us as are the meanings of our moral utterances. I 
suggest a subjectivist theory of the meanings of moral terms, alongside a more complex 
account of the pragmatics of moral language. As Hume stresses in the passage above, 
although the meanings of moral terms are simple, we use moral language to ‘regulat[e]… our 
conduct and behaviour’, which is undoubtedly a complex practice. In honour of its emotivist 
forebears, Hume and Stevenson, I call my theory ‘emotive subjectivism’. 
 In Chapter 5, I argued that Hume’s is an emotivist theory. His arguments, particularly 
those related to what I called his ‘Vivacity Thesis’, are too intricately connected to his theory 
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of ideas to persuade us now. Nevertheless, I will argue for a theory of moral language based, 
in large part, on the emotivism of Stevenson (1963), along with the ‘quasi-realist’ 
expressivism of Blackburn (1993a; 1998).1 
 Here is an outline of key claims from Chapters 7 and 8. Paradigmatic moral 
judgements are aliefs: intuitive, learned responses towards actions (and character traits) of 
types that we associate with causing happiness or harm, broadly construed. Moral aliefs play 
an important role in helping us coordinate our actions and attitudes within a society. When 
we engage in moral reasoning or disagreement, we typically try to determine the best way to 
categorise any one action or trait, so that we will experience what seems to us an appropriate 
moral alief. Our reflectively reasoned and endorsed moral judgements are, at least as a rough 
approximation, those moral aliefs that we experience when we consider an action or motive 
as falling under what seems to be the most appropriate morally salient category, among the 
potential categories under consideration. 
 If something like this theoretical view is accurate, then moral judgements are 
presumably important to us primarily because they help us to decide, and to agree on, what to 
value and how to act. Should we consider a token act as ‘stealing’ or as ‘kindness’? If we are 
persuaded to adopt the former categorisation, then we are at least typically ipso facto 
persuaded to disvalue the action and to refrain from or discourage it. If the latter, then we are 
at least typically ipso facto persuaded to value it and to perform or encourage it. We can say 
something very similar about types of action: if we are persuaded that abortion is best thought 
of as a medical procedure that empowers women rather than as a form of murder, then we are 
 
1 Whereas emotivists argue that moral utterances express emotions, perhaps broadly construed, 
expressivists argue that they express motivating attitudes of some kind(s), which might be very 
different from emotions.  
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likely to experience approval towards abortion, and so to be at least somewhat moved to 
value it and to perform or encourage it. 
  The most detailed and sophisticated extant theories of moral language that focus on 
its practical nature are expressivist theories, like Stevenson’s and Blackburn’s, along with 
others such as Gibbard’s (2003) and Horgan and Timmons’s (2006).2 These endorse the 
‘Humean ontology’ of morality: an anti-realist ontology such that morality is to be explained 
purely by reference to human attitudes and to the ordinary, naturalistic features of the world 
towards which such attitudes may be directed. Other theories that endorse this ontology 
include Dreier’s (1990; 2009) speaker relativism, and dispositional theories, such as Egan’s 
(2012), Lewis’s (1989), and Prinz’s (2007). I will have more to say about these in Chapter 
10, but for now I will assume that the account of the practical nature of moral language 
embedded within expressivism (although perhaps not unique to it) is broadly correct. I take it 
that some such account provides our current best way to understand the practical nature of 
moral language, within the framework of the Humean ontology. Indeed, I do not deny that an 
expressivist theory might ultimately be preferable to the theory that I develop here. However, 
I have at least two reasons for pursuing emotive subjectivism over an expressivist theory. 
The first of these is that the most detailed and persuasive forms of expressivism, 
including Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s (2003, 148), rely on a deflationary account of truth that 
we may not want to accept. It is, I think, worth our while to consider how we might draw on, 
in my case, Blackburn’s careful treatment of moral practice without having to rely on 
deflationism about truth. One of my aims will be to vindicate ordinary moral talk and 
behaviour, as Blackburn aims to, but without requiring any one theory of truth. This may 
 
2 Horgan and Timmons argue for a form of ‘cognitive expressivism’, by which beliefs may be either 
descriptive or normative in nature, and by which moral utterances express normative beliefs. 
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have a further benefit. It is often claimed that expressivism has a problem with understanding 
how simple moral sentences, which have no descriptive meanings, can be meaningfully 
embedded in more complex sentences, where they appear to require descriptive meanings. 
The resulting ‘Frege-Geach’ problem is seen by many as insurmountable (e.g. Schroeder 
2008). My own view is that Blackburn’s (1998) theory has the resources to overcome it. 
However, we can note that moral terms are straightforwardly descriptive, according to 
emotive subjectivism, so that the problem does not arise for this theory. 
My second reason is that the moral alief theory suggests a different picture of moral 
thinking than those presented by current expressivist theories. Indeed, the picture of moral 
thinking that I reject is implicitly accepted within most metaethical theories, including 
speaker relativism and dispositional theories. The moral alief theory – and, we will see, 
several recent psychological studies, aside from Haidt’s – suggest that moral thought and 
language is significantly less reflective, and appears significantly less consistent, than most 
metaethicists generally assume. 
 In asking what moral utterances mean, metaethicists have typically assumed that, as 
Gill (2009a, 216) said just over ten years ago, ‘ordinary [moral] discourse is uniform and 
determinate enough to vindicate one side or the other’ of various metaethical disputes. Gill 
(2009a, 232) doubted the veracity of this assumption, and recommended that ‘descriptive 
meta-ethics [should] involve much more empirical investigation than it typically did in the 
20th century’, to discover how people in fact use moral terms. As we will see in Chapter 10, 
such studies are now being undertaken, and they generally suggest that the above assumption 
about ordinary moral discourse is mistaken, as Gill suspected. 
Moreover, although it is generally acknowledged that much moral knowledge is tacit, 
I suspect that metaethicists often overestimate the extent to which people can interpret their 
own moral judgements. More precisely, given the intuitive nature of moral judgements, I 
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strongly doubt that introspection on our own judgements of moral wrongness can help much 
in the process of coming to understand the meaning of moral utterances. Indeed, my theory 
will rely on the thesis that most of what we think when we judge something wrong is 
unavailable to conscious attention, as I have argued over the last two chapters. Call this the 
‘opacity thesis’. 
I hope to show that we have good reasons for moralising as we do. The opacity thesis 
allows for what I will call a ‘strongly indexical’ account of moral utterances, such that they 
often refer to the moral aliefs experienced at the time of utterance, regardless of the tense of 
the moral sentence being uttered. I will argue that this allows for a method of vindicating 
moral language that is closely related to, and draws heavily on, Blackburn’s quasi-realism. 
For simplicity, I will focus mainly on one type of moral utterance: that of the form ‘x is 
wrong’, where x is a token action.3 I will call this ‘MU’ (for ‘moral utterance’). 
In §9.1, I provide the essential elements of emotive subjectivism. In §9.2, I argue for a 
subjectivist theory of the meaning of moral terms. In §9.3, I argue for a pragmatic account of 
moral language. I will further motivate and defend emotive subjectivism in Chapter 10. 
 
9.1. Situating emotive subjectivism 
Emotive subjectivism sits within the wider theoretical framework of so-called ‘hybrid 
theories’. These typically aim to combine the most plausible elements of cognitivism, by 
which moral utterances express moral beliefs, and expressivism, by which moral utterances 
express desires or other motivating attitudes. As Schroeder (2009, 258) notes, it appears 
plausible to many that ‘cognitivists avoid expressivists’ problems with logic and inference 
 
3 Following Grice (1968, 226), I employ an ‘artificially wide sense’ of ‘utterance’, to cover cases of, 
for example, writing that some action is wrong. 
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because they associate moral sentences with ordinary descriptive contents, and… 
expressivists can offer elegant explanations of the motivating power of moral judgments and 
the pull of the Open Question argument’. A theory which allows that moral utterances 
express both beliefs and desires may therefore seem attractive. 
  Fletcher (2014) distinguishes two claims that a hybrid theorist might make: 
 
(i) moral thought: Moral judgments have belief and desire-like aspects or 
elements. 
(ii) moral language: Moral utterances both ascribe properties and express 
desire-like attitudes (Fletcher 2014, 173). 
 
 In this chapter, I will defend a hybrid theory of moral language, by which moral 
utterances ascribe properties and implicate desire-like attitudes. In §9.3, we will see that this 
(probably) sits within the class that Fletcher (2014, 173) calls ‘implicaturist hybrid views of 
moral language’. Not all hybrid views entail anything about implicature; examples of non-
implicature views include Boisvert (2008) and Ridge (2014). 
 Most typical hybrid theories, whether of the implicature hybrid kind or otherwise, 
claim that any description that occurs when we call something ‘wrong’ is given by the belief-
like element of our moral judgement, and that we simultaneously (semantically or 
pragmatically) express the desire-like element of that judgement. So, for example, Barker 
(2000) argues that, when we say, ‘X is good’, we mean that X has some natural property F, 
and we imply that we are committed to approving of F things. Here, the moral judgement that 
X is good includes a belief that X has some natural property F, and the moral utterance ‘X is 
good’ expresses that belief, and so ascribes property F to X. 
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 I do not argue for such close connections between the (somewhat belief-like) 
representative component of a disapproval alief and the descriptive element of MU. 
According to emotive subjectivism, we do not express the descriptive component of a moral 
judgement when we sincerely utter MU, but instead refer to our occurrent disapproval alief. 
Such aliefs, along with occurrent approval aliefs, are what I call ‘moral judgements’, and so I 
understand subjectivism as the theory that utterances like MU express judgements about our 
moral judgements. This is merely a terminological stipulation, of course: I could stipulate that 
moral judgements just are those mental states, whatever they may be, that we express via 
utterances like MU. However, I will argue, moral aliefs are of central importance to our 
moral concerns, whereas our judgements about these aliefs are not.  
Roughly following Stevenson (1963), I suggest that an utterance of MU means that 
the speaker disapproves of x, and that the utterance has the expressive function of pressing 
others to come to evaluative agreement. Here is my preferred formulation of emotive 
subjectivism: 
 
A sentence of type MU means that the speaker is experiencing, or would 
experience, negative (micro)valence towards x, of the kind produced by an 
occurrent disapproval alief. When uttered, this sentence has the pragmatic 
function of: 
(i) demonstrating one’s current commitment to disapproval of x, and; 
(ii) demanding of anyone who does not disapprove of x either that they 
come to disapprove or that they provide the speaker with sufficient reason 
to stop disapproving. 
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I will generally summarise the literal meaning as ‘I disapprove of x’. I will sometimes 
describe the experience of disapproval as a ‘feeling’, but I do not suggest anything more than 
micro-valence by this. Unlike Stevenson (1963, 18-19), mine is not an emotivist theory, 
because I do not claim that any part of the meaning of a moral term or utterance is given by 
what he calls its ‘dynamic’ use: its being such as to ‘give vent to our feelings’ or to ‘incite 
people to actions or attitudes’. My theory entails a relatively simple subjectivist theory of the 
meanings of moral terms, of a kind which Stevenson strongly repudiated in his later work. 
Some key points: the features of x that cause disapproval may or may not be 
consciously available to the utterer. As Haidt shows, in many cases, we feel that something is 
wrong, without being able to say why. Very typically, the feeling is accompanied by at least 
some aversion towards x, but I remain neutral as to whether this is any part of the meaning of 
MU. It may be that some atypical aliefs do not motivate in this way, as discussed in chapter 
8.4 Finally, the meaning of moral sentences can be either strongly or weakly indexical: if 
strongly, then we mean that we disapprove of x, here and now; if weakly, then the meaning of 
the sentence is more closely related to the tense of the sentence. A strongly indexical 
utterance of ‘x could be wrong, but I doubt it’, means that I could be, but doubt that I am, 
experiencing disapproval towards x. A weakly indexical utterance of ‘x could be wrong, but I 
doubt it’, means that I could come to disapprove of x in other circumstances, as where I learn 
more about x, but I doubt it. 
Admittedly, the suggested meaning of the strongly indexical utterance of ‘x could be 
wrong, but I doubt it’ appears highly counterintuitive. It certainly seems that we can doubt 
 
4 So-called amoralists – people who sincerely express moral sentences like MU without experiencing 
any motivation to act in accordance with them – are theoretical possibilities by this account (e.g. 
Brink 1986; Smith 1994, 60-76). If they exist, however, they are rare: aliefs are very commonly 
motivating. 
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whether an action is wrong, but it does not seem to most of us that we can doubt whether we 
are experiencing disapproval or not. Generally, facts about our own experiences are much 
more readily available to us than are facts about objects or properties in the world. Indeed, 
moral facts appear more similar to facts about objects or properties in the world, at least in 
this respect, than they do to facts about our own experiences. This is one reason why many 
people find metaethical theories like realism and expressivism more plausible than 
subjectivism. 
However, the opacity thesis is of crucial importance here. Because of their intuitive 
nature, it is not always clear to us when we are experiencing moral aliefs. There is very 
strong evidence, some of which has been discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, to show that we are 
not always aware that we are, or how we are, influenced by aliefs, generally (Gendler 2008a; 
2008b). It is, therefore, highly possible on my account that we are sometimes unsure about 
whether we morally disapprove of an action or not. Perhaps, in such cases, we experience 
other, somewhat similar, intuitive responses, or we are aware that we disapprove, or not, of 
other somewhat similar actions. According to emotive subjectivism, at least some cases of 
moral doubt are best explained as cases of doubt about one’s own moral responses. 
I will argue that the ambiguity between the strongly and weakly indexical meanings 
of MU plays an important role in moral language. This is not an ambiguity of which we are 
always aware, although some psychological studies, to be discussed in Chapter 10, appear to 
suggest that we are at least sometimes aware of it. Despite this complication, however, mine 
is a relatively simple subjectivist theory, of the kind that Zangwill (1990, 587) summarily 
dismisses as ‘[b]ad old Naive Subjectivism’. Very few philosophers since Hobbes have been 
tempted by anything similar. In Chapter 10, we will see that there are good reasons for this. 
Nevertheless, I will argue that, given both the opacity thesis and a suitable account of the 
pragmatic nature of moral language, subjectivism can and should be defended. 
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I have only provided a brief outline of emotive subjectivism so far. I will now argue 
for the subjectivist theory of the meaning of moral judgements, before providing the basis for 
my pragmatic theory in §9.3. 
 
9.2. An argument for a subjective account of the meanings of moral terms 
The moral alief theory entails that any paradigmatic wrongness judgement is intuitively 
produced. There are several aspects of such judgements that we cannot readily come to 
understand from even careful introspection. For example, we are not consciously aware of the 
process by which they are produced, and they are learned in a habitual and associative 
manner that is similarly unavailable to conscious attention. Even where an occurrent alief is, 
unlike the process which caused it, consciously available, we cannot assume that it is fully 
available, or that we can easily or clearly distinguish it from other, related thoughts and 
feelings by introspection. Moreover, we typically think of harm when we judge some token 
action wrong, regardless of our beliefs about it.  
 This may seem a pessimistic view, given that it not only entails the opacity thesis, but 
also suggests that much of our moral thinking might be misleading to us. We might wonder 
whether, whenever we call things ‘wrong’, we are simply led by quick, intuitive responses to 
think of them as harmful, even where we reflectively believe that they are harmless. 
 Consider Sinnott-Armstrong et al.’s (2010) argument, concerning the limits of 
intuitive calculating power and the implications of this for moral intuitions. In brief, they 
argue that there is significant evidence to show that intuitive processes cannot perform 
complex, accurate calculations. These processes can, however, perform fast calculations 
based on large amounts of unconsciously stored experience, and they often use such 
calculations to act as heuristics. Therefore, Sinnott-Armstrong et al. conclude, if moral 
questions are complex ones, then moral intuitions are very likely to be heuristics. 
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To give a bit more detail: when we respond quickly to questions, we often 
unconsciously substitute a heuristic answer for a carefully reasoned one. For example, if we 
are asked to quickly estimate the numbers of seven-letter words in a chapter which have ‘n’ 
as their sixth letter, and then to quickly estimate the numbers of seven-letter words in the 
same chapter which end in ‘ing’, we are very likely to offer a higher number in response to 
the second question than to the first. However, on reflection we can see that this is 
impossible. The standard explanation for this type of response is that we rely on an 
‘availability heuristic’: we intuitively substitute the ‘target attribute’ – the numbers of words 
of a certain type within a chapter – for the more accessible attribute of the numbers of certain 
word types of which we can quickly think of examples (Sinnott-Armstrong et al. 2010, 248-
250). 
 Many intuitive processes are heuristic in something like this way. Consider the 
example of a fear alief, from Chapter 8. A fear alief appears to (roughly) substitute the target 
attribute of being dangerous with the more accessible attribute of being of a kind that we 
generally associate with danger. When we have to make quick decisions about our safety, 
such responses are often very valuable. However, as in Iron Cage, they can also be 
misleading. 
 Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010, 268) argue that, according to almost all theories of 
moral wrongness, moral intuitions can only be heuristics, so that they are unlikely to be 
consistently reliable or to appropriately respond to the target attributes of our moral 
judgements. For example, act utilitarians believe that an action is wrong only in virtue of its 
failure to maximise happiness. If they are correct, then the target attribute of a wrongness 
judgement is that of being not such as to maximise happiness. However, moral intuitions 
cannot then be relied on to accurately respond to wrongness, for this attribute is too complex 
for intuitive processes to accurately respond to. 
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The only theories that Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (2010, 257) allow to be exceptions to 
this are ‘those that identify moral wrongness with the judger’s own emotional reactions or 
preferences’. Any other candidate attribute for wrongness, at least given the assumption of 
naturalism, would be too complex for non-heuristic intuitions to plausibly respond to. Note 
that this is not a claim about the complexity of potential properties of wrongness, but about 
the complexity of the thought processes required to correctly identify wrongness, according 
to most theories of moral wrongness. It applies as much to expressivist theories – at least, to 
those that entail that we should carefully reflect to appropriately identify wrong actions – as it 
does to most realist theories. 
In §8.3, I argued that whenever we judge something morally right or wrong, we do so 
because we experience an intuitive judgement – an alief – towards it. Moral aliefs just are the 
‘emotional reactions or preferences’ that cause us, somehow, to utter sentences like MU. 
Therefore, if we accept the foregoing, we have only three options to explain what we mean 
when we utter MU: we can deny that there is any attribute in virtue of which anything is 
morally wrong; we can allow that there is such a target attribute, but accept that moral 
judgements are about some heuristic attribute; or we can understand MU to mean something 
like, ‘I disapprove of x’. 
We cannot dismiss the first option. We might be consistently misled into implicitly 
thinking that x has some mysterious but essentially harmful property whenever we utter MU, 
even where the evidence and our reflective judgements demonstrate that x is harmless. This 
suggestion is reminiscent of Mackie’s (1977, 35) contention that the ‘basic, conventional, 
meanings of moral terms’ involve a ‘claim to objective, intrinsic, prescriptivity’. Like 
Mackie, I reject any such notion. Therefore, if this suggestion is correct, then I would have to 
agree with Mackie’s (1977, 48) ‘error theory’, which entails that MU is in all cases false, or 
at least not true. Perhaps our best option in this case would be to accept a ‘hermeneutic 
 246 
fictionalist’ view like Kalderon’s (2005), by which we only ever pretend that moral 
properties are ever instantiated. 
 Fortunately, I do not think we need to accept either an error theory or fictionalism, for 
at least two reasons. The first of these comes from the opacity thesis itself. We cannot just 
assume that the semantic content of MU is directly related to the content of a moral alief, 
because we have reasons to think that there are very complex connections between, on the 
one hand, the objects of our intuitive judgements and, on the other hand, our conscious 
thoughts and speech acts. We do not have direct conscious access to the psychological 
relations between wrongness judgements and harm, and so we should not simply expect 
moral utterances to be about harm. Put simply, MU need not be about what a wrongness 
judgement is about. Perhaps it is, but we would need to argue for this claim and, I suspect, 
develop empirical studies to support it. We should not, therefore, assume that MU expresses a 
moral judgement. 
 My second reason to reject error theory is more important. As Blackburn (1993a, 149-
152) argues, moral anti-realism seems to do little to motivate us to give up moral talk, and 
any plausible anti-realist theory must explain why this is. Even if we were convinced that all 
our moral utterances were false, we would surely not simply ignore our moral judgements. 
We would still be pleased by kindness and appalled by cruelty. We would still experience 
disapproval towards many harmless wrongs. And, Blackburn (1993a, 150) argues, we would 
therefore need to develop some language to discuss and to co-ordinate these judgements and 
attitudes, albeit a language ‘purged’ of the ‘metaphysical mistakes’ besetting moral language. 
Yet there is no reason to think that this new language would be substantively different from 
our moral language as it currently stands, and so no reason to think that our current language 
involves the kinds of metaphysical commitments that Mackie suggests it does. Therefore, we 
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should reject the first option: that there is no attribute in virtue of which anything is morally 
wrong. 
Now consider the second option: that there is a target attribute for our reflective 
judgements of wrongness, but that moral judgements – moral aliefs – are about some 
heuristic attribute. If this is right, then we should ask what target attribute the heuristic 
attribute is replacing. The only plausible candidate is that of causing harm (broadly 
construed), so that, roughly speaking, wrongness judgements stand to beliefs about harm as 
fear responses stand to beliefs about danger. Moral aliefs certainly appear to play the 
psychological role of heuristic guides to questions of well-being, broadly considered. 
This appears to lead us directly back to an error theory, such that we mistakenly judge 
harmless wrongs to be harmful in some sense, even as we reflectively believe that they are 
harmless. However, I acknowledged in §8.4 that moral judgements, broadly speaking, often 
involve complexes of moral alief and non-moral belief. We should therefore ask whether MU 
might get its meaning from all or some of the components of such complexes. If so, then we 
may, perhaps, avoid such an error theory even if we allow that moral aliefs are heuristics. 
It is very difficult to know how plausible this might be, given the many possible 
beliefs that may be relevant as well as the moral alief. Nevertheless, I think we should reject 
this option. For one thing, there does not appear to be any difference in the meaning of MU 
when it is uttered in immediate response to some action from when it is uttered after careful 
reflection. But in the first kind of case we presumably have little to go on apart from our 
intuitive responses, and primarily our moral aliefs, for we will typically not have had time to 
form reflective beliefs. Moreover, this approach seems to lead to Open Question worries: if 
moral judgements are at least primarily aliefs, then we can disagree, or be unsure, about any 
of our reflective beliefs relevant to some action without thereby disagreeing, or being unsure, 
about whether it is wrong. Therefore, MU appears to get its meaning primarily from a moral 
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alief. If we are to avoid an error theory, we must allow that it does this without being an 
expression of a heuristic judgement that something is such as to cause harm. 
This leaves just one answer: whenever we utter MU, we refer to our own disapproval 
alief towards x. Of course, we do not typically think we mean this by MU. Here, the opacity 
thesis is crucial to understanding our moral practices (as well as, I trust, keeping us at bay 
from the dangers of Moorean Open Question arguments). Given the prevalence of aliefs in 
human psychology, and the intuitive and often micro-valent nature of these, we can very 
plausibly hold the thesis that we will typically experience a moral alief whenever we consider 
any morally salient object, even where the relevant affective and behavioural effects are not 
immediately obvious to us.5 I suggest that this thesis allows for a form of ambiguity about the 
meaning of moral terms that, I will argue, we employ constructively. Moral terms can often 
be, but need not be, strongly indexical: they can meaningfully refer to one’s occurrent moral 
aliefs, regardless of the tense of the moral sentence. To say that x is, would be, was, could be, 
or will be wrong is, in cases of strong indexicality, to say that x would be, was, could be, or 
will be such that one is, here and now, experiencing negative (micro)valence, of the kind 
produced by an occurrent disapproval alief, at the thought of x. 
For example, if I sincerely say, ‘even if I stopped disapproving of torture, then torture 
would still be wrong’, then I mean roughly that, even if I were to stop disapproving of 
torture, then torture would still be such that, here and now, I disapprove of it (I will discuss 
his further in §10.3). However, this meaning is not obvious to me, because it is far from 
obvious to me what I am referring to when I call torture ‘wrong’. 
This semantic interpretation is strongly influenced by expressivist arguments (e.g. 
Blackburn 1998, 314; Sinclair 2008, 265). I will explain this mainly in chapter 10, but for 
 
5 In Chapters 3 and 5, I argued that Hume holds this thesis.  
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now I will simply state my intention to endorse the same general approach to vindicating 
moral language that expressivists take: to stress that, while it is true that the moral utterances 
that we make are dependent on our moral judgements, and that our language would change if 
our judgements were to change, it does not follow that there is anything defective about our 
current judgements or use of moral language. In particular, understanding this dependence 
need not mean that we come to focus more on our judgements than on the objects of these 
judgements, or that we should do so. We moralise because we care, here and now, that (for 
example) people are not tortured, rather than because we care about how we feel when they 
are tortured. Moral language refers to some of the feelings by which we care, but, more 
importantly, it also allows us to express our concern for the victims of torture, among many 
other things, and to negotiate any relevant practical questions with others. 
According to the opacity thesis, our moral experiences, including introspective ones, 
provide no obvious indications as to whether our moral judgements are caused by our 
awareness of mind-independent properties (torture is objectively like that, and hence appears 
so to me) or by our tendencies to respond towards certain non-moral properties (torture is 
subjectively like that to me). Whereas Mackie (1977, 35) held that ‘ordinary’ moral 
statements ‘include a claim to objectivity’, I will argue in Chapter 10 that they are typically 
neutral on such matters: most people employ the predicate ‘wrong’ without any underlying 
metaethical commitment. What led Mackie to his error, I suspect, is that we frequently use 
language that seems to entail moral objectivity, or moral realism, and for good reasons. I will 
have more to say about this in Chapter 10. 
Even allowing for my thesis of stronger and weaker indexicality, my theory of the 
meaning of moral judgements is much simpler than most subjectivist theories. These tend to 
be dispositional theories, by which MU means that I (some of us, all of us) am (are) disposed 
to disapprove of x under certain conditions (e.g. Egan 2012; Lewis 1989; Prinz 2007). In 
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Chapter 10, I will argue that, while these can offer much in the way of vindicating moral 
language, a simple subjectivist account that is coupled with a suitable account of pragmatics 
can offer more. Before arguing for this, however, I must say something about the pragmatic 
theory that accompanies my subjectivism. 
 
9.3. The pragmatics of moral language 
Perhaps the earliest detailed account of the practical purpose of moralising comes from 
Stevenson (1944; 1963). He saw moral language as fundamentally related to those areas of 
life where we ask what to value or how to act. As we saw in Chapter 8, he focused mainly on 
interpersonal disagreement, but he also considered cases of solitary indecision, as where we 
mull things over or ask ourselves whether something is really wrong. Stevenson’s general 
view of moral language is at least roughly shared by later expressivists, including Blackburn 
(1993a; 1998) and Gibbard (2003). For example, Sinclair (2016, 2837) notes Stevenson’s 
influence when he delineates moral statements by reference to their societal function, such 
that moralising is ‘a distinctive linguistically infused mutual co-ordination device through 
which competing parties can negotiate towards (and thence maintain) mutually beneficial and 
stable patterns of attitudes and actions’. Despite being no expressivist, Haidt (2012, 189-220) 
suggests that morality evolved so as to fulfil something very like this role, because more 
morally cohesive societies were better able to survive than less cohesive ones. 
 As I read him, Stevenson argues for a view in his early work, albeit one which he 
would later come to reject, by which moral utterances both express and describe our moral 
judgements. For example, Stevenson (1963, 23) claims that calling something ‘good’ 
describes one’s approval in a way that has the ‘dynamic function of giving direct expression’ 
to that approval. Here, to express approval is to utter a sentence that means that one approves, 
but in such a way that one is thereby seeking to resolve moral disagreement with others, by 
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trying to influence them to approve, while also showing a willingness to be persuaded to alter 
one’s own attitudes, given sufficient reason. 
Stevenson explains his early emotivism by reference to his own, controversial, theory 
of meaning, which need not concern us here. Shorn of any such entailments, I believe that it 
provides our best theory of both the meaning and pragmatics of moral language. We therefore 
need to consider how we might understand pragmatics more generally. I think that the best 
starting point, at least, is to adopt Grice’s (1989) theory of ‘implicature’, and to claim that 
MU carries a generalised conversational implicature.  
 
9.3.1. Gricean implicature 
Grice (1989) argues, very plausibly, that in many cases a complete account of the meaning of 
the sentences used in any conversational exchange cannot completely account for all that is 
communicated by that exchange. We very often imply things that are not entailed by the 
literal meanings of the sentences that we use. He offers this example: 
 
Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now 
working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, 
Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison 
yet (Grice 1989, 24). 
 
 As Grice observes, A may well ask what B is implying by saying that C has not yet 
been to prison, although she may not need to, perhaps if she knows that C readily succumbs 
to temptation. Something has been implied by B’s phrase, and we cannot look purely to the 
meaning of the relevant terms to understand what this is. This gives us an example of what 
Grice (1989, 26) calls ‘conversational implicature’. 
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 There are two kinds of conversational implicature, according to Grice; the general and 
the particular.6 The example just given is a form of particular conversational implicature, 
because it is only due to the particular circumstances in which the phrase ‘he hasn’t been to 
prison yet’ occurs that the phrase implies anything. General conversational implicature 
occurs where an utterance of some phrase or sentence generally carries an implicature of 
some kind, unless the implicature is cancelled. Grice’s (1989, 37) example is the utterance of 
‘a sentence of the form X is meeting a woman this evening’ which generally implicates – at 
least, if X is a heterosexual man, as Grice seems to be assuming – that X is not meeting his 
wife or a family member. We can cancel this implication, however, simply by saying that the 
relevant woman is his wife or family member. 
 Grice (1989, 26) describes our conversations and ‘talk exchanges’ as 
‘characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts [in which] each participant 
recognizes… to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually 
accepted direction’. He argues that we all, ceteris paribus, expect one another to observe a 
principle which he calls the ‘Cooperative Principle’: ‘Make your conversational contribution 
such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange in which you are engaged’ (Grice 1989, 26). This forms the background to our 
conversations, as we continually assess each other’s reasons for saying what we say 
accordingly. 
 Grice then sets out four ‘conversational maxims’, which he claims we generally 
presume one another to adhere to. Davis (1998, 11-12) summarises these as follows (as cited 
in Fletcher 2014, 176): 
 
6 Grice (1989, 25) also discusses a distinct class of conventional implicatures, which need not concern 
us here. 
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 Quality: Make your contribution true; so do not convey what you believe 
to be false or unjustified. 
 Quantity: Be as informative as required. 
 Relevance: Be relevant. 
 Manner: Be perspicacious; so avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive 
for brevity and order. 
 
 Conversational implicature typically occurs by deliberately flouting one or other of 
these maxims. So, to continue with the previous example, by saying only that X met a 
woman, we are failing to be specific where it would be expected that we would be specific if 
we meant that X had met his wife or family member (Grice 1989, 38). For any successful 
conversational implicature, we should be able to ‘calculate’ what is being implicated, by 
considering what is uttered in light of the four maxims (Grice 1989, 39). 
 However, we (or, at least, the neurotypical among us) do not usually need to perform 
any reflective calculation, as we will quickly recognise what is being implicated. General 
conversational implicature appears to be a prevalent feature of our use of language. Common 
examples include implying that not all of the essays have been marked by saying that ‘some 
of the essays have been marked’ and implying that you cannot have both a drink and a snack 
by saying ‘you can have a drink or a snack’.  
 A useful, albeit rough, way to think of general conversational implicature is to 
consider it as what is implicated when we say something that, had we not intended to 
implicate something, would not have been well said in the way that it was said. To use a 
different example, of a kind which Grice (1989, 37-38) also discusses, why say ‘I was in a 
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filthy house last night’ unless I meant to imply that it was not my house? If it were my house, 
then I should be inexplicably violating Quantity by not saying ‘my’ house. 
 
9.3.2. Implicature and moral utterances 
Barker (2000), Copp (2001; 2009), Finlay (2014), and Strandberg (2012) all develop 
implicature hybrid theories, by which moral utterances have descriptive meanings and imply 
desire-like attitudes. None of these theorists endorse or consider anything like the moral alief 
theory, of course, and none are attracted to any form of subjectivism about meaning. 
 Barker (2000) and Copp (2001; 2009) argue that uttered moral assertions carry what 
Grice (1989, 25) calls ‘conventional’, rather than conversational, implicatures. Finlay (2014) 
suggests something very close to an account by which moral utterances carry particular 
conversational implicature, although he does not use this language. He develops his own 
account of the pragmatics of language, albeit one that is influenced by Grice’s theory. 
To illustrate just how different implicature hybrid theories may be, consider that 
Strandberg’s (2012) is the most similar to mine, insofar as it is the only other theory (to my 
knowledge) to claim that assertoric moral utterances typically carry a generalised 
conversational implicature. However, Strandberg’s main aim is very different to mine: to 
reconcile cognitivism with the intuition behind motivational internalism. This is the resulting 
theory: 
 
The Dual Aspect Account (DAA): A person S’s utterance of a sentence of 
a type according to which φing has a certain moral characteristic, such as 
“φing is wrong,” conveys two things: (i) The sentence expresses, in 
virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that φing has a moral 
property. (ii) An utterance of this type of sentence carries a generalized 
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conversational implicature, GCI, to the effect that S has a certain action-
guiding attitude in relation to φing. (Strandberg 2012, 101) 
 
 Clearly, Strandberg is unwilling and unable to vindicate moral language while 
adhering to the Humean ontology, as I hope to do, because he allows for moral properties, as 
I do not. Given the many differences between mine and other implicature hybrid theories, I 
do not intend to argue against other such theories directly. Moreover, I do not insist that mine 
is an implicature hybrid theory, as set out here. First, there have been several criticisms of 
Grice, and we may want to endorse some modified understanding of implicature, such as 
Davis’s (2003). More fundamentally, Fletcher (2014, 195) argues that, while ‘GCI’ views 
such as Strandberg’s fare better than other implicature hybrid theories, views which endorse a 
‘Simple Pragmatic Story’ may fare even better. This story is as follows: 
 
(1) People commonly have desire-like attitudes in accordance with 
their moral judgments. 
(2) People’s moral utterances voice their moral judgments accurately, 
at least for the most part. 
(3) (1) and (2) are common knowledge. (Fletcher 2014, 195) 
 
I see no reason why the essential features of my account should not conform to 
something like this story as well as to Grice’s or Davis’s. If so, we would have our relatively 
simple subjectivist account of the meaning of moral terms, along with a simple pragmatic 
account by which: 
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(1) People are commonly committed to adhere to any moral judgement 
to which they refer, and they typically want others to either come to 
share that judgement or to convince them to change their own 
judgement. 
(2) People’s moral utterances refer to their moral judgments 
accurately, at least for the most part. 
(3) (1) and (2) are common knowledge. 
 
 For this reason, although I am happy to consider mine as an implicature hybrid 
theory, sitting within a Gricean framework, I rely only on the formulation in §9.1, which is 
neutral regarding theories of implication. What matters more than the theory of pragmatics 
that we might want to employ is our understanding of what we are doing when we moralise, 
such that moral utterances have the implications that I take them to have. I address this in 
Chapter 10, where I will argue that we moralise in something like the way that Blackburn and 
other expressivists have previously suggested.  
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10. What We Do When We Moralise 
 
Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked 
among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable, that any human 
creature could ever seriously believe, that all characters and actions were 
alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one… Let a man's 
insensibility be ever so great, he must often be touched with the images of 
RIGHT and WRONG; and let his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must 
observe, that others are susceptible of like impressions (M 1.2, SBN 169-
70). 
 
In this final chapter, I consider some of the ways in which ordinary moral language proceeds, 
and I try to demonstrate that many of the quasi-realist strategies for vindicating it may be 
applied within the emotive subjectivist framework. Like expressivists, I understand moral 
language as providing a pragmatic solution to problems of social coordination. As 
expressivists do, I take it that our use of moral language typically reveals only our first-order 
moral judgements, rather than any metaethical commitments. Unlike any expressivist, 
however, I will argue that we have learned to moralise by referring to our moral judgements 
via language that often, but not always, seems to suggest that we hold some kind of realist 
view.  
Realists are cognitivists who believe that some of our moral beliefs are true. Such 
beliefs are often taken to be about what Shafer-Landau (2003, 15) calls ‘stance-independent’ 
moral facts: facts that obtain, independently of any given actual or hypothetical human 
perspective, such that some things just are morally good or bad, right or wrong. Some 
realists, like Brink (1989), offer what Sinclair (2012) calls the ‘presumptive argument’, which 
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states that we should presume realism unless proven otherwise, because ordinary people 
appear to be implicit realists. In contrast, Sinclair, Blackburn and other expressivists aim to 
vindicate this language, but without requiring that we endorse anything other than the 
Humean ontology. 
 My view is strongly influenced by expressivists like Blackburn, Sinclair and, as we 
have seen, Stevenson. I will argue that some of Blackburn’s (1993; 1998) ‘quasi-realist’ 
arguments can be employed, largely unchanged, within the framework of emotive 
subjectivism. In this way, I hope to vindicate ordinary moral practice and language in a very 
similar way that Blackburn seeks to do. However, we will see some good reasons to think 
that ordinary moral practice and language is not so realist-seeming as is often thought.  
In §10.1, I consider the quasi-realist approach to explaining and vindicating ordinary 
moral language. In §10.2, I respond to a pressing objection to my theory, which I call the 
‘incompatibility objection’. In §.10.3, I ask what those features of this language are that 
require vindication, and I argue that ordinary moral language does not typically imply any 
metaethical theses. We need only explain why people sometimes appear to believe in stance-
independent moral facts, nothing more. Finally, in §10.4, I begin the work of vindicating 
moral language, so understood, by means of emotive subjectivism. I will conclude without 
having achieved a full vindicatory account, which I believe will take significant work to 
achieve, but with sufficient reason to be optimistic that such an account is obtainable. 
 
10.1. Quasi-realist expressivism 
Expressivism, in Blackburn’s words, ‘says that we voice our states of mind, but denies that 
we thereby describe them’ when we moralise (Blackburn 1998, 50, Blackburn’s emphasis). 
The negative thesis here is, of course, a denial that expressivism is any form of subjectivism. 
Most expressivists, and their emotivist precursors, have stressed this denial, since Ayer 
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(1936, 108). It is debatable whether the denial should be accepted: Jackson and Pettit (1998) 
and Suikkanen (2009) argue that the two theory types cannot be meaningfully distinguished, 
or at least that expressivism has unavoidable ‘subjectivist consequences’ (Suikkanen 2009, 
383). However, I shall assume that we can meaningfully distinguish the two theory types. 
According to expressivism, it is no part of ordinary moralising to ask or consider what 
it is for something to be right or wrong, at least in the sense in which a metaethicist asks this. 
Instead, the aim of moralising is to find the best way to coordinate our judgements about 
what to value and do (e.g. Blackburn 1998, 12; Sinclair 2012, 168). By such accounts, the 
practice of moralising involves no commitment to any (folk) metaethical view; neither 
realism nor subjectivism, for example. 
 However, as all metaethicists tend to do, expressivists generally assume that we 
typically talk as if we were moral realists, by consistently talking of moral ‘beliefs’, ‘facts’, 
‘truths’, ‘objectivity’ and so on. They therefore seek to vindicate moral language, so 
understood. Blackburn’s (1998, 79) vindicatory strategy is a quasi-realist one, which relies on 
his adherence to the deflationary theory of truth. By this theory, any proposition ‘p’ is true if 
and only if p, where this encapsulates all that there is to be said about truth. This is then 
assumed to further deflate talk of facts, properties, beliefs and so on, given that a fact or 
property is something that truly obtains, that a belief is a truth-apt mental state, and so on. It 
roughly follows that, when we express an attitude of disapproval towards torture by asserting 
that ‘torture is wrong’, we are fully entitled to understand ourselves as expressing a belief 
that, as a matter of fact, torture is truly wrong. 
The many complexities of realist-seeming moral language are then taken to be 
explicable via the underlying complexities of our moral attitudes, and the task of co-
ordinating these. Talking of moral truth, knowledge and belief can help us make sense of, and 
communicate, our various levels of strength, doubt, or confusion regarding our attitudes. If 
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we are unsure how to feel about eating meat, for example, we may say that we think that 
eating meat is permissible, but that we don’t know whether to believe this. In contrast, given 
the horrors of torture, we say that we know that, as a clear matter of fact, torture is 
objectively wrong. For Blackburn, this statement expresses a first-order moral belief, not a 
metaethical one. That is, it expresses a firm commitment towards the impermissibility of 
torture: an attitude of disapproval. 
Zangwill (1990) argues that a suitably complex subjectivism might successfully adopt 
much or all of the quasi-realist strategy, and so similarly vindicate moral language and its 
features. Roughly in this vein, I argue that emotive subjectivism can be understood, at least to 
some extent, as a ‘modest’ version of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realism’, because it entails that we 
often usefully talk as if there are stance-independent moral facts, truths, and so on (Miller 
2005, 77). Unlike Blackburn’s ‘ambitious’ quasi-realist view, however, the modest version 
does not allow that there are stance-independent moral facts, truths and so on. I will, 
however, argue that we should allow for moral objectivity, at least once we understand 
‘objectivity’ in an appropriate way. 
 The crucial difference between my view and Blackburn’s, of course, is that I argue 
that an utterance like MU, as discussed in Chapter 9, does not express one’s moral 
judgement, but instead refers to it. There is an important potential objection to this view, 
which I will address now. 
 
10.2. The incompatibility objection 
The incompatibility objection stems from the simple but obvious fact that we do not appear to 
be referring to our mental states when we assert moral claims. Consider moral disagreement, 
as where Steve says that legalising abortion is morally wrong, while Hasina claims that 
legalising abortion is morally obligatory. According to emotive subjectivism, the meanings of 
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Steve and Hasina’s utterances are as follows: Steve means that he disapproves of legalising 
abortion, whereas Hasina means that she approves of legalising abortion and disapproves of 
not doing so. Clearly, by this interpretation, neither Steve nor Hasina need be saying anything 
false. Yet, when Steve and Hasina disagree about whether legalising abortion is morally 
wrong or obligatory, it seems that at least one of their judgements must be false. 
This ‘argument from disagreement’ certainly seems decisive, and it has persuaded 
many since Moore (2005, 45-46) discussed it in 1912. It seems obvious to us that utterances 
like MU refer to the objects of our disapproval, and to the properties of these objects, but not 
to the disapproval itself. Steve and Hasina are not disagreeing about whether they do 
disapprove of legalising abortion, but about whether they should do so. Indeed, the relevant 
kind of disagreement seems to be ‘disagreement in attitude’ – disagreement about what to 
value and how to behave – rather than disagreement about facts of any kind (Stevenson 1963, 
1). 
A similar argument ultimately persuaded Stevenson to disavow any subjectivist 
elements of his emotivism. Stevenson (1963, 213) came to deny that a sentence like ‘Jones 
ought not to have insulted Smith’ includes in its meaning ‘I [the speaker] disapprove of 
Jones’ having insulted Smith’, because this analysis would lead him to endorse two claims 
that he rejects. The first is that the former sentence expresses a belief about the speaker’s 
attitude as well as the attitude itself. This is not problematic in and of itself, but Stevenson 
takes it to imply the second claim: that the speaker’s reasons for her attitude would include 
reasons to support her belief that she has the attitude. Stevenson thinks that this is clearly 
mistaken. 
The worry here lies in the fact that, in saying that Jones did something wrong, I am 
saying something that my interlocuter will agree with only if she thinks that Jones did 
something wrong. If I try to support my claim with reasons to believe that I disapprove, then 
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even if she accepts these, they need not give her any reason to disapprove. If I am to hope to 
persuade my interlocuter that Jones did something wrong, then my reasoning must be about 
Jones and her actions. As with the argument from disagreement, this seems to require that 
MU refers beyond our moral feelings or attitudes. Moral agreement will occur if and only if 
we both share at least roughly the same attitudes towards Jones and her actions. It will not 
occur just because we share the same beliefs about our own or each other’s moral 
judgements. 
As an objection to emotive subjectivism, these worries can, I think, be generalised to 
the seeming incompatibility between the claim that MU means, roughly, ‘I disapprove of x’ 
and the clearly true claims that we do not appear to talk as if we are referring to our own 
judgements when we moralise, and that we appear to talk instead as if we are referring to the 
objects of our moral judgements. This kind of general objection is, I take it, at the core of the 
expressivist’s – and, indeed, many people’s – denial of simple subjectivism. This is the 
incompatibility objection. 
To overcome the incompatibility objection, we have to explain moral disagreement as 
normative disagreement. Disagreement about whether x is wrong is not simply disagreement 
about how we feel about x, but neither is it simply disagreement about the features of x. Even 
if you persuade someone that an action is to be called ‘wrong’, you are not in agreement 
unless she has a disapproving and aversive attitude towards it (Stevenson 1963, 16). 
Disagreement about whether x is wrong is disagreement about, roughly, how we should feel 
and behave towards x. Expressivism appears to capture this very well, because it explains 
moral discourse generally as discourse about what to value or do. Indeed, I believe that it 
does explain this well, and I will argue that emotive subjectivism can borrow much of its 
explanation, albeit with a focus on the pragmatics of moral language rather than on the 
meanings of moral terms. 
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Given emotive subjectivism, where Steve says that legalising abortion is wrong and 
Hasina says it is right, this does not, of itself, constitute any factual disagreement. Each 
knows the other’s moral judgement (Steve knows that Hasina strongly approves, and Hasina 
knows that Steve strongly disapproves). Each (let us say) agrees on all other relevant facts. 
Yet Hasina will not have won the debate until Steve approves of legalising abortion, and vice 
versa. The kinds of reasons that each needs to persuade the other are reasons about abortion, 
its consequences, women’s preferences, the law, and so on; not about their own psychologies. 
It is because Hasina wants Steve to recognise and respond to the many harms of forbidding 
safe abortions that she will list these, although in doing so she will also explain much of that 
which makes her disapprove of torture. 
As Haidt (2001; 2012) urges, in presenting her reasons, Hasina will be engaged to 
some extent in post hoc reasoning. This is because her moral judgement consists of an 
intuition (roughly, that prohibiting abortion is such as to cause harm, on my account) and 
because the associative thought processes that lead to this intuition are opaque to her. In 
Haidt’s (2001, 818) terms, the moral reasoning involved in justifying her judgement to Steve 
will be an ‘effortful process, engaged in after a moral judgment is made, in which [she] 
searches for arguments that will support an already-made judgment’. However, this should 
not be taken to imply that Hasina’s reasoning is defective. In honestly entering the 
disagreement, Hasina is, inter alia, opening herself up to reasons to be persuaded, even if she 
finds it unlikely that any will be found. She is at least willing to consider new ways of 
conceptualising abortion, as discussed in §8.4. She is allowing that these may make her 
change her judgement and behaviours towards abortion, even if she hopes to persuade Steve 
before she is persuaded. She is thus sincerely engaged in a disagreement in attitude with 
Steve. 
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Admittedly, it is not immediately obvious that any subjectivist theory can explain 
moral disagreement as disagreement in attitude in this way. Köhler (2012), for one, argues 
that it cannot do so, but that expressivism can. Köhler suggests, I think plausibly, that 
subjectivists and expressivists are primarily concerned to explain our moral thoughts, rather 
than the meanings of moral sentences. At least, I take this to be his meaning when he says 
that their theories are ‘primarily theories about which mental states constitute moral 
judgements’ (Köhler 2012, 74, Köhler’s emphasis). Köhler (2012, 74) assumes that both 
expressivists and subjectivists typically focus on moral sentences because ‘moral sentences 
are those sentences normally used to express moral judgements’. If this is how we must 
understand the relation between moral sentences and moral judgements, then subjectivism 
can be understood as ‘the view that making a moral judgement is having a belief that one has 
a certain conative attitude’ (Köhler 2012, 76). This certainly suggests that subjectivists 
cannot plausibly explain moral disagreement. If one accepts that moral judgements just are 
those mental states that are expressed by moral utterances or sentences, then one has to 
conclude that subjectivism cannot allow that moral disagreement typically involves 
disagreement in moral judgement. Steve and Hasina simply do not disagree in their moral 
judgements, so understood (see also Sinclair 2020, 33-34). 
This is one reason why I carefully distinguished what I call ‘moral judgements’ from 
those mental states expressed by moral utterances. The moral aliefs that I call ‘moral 
judgements’ are, I argue, central to our moral concerns, and so similarly central to moral 
disagreement. When we think about torture, we are, hopefully, deeply concerned about the 
pain that torture causes. Our disapproval of torture, unlike our judgement that we disapprove, 
is a crucial element of this concern. When we say that ‘torture is wrong’, we do so primarily 
because we want others to feel the same way, or to commit to never supporting torture, and 
so on. We do not, generally, say ‘torture is wrong’ primarily because we want to inform 
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people that we disapprove of torture. However, to understand why we engage in moral 
discussion as we do, we must look at least as much to the pragmatics of moral language as to 
the literal meanings of our moral utterances. 
According to Köhler, expressivism can explain moral disagreement as subjectivism 
cannot, because it allows that our conative attitudes are expressed via moral sentences, rather 
than referred to. On Blackburn’s (1998, 70) view, to believe that X is good or right is, 
roughly, to have ‘an appropriately favourable valuation of X’, whereas to deny that X is good 
or right is, roughly, to reject such an attitude. Such attitudes may be directed towards other 
attitudes and feelings, as well as towards motives or actions (Blackburn 1998, 12). If I utter 
MU, then my ‘attitude is put forward as something to be adopted. The action [of speaking] is 
one of attempting public coordination or sharing of the attitude’ (Blackburn 2006, 151). 
 Whereas quasi-realist expressivism locates the attempt to share an attitude in the 
meaning of a moral sentence, emotive subjectivism locates it in the pragmatics of a moral 
utterance. By saying that some action is morally wrong, I mean that there is something about 
it that I find seriously unpleasant, although I may not be able to say precisely what, and I 
implicate my desire that you either persuade me otherwise or adopt the same moral attitude. 
You will very likely understand this: given the norms of moral assertion, why would I 
mention my moral judgement unless I hoped to persuade you to converge in your moral 
judgement? However, different types of moral disagreement and discussion call for different 
kinds of moral assertions. I turn to some of these now. 
 
10.3. Ordinary moral language  
Just as Gill (2009a) suspected, as we saw in Chapter 9, non-philosophers appear not to be 
consistent enough in their use of moral language for us to learn the answers to metaethical 
questions from any close study of such language. Notably, non-philosophers do not 
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consistently use seemingly ‘objective’ moral language (Fisher et al. 2017; Goodwin & Darley 
2008; 2012; Pölzler & Wright 2019; 2020; Sarkissian et al. 2011; Wright et al. 2013). In 
these studies, ‘objectivity’ is typically contrasted with either ‘subjectivity’ (Goodwin & 
Darley 2008; Fisher et al. 2017) or ‘relativism’ (Sarkissian et al. 2011; Wright et al. 2013). It 
is typically assumed that moral objectivity is closely related to (if not identical to) moral 
realism (e.g. Goodwin & Darley 2008, 1340). 
 To test whether people view morality as ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’, these studies 
typically presented people with a range of statements, including moral statements such as 
‘robbing a bank in order to pay for an expensive holiday is a morally bad action’ (Goodwin & 
Darley 2008, 1361). They then asked various questions about each statement; typically, 
mainly of two general kinds. The first kind of questions assess whether the respondent 
thought that the statement was true, false, or ‘just an opinion or attitude’ (Wright et al. 2013, 
339). Other questions, following the first kind of question, aimed to assess whether the 
respondents thought it would be possible or not for two people to disagree in their answer to 
the statement, and to both be correct. These question types closely follow Goodwin and 
Darley’s suggestion that ‘if an individual takes a particular ethical claim to be true, and 
regards situations of ethical disagreement as necessarily implying that at least one party is 
mistaken, then they are an objectivist (with respect to that statement)’ (Goodwin and Darley 
2008, 1341-2, their emphasis). Fisher et al. (2017, 1123), Sarkissian et al. (2011, 484), and 
Wright et al. (2013, 339) at least broadly follow Goodwin and Darley’s approach. 
Pölzler and Wright (2020, 55) somewhat similarly ‘take the moral realism/anti-
realism debate to be about whether moral sentences are true in that they match (objective) 
moral facts; and about whether these facts are objective in that they would obtain even if 
observers had different or no mental states towards them’. However, they went to greater 
lengths than the other study developers to consider a range of metaethical views in at least 
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some depth. In their studies, respondents were very clearly directed to answer metaethical 
questions, after having been given very brief explanations of metaethical positions to respond 
to. Unsurprisingly, they appeared to respond with confusion, and they struggled to make 
sense of this new way of thinking, as we all do when first introduced to metaethics. In the 
other studies, however, people were asked to think more about questions of truth and 
disagreement than about any explicitly defined metaethical theories. 
These studies generally showed that people often provide very different answers to 
one or both of the two kinds of questions, regarding statements which, they often explicitly 
recognised, were all moral statements. Some moral statements were treated objectively (in 
the sense here discussed): the respondents answered that a statement was either true or false, 
and that if two people disagreed about the statement then one of them must be mistaken. 
Other moral statements were treated non-objectively to some extent, in that it was allowed 
either that a statement was neither true nor false, or that two people could disagree without 
either person being mistaken, or both.  
The studies suggest that different types of moral judgement are treated in different 
ways. To give some examples: Negative moral judgements are treated as more objective than 
positive ones; judgements that are more firmly held are treated as more objective than ones 
that are less firmly held; judgements that cause discomfort when others disagree with them 
are treated as more objective than ones that cause less or no such discomfort (Goodwin & 
Darley 2008; 2012). Goodwin and Darley (2008, 1360) also noted, to their ‘surprise’, that 
people ‘who grounded their ethical beliefs in their pragmatic consequences for society tended 
to be more objective than those who did not’. People’s ‘intuitions take a strikingly relativist 
turn when they are encouraged to consider individuals from radically different cultures or 
ways of life’, or so it appears (Sarkissian et al. 2011, 500). People also appear to have more 
objectivist intuitions when they think there is a general moral consensus, when they strongly 
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desire to punish transgressors, and when they feel disgusted by other cultures’ practices 
(Pölzler & Wright 2019, 4). This list is not exhaustive. 
Pölzler and Wright (2019; 2020) and Wright et al. (2013) argue from these studies 
that non-philosophers are metaethical pluralists. However, I think that the studies can be at 
least as plausibly interpreted to show that people typically have no metaethical commitments 
or, perhaps even more plausibly, that any metaethical commitments that they might have are 
significantly less important to them than are their moral commitments. It is their moral 
commitments that people seemed to want to focus on throughout the studies; not their 
metaethical understanding of these commitments. People were asked, for example, about 
whether some actions are wrong, whether these actions are truly wrong, and whether other 
people might be ‘mistaken’ if they disagree (Goodwin & Darley 2008, 1348). I suggest that 
(at least) those of us who are not already metaethicists will typically treat all these as moral, 
rather than metaethical, questions. We might well say that the person who disagrees with the 
claim that abortion is permissible is ‘mistaken’, not because of any metaethical view that we 
hold, but because we think that such people are morally mistaken: we disapprove of their 
attitudes. 
There is one possible exception, I think. The more that respondents justify ‘morality 
by reference to God’, the more their ‘intuitions’ suggest that there is some kind of ‘moral 
objectivity’ (Pölzler & Wright 2019, 4). It may be that the relevant religious belief systems 
include metaethical theories, so that religious people are discussing their metaethical 
commitments in such cases. However, I am far from certain of this: they may be stressing 
their moral commitments in cases where they are unwilling to seriously consider altering 
these commitments, because of their religious beliefs.  
In most or all other cases, I suggest that people appear to treat moral statements 
‘objectively’ when they, roughly, want to assert or to stand by these statements rather than to 
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open themselves up to other viewpoints, and that they treat moral statements ‘non-
objectively’ in other cases. From the perspective of the respondents of these studies, it 
appears very likely that they were responding to moral questions, such as whether abortion is 
morally wrong, or whether other people must be morally mistaken if they disagree. It seems 
very likely that the variations in the kinds of answers that they gave is due to the fact that 
they have been moralising: they have attempted, as best they can, to decide what to do, where 
to persuade others, and where to open themselves to being persuaded.  
A good example to support this explanation comes from Fisher et al.’s (2017) study, 
in which people tended to treat their moral judgements concerning ‘highly controversial 
topics’ as more ‘objectively true’ when they were trying to win arguments against others than 
when they were engaged in cooperative interactions. Fisher et al. (2017, 1132) conclude that 
the study ‘demonstrated that the character of people’s social interactions influences their 
understanding of truth’. However, I think it far more likely that these shifts were made for 
pragmatic reasons than because the people concerned changed their metaethical views – or 
pretended to – between different interactions. We can, I suggest, make better sense of these 
shifts by understanding the people involved to be less concerned, if at all, with questions 
about metaethical truth, even broadly construed, than they were with normative questions: 
questions of what to value or how to act.  
Wright et al. (2013, 354) allow that all such debates are genuinely metaethical, but 
they nevertheless suggest a similar explanation to this: that the classification of some moral 
judgements as ‘objectively grounded’, and others as ‘relatively grounded,’ may ‘serve the 
important psycho-social function of determining the level of permissible dialogue and 
exploration’. The function of talking in a realist manner seems to be to remove a moral issue 
from ‘the realm of legitimate personal and social negotiation’: to demonstrate that one not 
only wants to abstain from certain actions, but to demand of others that they too abstain; to 
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signal the desire to punish transgressors; and so on. In contrast, we create ‘space for personal 
and social exploration, discussion, and debate’ by treating a morally salient issue in less 
objective terms (Wright et al. 2013, 355).  
Wright et al.’s interpretation is grist to the expressivist’s mill. If we are prepared to 
accept a deflationary theory of truth, then this may well support a quasi-realist view of some 
kind, albeit one that is presumably adjusted to account for people’s inconsistent approach to 
moral language. However, I think it also supports my theory, which requires no adherence to 
any one theory of truth, perhaps even more than it supports expressivism.  
Recall, from §9.1, the claim that the meaning of moral sentences can be either 
strongly or weakly indexical. Where a sentence is used in a strongly indexical sense, then we 
mean that we disapprove of x, here and now. Where a sentence is used in a weakly indexical 
sense, then the meaning of the sentence is more closely related to the tense of the sentence. 
I suggest that Wright et al.’s ‘relatively grounded’ moral utterances are weakly 
indexical ones, which are employed more to reach agreement than to demonstrate 
commitment to one’s moral judgement. If we contemplate practices in different cultures, for 
example, then we may feel that we can potentially learn from these practices, or perhaps that 
it matters less to us if people act in ways that we find immoral in such cultural contexts than 
if they perform similar actions within our own cultural contexts. Perhaps even more 
plausibly, we might consider it unlikely that we could (or should) successfully demand of 
individuals in different cultural contexts that they change their practices, although we might 
be able to persuade them via more open means of discussion, negotiation, and so on. 
In cases like this, we would do well to acknowledge the feelings and judgements of 
others, and to reflect on how we would feel in such contexts. Weakly indexical moral 
sentences are useful in such contexts. To say that, ‘if I were a member of your culture, then it 
would not be wrong for me to act as you do’, when said in a weakly indexical sense, is to 
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acknowledge that if I had been brought up in your culture, then I would not disapprove of so 
acting. Such sentences may reflect an openness to learning, or an acknowledgement that one 
is engaged in a debate with moral equals. 
‘Objectively grounded’ utterances are, I suggest, strongly indexical ones, used more 
to demonstrate commitment than to reach agreement. If a moral commitment is important to 
us, or if we feel a strong desire to punish transgressors, or if we think that there is a general 
moral consensus, then we may well be less inclined to open ourselves up to discussion about 
the commitment than we would be otherwise. This may be because we feel less comfortable 
about doing so (another predictor of moral objectivity), or because we feel confident that 
such discussions have already been satisfactorily concluded. Similarly, if we believe that 
there are pragmatic consequences when people do not behave in accordance with our 
commitments, or if we feel disgusted by those who behave otherwise, then the commitments 
are likely to be ones that we will not want to seriously consider altering. 
In cases like this, we are very likely to stand firm, to remain heavily influenced by our 
current moral feelings, and to refuse to seriously consider whether we would feel differently 
in other contexts. Strongly indexical moral sentences are useful in such contexts. In such 
sentences, to say that something was, would, or will be wrong is to say that it was, would, or 
will be such that, thinking about it now, I disapprove of it. For example, to say that, ‘if I were 
in your shoes, then I might approve of your action, but it would still be wrong’, when said in 
a strongly indexical sense, is to say that I might, in other circumstances, approve of the 
action, but it would still be such that I disapprove of it here and now. Such sentences 
demonstrate the strength of one’s commitment, and of one’s determination to adhere to it. 
I believe that the notion of strong indexicality and the opacity thesis are sufficient to 
allow that we can, sincerely and truly, say things like ‘if I were in your shoes, then I might 
approve of your action, but it would still be wrong’, or ‘if I were to stop disapproving of 
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torture, then torture would still be wrong’. According to emotive subjectivism, when the 
latter sentence, for example, is uttered in a weakly indexical sense, it means that, even if I 
were to stop disapproving of torture, then I would still disapprove of torture. This expresses a 
clear contradiction. However, when the same sentence is uttered in a strongly indexical sense 
(as I believe that such sentences typically are), it means, ‘if I were to stop disapproving of 
torture, then the torture of which the hypothetical version of myself no longer disapproves 
would still be something towards which I feel disapproval, as I think about it here and now’. 
No contradiction is involved. 
The opacity thesis is crucial here, in understanding why we utter sentences with this 
meaning, and why they do not appear to us to mean this when we do utter them. Most of what 
we think when we judge something wrong is unavailable to conscious attention. We usually 
recognise when we judge something wrong and, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, we can 
typically clearly distinguish these kinds of intuitive responses from other kinds, but we 
cannot know, purely from introspection, what it is for something to be wrong. Moreover, I 
have argued, it is not greatly important to most of us, most of the time, what it is for 
something to be wrong, where this is considered as a metaethical question.  
According to emotive subjectivism, we often shift between using weakly and strongly 
indexical senses of moral sentences, and we do so largely for pragmatic reasons. To argue for 
this view in greater detail, I will aim to show that several of Blackburn’s quasi-realist 
strategies for vindicating moral language can be applied to emotive subjectivism. In §10.4, I 
at least begin to argue that the emotive subjectivist can vindicate moral language as well as 
the quasi-realist can – perhaps better – and that this is also an improvement on some other 
metaethical theories that endorse the Humean ontology. 
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10.4. Towards a vindication of moral language 
I cannot hope to provide a full account of the ways that emotive subjectivism might vindicate 
moral language. Instead, I will try to consider some of the most significant aspects of moral 
language that might seem hard to vindicate by this theory, and to demonstrate that there 
appear to be very similar strategies for the emotive subjectivist to employ to those developed 
within Blackburn’s quasi-realism. 
 
10.4.1 Moral objectivity 
At least sometimes, our moral language appears to suggest that we are referring to stance-
independent moral facts, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Blackburn provides a 
compelling argument that it is not only realists who can explain the existence of such facts, 
but that expressivists can too: 
 
[Realists say that denying] women the vote is wrong, whatever your [sic] or 
I or anyone else thinks. Can an expressivist say as much? This is to be 
assessed in the standard way, of imagining scenarios or possible worlds in 
which you or I or others think that women should not have a vote, and 
passing a verdict on them. Naturally, these scenarios or possibilities excite 
condemnation, and so the answer is that denying women the vote is wrong, 
whatever you or I or anyone else thinks about it. In giving that answer one 
is, of course, standing within one's own moral view. One is assessing the 
scenario in the light of things one thinks and feels about such matters. But 
that is no objection, since there is no other mode of assessment possible. 
One cannot pass a verdict without using those parts of one's mind that 
enable one to pass a verdict (Blackburn 2006, 154). 
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We have seen that, given Blackburn’s deflationary theory of truth, he can move 
quickly from the argument above to the further conclusion that the relevant ‘verdict’ – that 
denying women the vote is wrong, whatever anyone thinks – expresses a true belief about a 
moral fact. However, we also saw in §10.3 that moralising does not always, or even typically, 
require or include reference to such facts: people are not implicit realists. We need not 
explain how anything like stance-independent moral facts or properties might truly exist, for 
such claims are not sufficiently widespread in ordinary moral language to require vindication. 
We must, however, explain why we often, but not always, treat our moral judgements as 
‘objective’, as the term is used in §10.3.  
I think the emotive subjectivist can use a similar argument to Blackburn’s to explain 
this. If I think of a scenario or possible world in which women are denied the vote and in 
which I fail to disapprove of women being denied the vote, then I experience disapproval. I 
disapprove of my own attitude in this scenario, and of any similar attitude, and so I call all 
such attitudes ‘wrong’. Here and now, standing within my ‘own moral view’, to use 
Blackburn’s term, I deem it wrong to deny women the vote, no matter what anyone, 
including hypothetical versions of myself, might think. 
By emotive subjectivism, anything of which I disapprove is, by definition, really and 
truly wrong (I really do, as a matter of fact, disapprove of it). I can truthfully say, therefore, 
of anything that I judge wrong, ‘it really is wrong!’ Here, the stress on ‘really’ is simply a 
useful way to propagate my attitude. 
Sinclair (2014, 430-431) suggests that an expressivist account of moral disagreement 
can profit from seeing a parallel with ‘political disputes’, broadly conceived. Just as two 
communities can stand firm while remaining open to negotiations when negotiating some 
contested territory, so two people may stand firm but remain open to negotiations during 
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moral disagreements. This is a helpful analogy, from which emotive subjectivists may 
similarly benefit. In her debate with Steve, Hasina is strongly committed to her moral 
judgement, and she has important and reflectively endorsed reasons for this. However, she 
also recognises that the question of the permissibility or otherwise of abortion is one that 
ultimately requires a communal response. Because she cares deeply about the permissibility 
of abortion, she may therefore concentrate her moral language on what is, when considered 
merely as a matter of meaning, the trivially true claim that banning abortion is, as a matter of 
fact, wrong. She may say that it is ‘universally’ wrong, by which she will mean that she 
currently feels disapproval towards the idea of anyone, anywhere, being denied access to safe 
abortion. Much as discussed in §8.3, she is likely to support such claims with non-moral 
claims about the harms caused by denying abortion, the freedom that the legal right to 
abortion gives women, and so on. 
As Stevenson (1963, 1) saw, the kind of moral disagreement that exists in cases like 
Steve and Hasina’s closely parallels the kinds of factual disagreement in which we are 
unwilling to back down. Hasina treats her disapproval of banning abortion as a fixed point, as 
she would a well-evidenced belief that legalising abortion decreases infant mortality, for 
example. In either kind of case, she can best proceed by presenting reasons for her attitude, 
while assuming that any reasonable opponent should be compelled by her arguments to either 
share her attitude or offer strong arguments of his own. Therefore, she is well served by 
talking as if engaged in factual disagreement. ‘Either it’s wrong or it’s not’, she might say. 
‘Can’t you see that these features are the morally relevant ones?’ As Stevenson saw, this kind 
of language facilitates the practical, coordinating role of morality. 
Generally, where we appear to talk as if discussing a stance-independent moral 
reality, we are being objective, in that we are using strongly indexical moral language. If I 
consider a misogynist’s claim that only men should vote, then I experience disapproval, and I 
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sincerely and accurately call the claim ‘wrong’. Given my metaethics, I must allow that his 
misogyny is only wrong in virtue of my disapproval of it, and of course I allow that he 
approves of it. However, I need not conclude that his misogyny is morally right, even relative 
to his outlook. As Blackburn (1998, 314) argues, the descriptive claim that others approve of 
things of which we disapprove is very different from the moral claim that theirs is ‘no worse 
a view’ than ours. So, the misogynist approves of his misogyny. If I consider whether 
misogyny is therefore morally permissible in any way, then I must moralise, and if I moralise 
then I must call misogyny ‘wrong’. This is a commitment which I am not willing to consider 
altering, or at least, not just because a misogynist disagrees with it. I therefore remain 
objective: I say, ‘no matter what anyone thinks, it really is wrong to deny women the vote’, 
and I mean this in a strongly indexical sense. Denying women the vote would be morally 
right only if I were to approve, here and now. 
Before considering other forms of moral language, I will briefly argue that emotive 
subjectivism is better placed to vindicate moral objectivity, as I understand it, than any 
dispositional theory of value. 
 
10.4.2. Dispositional theories of values 
The most influential dispositional theory of value is Lewis’s (1989, 113), which roughly 
holds that something is a value ‘if and only if we would be disposed, under ideal conditions, 
to value it’.1 To be ‘a value – to be good, near enough – means to be that which we are 
disposed, under ideal conditions, to desire to desire’ (Lewis 1989, 116). And ideal conditions 
are of those ‘of the fullest possible imaginative acquaintance’ (Lewis 1989, 121). Therefore, 
 
1 The full definition is: ‘Something of the appropriate category is a value if and only if we would be 
disposed, under ideal conditions, to value it’ (Lewis 1989, 113). Here, we need not worry about the 
‘appropriate category’. 
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if we want to know whether actions, motives or other things are good or not, then we have to 
approximate this level of imaginative acquaintance as best we can, by imagining ‘vividly and 
thoroughly how it would be if these putative values were realised (and perhaps also how it 
would be if they were not)’ (Lewis 1989, 121). If we desire to desire something after 
subjecting it to a rigorous process of imaginative acquaintance, then we can be at least fairly 
confident that it is good. 
 As Lewis (1989, 123) stresses, this allows for cases of knowledge and cases of 
‘ignorance and error, for hesitant opinion and modesty, for trying to learn more and hoping to 
succeed’. It allows for moral improvement to occur if we think carefully about the objects of 
our attitudes, and it allows that we may learn from the experiences of others. These are all 
undoubtedly positive features. Nevertheless, as Lewis concedes, it is highly possible that we 
will not all be disposed to value the same things, even in ideal circumstances.  
If this possibility obtains, then we cannot simply see all values as values simpliciter. 
Giving the vote to women might be good according to our value system, but it is bad by the 
misogynist’s. If female emancipation is not something that the misogynist would value under 
ideal conditions, then I must simply accept that it is bad for him. However, as Egan (2012, 
565) argues, when I think this, my thought of badness will not be an evaluative thought, for I 
do not share the relevant value system. Prinz (2007) accepts this kind of view, as does Dreier 
(1990; 2009) in his speaker relativism. However, I agree with Egan (2012, 565) that it is an 
‘uncomfortable and unsatisfying result’ of dispositionalism. We want to deny that misogyny 
is in any way good or valuable, without any error or omission, and without requiring anything 
more than the Humean ontology. 
Egan (2012, 559) argues that we can do so, by developing a ‘de se relativist version of 
a dispositional theory of value’. The idea is that we can adopt, for example, something very 
like Lewis’s account, but where ‘evaluative belief is not a matter of believing that x is 
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disposed to cause [response] R in [person(s)] Ks in [conditions] C, but of self-attributing the 
property, being someone in whom x is disposed to cause R in C.’ As Egan (2012, 573) 
concedes, this is primarily an account of evaluative belief rather than language, and so he 
requires a ‘broadly Stalnakerian’ theory of the semantic content of sentences. Roughly, an 
utterance of MU is, by convention, understood by its hearers as a ‘bid’ to add the property 
being someone in whom x is disposed to cause disapproval in C ‘to the stock of things that all 
of the parties to the conversation believe, take each other to believe, etc.’ (Egan 2012, 573).  
I suggest that emotive subjectivism can allow for something very similar, but without 
requiring anything like Stalnaker’s theory of meaning. Moreover, although Egan’s suggested 
form of dispositionalism responds to similar worries to my own, I think we do better without 
dispositionalism. Where we call some distant act of unfairness ‘wrong’, we do so, not 
primarily because we care about how (we believe) it would feel to us, or to anyone, under 
other conditions, but simply because we object to unfairness, here and now. 
 Emotive subjectivism can, I believe, explain our tendencies towards moral objectivity, 
including our rejection of moral relativism – where we do reject this – better than typical 
dispositional theories can, while remaining relatively neutral on theories of truth and 
semantic meaning. Yet on other occasions, a different kind of language is needed.  
 
10.4.3. Moral subjectivity 
If you tell me, as a decreasingly frequent meat-eater, that eating meat is impermissible, then I 
will be open to learning something. I will allow that different people have good reasons for 
holding different attitudes, and I will want to hear yours. Here, I am less interested in 
persuading you than in discovering whether you might persuade me. This case is less similar 
to a factual argument than to ones where I might be persuaded to persist with trying to enjoy 
some new flavour, for example, or to devote some time to a musician whose music has not 
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yet appealed to me. Here, I do seem to talk as simple subjectivists predict: ‘I don’t feel that 
way about it yet, but I suspect I might do so at some point’. 
In Chapter 8, I discussed various ways in which we can put pressure on one another to 
rethink the types of actions or motives that we are morally assessing, so that we may 
potentially feel different moral aliefs toward them. I suggest that, where we are open to 
reconceptualising the objects of our moral judgements and rethinking the judgements 
themselves, we signal this by talking about these judgements in less objectivist language than 
otherwise: we use MU in a weakly indexical sense. This allows ‘space for personal and social 
exploration, discussion, and debate’, as Wright et al. (2013, 354) suggest. In this kind of case, 
I will talk less of moral truths and more about different moral views. ‘I am coming to think it 
could be wrong’, I might say, ‘although I don’t disapprove myself’. By this, I mean that I am 
coming to think that eating meat is possessed of features of kinds that I elsewhere disapprove 
of, or otherwise might disapprove of. 
This type of language is used wherever we seriously consider our own moral doubt or 
error. Any plausible metaethical theory must allow that we can experience disapproval 
without being certain that what we disapprove of is wrong. As Blackburn (1998, 318) does 
within his quasi-realism, the emotive subjectivist must explain and vindicate our talk of fears 
for our own fallibility. 
Blackburn (1998, 318) argues that, to doubt one’s own moral beliefs is to consider 
first-order evaluative questions about whether they stand up to the kinds of moral thinking in 
which one ought to engage. It is to accept that, if one improved one’s thinking about the case, 
one might change one’s mind. If I am unsure whether I am correct in judging it permissible to 
eat meat, then I am acknowledging that I might come to judge otherwise, perhaps if I were to 
learn more information or think more sensitively about the pain of animals. 
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I think that the emotive subjectivist can, once more, adopt this response, or one very 
like it, by reference to weakly indexical moral utterances and the fact that we may feel very 
differently about action types or tokens depending on how we conceptually categorise them. 
This is surely something that is readily apparent to us. Indeed, consider Blackburn’s (2006, 
155) very brief example of a case of moral doubt, as follows: ‘Was he selfish and despicable, 
or prudently protecting himself in an unfortunate situation?’ Similarly, the meat-eater might 
ask, ‘is it really cruel, or is it humane? Are we killing beings with hopes and dreams, or 
merely animals that cannot be capable of such things?’ Different ways of thinking about the 
matter will elicit different feelings. Some feelings may clash with others, and some may not 
seem to relate to our typical justificatory reasons for holding moral judgements. In trying to 
make sense of this, we try to come to stable moral judgements. 
Here, I follow the quasi-realist line, by which a ‘stable’ moral judgement is one that 
would survive any of the kinds of reflection of which the judger approves, or which she 
would approve of on further reflection (Egan 2007). For the quasi-realist, any question about 
whether one’s own moral belief is true is a question about whether it is stable. The emotive 
subjectivist can follow a very similar path. It may be true that meat-eating is permissible 
insofar as I think of it as such, but simultaneously true that it is wrong insofar as I think of it 
as eating animals that people have killed. If I am to reach a verdict that it is simply one or the 
other, then I must reach a stable moral judgement regarding meat-eating. 
In such cases, I may employ weakly indexical thoughts or utterances to consider what 
kinds of features are such as to make me approve or disapprove, and whether I approve or 
disapprove of my responses towards such features. ‘I might come to disapprove if I were 
faced with the pains of animals’, I might say. Where I am relatively free of doubt, I will be 
more likely to employ strongly indexical thoughts or utterances, although I may have other 
reasons too for changing between these. 
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Sinclair (2012, 174) claims that ‘[t]hree important assumptions of moral practice are 
that moral disagreements are possible, that moral discussion is sometimes a fruitful way of 
resolving such disagreement and that reasons can be offered for and against moral claims’. I 
hope to have shown that emotive subjectivism has the resources to explain how and why 
these assumptions are correct. Of course, much more remains to be said. 
To hint at the answer to one further question, emotive subjectivism can, I think, allow 
for moral progress, as well as for moral doubt. We typically approve of consistent moral 
attitudes, and so we can and, plausibly do, each try to develop a consistent and coherent set of 
stable moral judgements. As Lenman (1999, 167) argues, the absence of anything like a 
rational justification for our fundamental moral desires nevertheless allows that ‘[w]ithin the 
system of values, interests and institutions we inhabit there is plenty for the justification of 
ethical and other claims to be’. We can aim to improve and justify our moral judgements, by 
reference to the kinds of thinking, valuing and feeling of which we approve. 
This may not be easy to achieve. It may not even be possible, or not for everyone, for 
we cannot fundamentally change many of our moral aliefs. However, we can rethink how to 
conceptualise and categorise action and motive types, and we can thereby influence how we 
feel about them. If it is habit that causes us to form our moral judgements, then – as Aristotle 
argued long before Hume – we should try to get into good habits. And given the fundamental 
relationship between harm and judgements of wrongness, these should be primarily habits of 
compassion and care for others. 
I will conclude with a further quotation from Lenman: one that is particularly salient 
for emotive subjectivism, given this theory’s thesis of strong indexicality as well as its focus 
on the habitual and social causes of our moral judgements: 
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[T]he fear that we might… become, by our present lights, contemptible, 
that the moral perspective from which our present attitudes make sense 
might be lost to us, is not always idle fantasy but may signal real dangers… 
The disintegration of our communities of judgement is a real danger but 
faith in a spurious objectivity for our values cannot meet it… If it is [just 
politics and education] that shores up our values…, the proper moral is not 
that we may no longer take our values seriously but rather that politics and 
education should be taken very seriously indeed (Lenman 1999, 174). 
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